HISTORIEK  HISTORIQUE  HISTORIC

 

Declining and rising empires: Venice, the Ottomans and Spain (I)


The decades around the year 1500 saw major changes in the political and maritime structure of the Mediterranean world. Old empires declined and new ones emerged. The old empires were Italian, maritime and centred on mercantile cities. The new empires were based on resource extraction from large territories east and west of Italy. Spain and France competed for hegemony in Italy while the Ottomans rapidly created a world power with large territories in Asia, Europe and Africa. As empire builders in an area connected by sea, the warriors of the rising empires had to adapt to maritime warfare. They did so by creating permanent naval forces, a part of the state formation process which made empire building a practical possibility. Gunpowder weapons were an important part of the change, although their relationship with progress in state formation remains a complex question. The navies were part of the organisational structure which enabled rulers to enforce control over violence and to raise taxes by selling protection to hitherto independent political units, thus creating empires .

The new Mediterranean empires were not maritime societies with dynamic merchants and large-scale shipowners. In a Mediterranean perspective, this was something new. For centuries the Italian city states had been dominant in both maritime trade and maritime warfare: northern Italy was economically and technologically the most sophisticated area of Europe; Venice and Genoa were great maritime entrepôts and shipowning cities; and Florence was a flourishing economic centre. Naval control of the Levant, in combination with a long experience of trade, also made Venice a middleman between Asia and Europe. Both Venice and Genoa owned territories and trading posts in the Levant. Venice and Florence had networks of trade using well-armed merchant galleys, while Genoa specialised in trade with huge and defensible sailing ships. Sea power, mercantile dominance and economic prosperity seemed to be inextricably interconnected. Would the new territorially-based empires be able to repeat this performance, provide security at sea in order to lower transport costs and stimulate investment in the maritime economy? Was the radical political unification of the Mediterranean a preparation for its rise into a leading centre of an emerging world economy, encompassing Europe, Africa, Asia and America?

Large-scale empire building began in the East. After the conquest of Constantinople in 1453, the Ottoman sultans began to develop Turkish naval power as a new means of imperial expansion in the Black Sea and eastern Mediterranean. They could make good use of the seafaring population in Anatolia and on the Greek islands which had once been the source of strength for the Byzantine navy. Naval bases were created and a permanent force of galleys and galley crews were established. When combined with heavy guns and efficient Janissary infantry, Ottoman galleys became a formidable weapon for imperial expansion, but the long war with Venice from 1463 to 1479 showed that the navy lacked experience. It was this inferiority which was rectified in the war with Venice between 1499 and 1502.
The Sultan used his navy for protection and regulation of trade, control of islands and coastal areas and support for imperial expansion. The activities of both Christian and Muslim corsairs were curtailed and the Mamluks of Egypt were supplied with gunners and naval experts against the Portuguese threat in the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean. Under Selim I (r. 1512–20) a dramatic expansion took place. Persia was defeated in 1514 and during 1516/ 17 the Mamluk sultanate was conquered, giving the Ottomans control over Egypt, Syria, Palestine and the holy cities of Mecca and Medina. The Mamluks had no navy, and the Ottoman navy was mobilised as a logistic and flank-supporting force to their army in this campaign. Ottoman sea power was also indirectly important for Selim’s triumphs. It meant that no Christian power was able to interfere with this struggle for domination in the Muslim world. France and Spain, the two rapidly rising great powers in the west, had for decades played with the idea of expanding their power to the Levant. In Portugal, king Manuel had attempted to intervene from the back door, through the Indian Ocean. With the growth of centralising forces and state formation in the Christian west such expansion had been possible. The consolidation of Muslim territories under Ottoman rule and the rapid state formation within this empire put an end to such ideas for centuries.

In 1522 the Order of St John, the last vestige of the western crusades, was forced to leave Rhodes after a long siege. This eliminated an irritating base for privateering and a potential base for large-scale western actions against Ottoman hegemony in the Levant. In 1526 the Turks also conquered most of Hungary, the first of several campaigns in where naval control of the Danube was essential for the logistics of the army. In a few decades, an empire with practically the same geographical configuration as the eastern half of the Roman empire had been created. Large parts of it were easily accessible from the sea and control of the sea was essential for trade and the transfer of resources between one part of the empire and another. The maritime axis Alexandria–Constantinople was especially important, as it provided the capital with Egyptian grain and made it possible to transfer resources between the two central parts of the empire. The ability to mobilise and concentrate resources was essential for early modern state and empire builders such as the Ottoman sultans. This, together with a strong desire to regulate trade and prices and ensure the supply of food and essential goods to their subjects, seems to have driven the great conquering sultans of the period 1451 to 1566 (Mehmed II, Bayezid II, Selim I and Suleyman I) to create a permanent navy. They were among the first territorial princes in Europe and Western Asia to make a serious attempt to create a working state monopoly of violence at sea through a permanent organisation.

