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Case study for onboard safety meeting Gíounding due to GPS jamming
The vessel was quite far from land, and as such a RADAR fix could not be taken. As an alternative, the OOW opted to reach out to the local navy to ascertain the vessel’s current position. As the vessel neared the port, RADAR fixes were acquired using range and bearing, and these were plotted on ECDIS through the RADAR overlay function. The vessel’s position was cross checked using the positions obtained from the local navy. The Master was called at 2200 hours on 6 December. After arriving on bridge, the OOW briefed him on the malfunction of the GPS. The Master took over the con at 2230 hours, and soon thereafter the OOW stopped verifying vessel’s position with the local navy. Engines were tested and pre-arrival checks completed at 2300 hours on 6 December. The vessel maintained various courses and speeds thereon. Meanwhile, the alarms on all bridge equipment connected to the GPS kept on reappearing, and the crew were focused on acknowledging them each time they appeared. Approximately 30 minutes before the scheduled pilot boarding time, the port control notified the vessel of a berthing delay and directed her to the anchorage. Unknown to the crew, the vessel’s actual position was approximately 2 nautical miles east of the position manually plotted on the ECDIS. The Master adjusted the course towards the anchorage with engines on half ahead. Soon thereafter the vessel ran aground on a reef at 8 knots. The vessel listed 5 degrees to starboard with no hull breach. As the vessel’s satellite phones and email communication were also non-functional, the shore management was contacted via the personal mobile phone of a crew member operating on a local SIM card. Additionally, Class was informed, and their emergency response service was activated. Salvors were engaged, and it took 48 hours for two tugs to successfully refloat the vessel. Some of the observations noted during the investigation were:
You should now perform an onboard risk assessment of the operation described. Learning from the case could be obtained by identifying the contributing factors for this specific incident to occur – and discuss whether some of the identified factors could be present onboard your ship. Key questions or points for bridge watchkeepers to discuss:
•Are there guidelines in the safety management system to identify and respond to a compromised GPS environment? A few key words to facilitate discussion:
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LMB-BML 2007 Webmaster & designer: Cmdt. André Jehaes - email andre.jehaes@lmb-bml.be
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