In the western Mediterranean another empire was forming in the same period. The union between the crowns of Aragon and Castile established during the 1470s by the marriage of Ferdinand and Isabella released dynamic forces in state formation which made it more than a dynastic alliance. The two rulers developed Spain into an early modern military state, but this state also had a maritime dimension. Aragon ruled over Sicily, Sardinia and the Balearics, and the reconquista continued after the conquest of Granada in 1492 with attacks on Muslim North Africa. The new empire also faced two other challenges where control of the sea lines of communication was essential. Columbus’ discoveries in the West Indies became the starting point for a Castilian colonisation of America based on a successful claim of Spanish-Portuguese monopoly of the trans-oceanic discoveries. From 1494, France, hitherto mainly engaged in wars with England and Burgundy, began to project power into Italy and attempted to gain control over Naples, later also over Lombardy. A French-Italian conglomerate state might become the most powerful empire in Europe.

The Italian wars (1494–1559) are a classic topic in military history, but attention has overwhelmingly been concentrated on the battles on land. The sea lines of communication were, nevertheless, also of great importance and in the maritime perspective the conflict was decisive for the future power structure in the western Mediterranean. The first French attack on Naples (1494/95) had been a rapid progress down the peninsula. This is often explained by the massive French use of modern siege artillery. It was, however, also a result of close co-operation between the French army and the navy, a largely improvised force of sailing ships and galleys. A considerable part of the army was sent by sea and the fleet made demonstrations along the coast to open the way for the army. At Rapallo, 4,000 soldiers were landed and successfully attacked the enemy forces in their rear.

The main French army soon had to be withdrawn northwards, however, leaving only garrisons in important fortresses. Spain and Venice (and other powers) allied against France, a Spanish fleet brought in an army from Spain, while Venice sent galleys to support the counter-attack and the blockades of cities occupied by the French. The French fleet was too weak to challenge this combination, and the isolated French garrisons capitulated. In the next phase of the Italian wars, from 1500 to 1504, both France and Spain maintained fleets of sailing ships and galleys to secure their lines of communication to southern Italy but they did not meet in any major battles at sea. The kingdom of Naples was gained for Spain by victories on land – these were the years when the Spanish infantry gained its reputation – but the operations were based on control of the sea lines of communication.


The Ottomans, the Habsburgs and France, 1510–59


In 1516, the new Spanish Mediterranean empire was inherited by the Habsburg prince Charles. Three years later he also inherited the Habsburg territories in Austria and the Netherlands and was elected German emperor as Charles V. The new western empire was mainly connected by sea lines of communication. In the very centre of the Habsburg territories lay the other European great power, France, rich in population and often regarded as an archetype for the ‘modern’ national state. For two centuries, the Habsburg ‘encirclement’ of France became the chief determinant of French foreign policy. Much of the circle around France was in fact open seas in the Atlantic and the Mediterranean. For the Habsburgs, the sea would be essential for the free transfer and concentration of resources for military actions and state formation, and their ability to develop a coherent maritime and naval policy would be crucial for the future of this conglomerate of European and American possessions. For France, efficient sea power might cut the Habsburg lines of communication.

Initially, the conflict at sea between France and the Habsburgs was concentrated on the Mediterranean, and early rise of Habsburg naval power was practically identical with the growth of the permanent galley fleets within the Spanish empire. This growth was also stimulated by Spanish ambitions in another direction. In order both to continue the reconquista of Muslim territories and to secure the lines of communication between Spain and Italy, a series of amphibious expeditions were launched against cities in North Africa. They were especially intense in 1509/10 when Oran, Bougie, Tripoli and the harbour fort in Algiers were taken. After that Spanish expansion in North Africa began to meet effective resistance. This came not from the local inhabitants but from a group of highly skilled corsairs, led by the brothers Oruc (killed in action 1518) and Khizr (or Hizir), both usually known as Barbarossa. They began operations from La Goletta (close to Tunis) but soon extended their control to other ports. In the late 1510s the corsairs paid allegiance to the Ottoman sultan who provided them with arms and men and appointed Khizr, (by now known as Hayreddin or Kheir-ed-Din: Defender of the Faith), governor of Algiers and commander of the western Ottoman fleet.

Algiers had been taken by the corsairs from the local inhabitants in 1516 and Spanish attempts to take that city in seaborne assaults in 1516 and 1519 failed when gales destroyed their fleets. In 1529 the Spanish fort which controlled the harbour of Algiers fell to Hayreddin Barbarossa’s forces. Initially these forces had to fight both Spain and the local Muslims. Many of the warriors were refugees from Granada, and together with seamen of east Mediterranean origin, they formed an efficient maritime state in North Africa. Hayreddin was born on the island of Lesbos in the Aegean and like most of the corsairs he was of humble social origin. Some were to make a fortune as corsairs – a few rose to high positions in the Ottoman service.

From 1521 to 1529 Spain and France were involved in a large-scale war over Italy. It was to a considerable extent fought at sea, predominantly in the form of close co-operation between armies and navies along the Italian and French coasts. Galleys and sailing ships – oared vessels now began to dominate – provided gunfire, amphibious capability, blockade forces and flank support during sieges and military operations. Warfare and diplomacy were substantially questions of gaining support or submission from the Italian states, where Genoa was a chief object of interest on the maritime side. Up to 1528, the most important entrepreneur in galley warfare, the Genoese Andrea Doria, served the king of France. His galley squadron was the most efficient part of the French fleet, but he was not given command of that fleet and he became dissatisfied with French policy towards Genoa and his own business interests. In 1528 Doria suddenly entered the service of the king-emperor Charles when his contract with France ended. He changed sides shortly after his galleys had won a victory over Spain. As a maritime condottiere, Doria understood how to show his value.

In his new contract he was given the overall command of the Habsburgs’ Mediterranean fleet: the galley squadrons of Spain, Sicily and Naples, Doria’s own galleys and other galleys hired from Italian entrepreneurs. In the same year, Doria staged a coup in Genoa, which politically and economically became attached to the Habsburg camp. For the Spanish king, Doria and his family became guarantors of Spanish control over the sea lines of communication between Spain and northern Italy (and further north to Austria, Germany and the Netherlands, later called the Spanish Road) and free access to the strategically important harbour of Genoa. For Genoa, Spain provided military security and a profitable market, while Doria in his position as galley entrepreneur and commander of the fleet gained access to a large patronage system and a flow of money. This ensured his leading position in Genoa and enabled him to enforce political peace in an earlier much disunited republic.

Doria’s change of sides in 1528 gave Spain control of the sea, and the French blockade of Naples (hitherto supported by Doria) was lifted. France had to admit defeat in Italy and signed a peace in 1529. The peace gave the Habsburg King-Emperor Charles an opportunity to launch offensive actions against the Ottoman empire, both in order to relieve his Austrian lands from military pressure and to retake territories in North Africa lost to Hayreddin’s forces. One part of this was the transfer of the Knights of St John – homeless since 1522 – to Malta and Tripoli in 1530.They made Malta into a heavily fortified naval base in a strategically important position. In most operations against the Muslims, the galleys of Malta as well as those of the Pope were to co-operate with Spain.

Andrea Doria began to attack North Africa, but his forces were met by a competent defence. Another Spanish idea was to stir up a revolt against the Turks in Greece, thus making this Christian area a counterpart to North Africa. In 1532 Doria conquered Coron in the Morea (Peloponese) and defeated a hastily assembled Ottoman fleet which was sent out to meet the intruders. Sultan Suleyman realised that this navy required better leadership, and in 1533 Hayreddin was called to Constantinople and appointed Kapudan Pasha: commander-in-chief of the navy. The two most famous sixteenth century Mediterranean admirals, who recently had connected two maritime states to the growing empires, were now in command of the imperial galley fleets.

Hayreddin wasted little time. During 1534 Coron was retaken and his fleet ravaged the coasts of southern Italy and occupied Tunis. In 1535, the King-Emperor Charles was not preoccupied with other urgent tasks and he decided to concentrate his military and naval power in a large expedition to Tunis, led by Charles in person. Seventy-four galleys, 30 small galleys (galeotas and fustas) and around 300 sailing vessels with about 20,000 men carried an army of almost 30,000 men which took the city, installed a client ruler and placed a Christian garrison in the fortress La Goletta close to Tunis. Portugal, the Pope, Malta and Genoa sent contingents to the fleet. Hayreddin was unable to counter this invasion but his fleet attacked Minorca instead.

France and the Habsburg empire again went to war in 1536. The first major operation was an invasion of Provence and an unsuccessful siege of Marseilles led by the Emperor and supported by the fleet. In 1537 France and the Sultan decided to invade Italy. It is an interesting example of the restrictions in radius of Mediterranean galley warfare that the Turks regarded it as necessary to conquer Venetian Corfu – the base nearest the Italian peninsula – as a first step in their Italian operation. The attack failed, but brought the Venetians into the war. In 1538, Venice, Spain and the Pope formed a formidable fleet, but it could not unite until late in the season, as Doria with the Spanish fleet did not arrive at Corfu until early September. The allied fleet had quantitative superiority over Hayreddin’s fleet, possibly 130 galleys against 90. Both fleets were now almost exclusively oared – the attendant sailing vessels were regarded as transports.

The Ottoman fleet was in the Gulf of Prevesa on the Greek coast south of Corfu. It was a classical place for naval actions – the battle of Actium was fought here in the year 31 BC. The narrow entrance to the gulf was protected by a castle and shore batteries, which made it difficult to enter. The Christian side was joined by an army of 16,000 men in sailing ships on 22 September, but it was too late in the season to begin a formal siege. The allied forces under Doria’s command attempted to make amphibious assaults on the castle to clear the way for the fleet before its supplies had run out. These failed and, with supplies running low, the Christians had to use a northerly wind in order to retire during 27 September. Some galleys and several sailing ships straggled and were attacked by the Ottoman fleet. Doria could not counter-attack to support them. The Christian losses were not great, but the Ottomans had showed that with an inferior force they could fight off a combined Spanish-Venetian attack. In the following decades they were supreme in the Levant and a serious threat to the western Mediterranean.

That was the long-term effect. In the short run, Mediterranean galleys showed their fragility. During the weeks after Prevesa, the Ottoman fleet was decimated by a sudden storm off the Albanian coast, although the crews seem to have been saved. Doria used this opportunity to capture Castelnuovo near Cattaro in October 1538. It was retaken in the summer of 1539 by Barbarossa’s fleet, which was larger this year and could dominate the Adriatic. France had left the war in 1538 and Venice did the same in 1540. Spain and the Ottomans continued their struggle. In 1541 Charles V was in the unusual situation of enjoying peace in both Germany and Italy. He decided once again to lead a great amphibious expedition, this time to Algiers, the centre of North African corsairs. A fleet of 65 galleys and 450 other vessels of various size with about 12,000 seamen and oarsmen, was collected to carry 24,000 Spanish, Italian and German soldiers across the Mediterranean. In order to prevent the superior Ottoman fleet from interfering, the attack was launched in the autumn. It was a gamble with the weather that the emperor lost. In a gale, 15 galleys and about 150 ships with stores and artillery were wrecked against the open coast of Algiers. The defence of the city was efficient and, after four weeks, Charles decided to evacuate with the loss of 12,000 men.

France again began to fight Spain in Italy in 1542. The new power balance at sea was shown when an Ottoman fleet of 110 galleys was sent to the western Mediterranean and spent the winter of 1543–44 in Toulon. It co-operated with the French in the siege and capture of Nice in 1543, but next year Hayreddin declined to take part in a projected siege of Genoa. He apparently hoped that the French would help him to retake Tunis, but, when they declined, he preferred to chase Spanish galley squadrons and ravage enemy coasts in Italy. This was the last expedition of Hayreddin who died in 1546. His rise from a humble sailor to state builder, commander of the largest fleet in the world and one of the Sultan’s viziers, was probably the most remarkable early modern career of a seaman. France left the war in 1544 and sent its Mediterranean galleys to the Channel for a projected invasion of England. A truce was concluded between Constantinople and Spain, but the war continued at a lower scale with corsair raids and attempts to capture bases in North Africa.

In 1551 this type of warfare escalated when the Ottomans took Tripoli from the Knights of St John. Next year, France was back in the war and about 100 Ottoman galleys went to the western Mediterranean.20 They surprised Doria’s fleet of 39 galleys on its way to Naples with soldiers, but he was able to escape with the loss of seven galleys. In 1553 the Ottoman fleet returned and invaded Corsica, but the island was retaken when the Muslim fleet returned to the east. Large Ottoman fleets appeared in the western Mediterranean in 1554– 56, expeditions which culminated in 1558 when 130 galleys took part. These fleets dominated the sea in the centre of the Spanish empire, although their strategic importance for the war in Italy is little known. Spain won the war in Italy, in spite of the French-Ottoman control of the sea. The Ottomans and the French did not establish any effective co-operation in which their fleets could be used for systematic sieges of fortified places. The Ottomans achieved little visible success except devastation along the coasts, but they may have tied up considerable forces in coastal defence, created difficulties for Spanish communications and interrupted trade.

The Ottoman fleet did not use North Africa for logistics and winter ports, and this reduced its efficiency in the western Mediterranean. Apparently the Ottoman logistical system in North Africa was too weak for expeditions of this size which had to be based in Constantinople. The Ottoman failure to establish a really strong base system in the western Mediterranean made it difficult for them to dominate this area with a galley fleet. Galleys had short radii of action, and none of the two great empires had found any solution to this problem other than increasingly expensive sieges of fortified ports which might serve as bases. From such bases, local squadrons of oared vessels could launch raids, which in the long run might weaken the enemy. The idea of developing gun-armed sailing vessels as front-line warships with a longer range had more or less disappeared in the Mediterranean after the early sixteenth-century experiences which apparently were disappointments. The next decades witnessed the apogee of large-scale galley warfare in the Mediterranean, but were also a period when the limitations of galleys as instruments for control of sea lines of communication became obvious.

 

To be followed

 

 

 

  LMB-BML 2007 Webmaster & designer: Cmdt. André Jehaes - email andre.jehaes@lmb-bml.be