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Warfare at Sea 1500 - 1650 (part III)

Guns, strategy and tactics

The gradual development of guns and more advanced sailing ships gave new options for warfare at sea. Guns meant that manpower was substituted by capital and technical development in metallurgy and chemistry. It meant that fighting power (firepower from guns) could be stored during long periods and transported for long distances. Guns and effective propulsive power from the wind also gave ships the opportunity to fight at long range, far enough to eliminate or reduce the effect of infantry weapons. Advances in sailing-ship technology improved the ability of ships to sail long distances and to remain at sea even under unfavourable circumstances – heavy weather, dangerous coasts and so on. The ship and its crew became masters of the sea to a greater extent than before.

Guns and improved sailing-ship technology increased the strategic range of maritime warfare. Men required a constant supply of food and water, they required space to live in and they often fell ill or died on extended expeditions. Warships filled to capacity with fighting men could not travel long distances or stay at sea for long periods if they were to have the necessary strength to fight successfully. In contrast, guns and properly stored gunpowder could remain at sea for long periods and even travel across oceans without any reduction in their fighting potential. They did not require food, water or firewood, nor did they fall ill. The combination of wind power, effectively harnessed by the new full-rigged ship, and firepower from its guns enabled the ship to stay at sea for several months without any dramatic reduction in fighting efficiency. Gun-armed ships still required large crews, however, and the problems with health remained. Sometimes the latter became crippling and a fleet had to give up the attempt to deploy power in an area at a great distance from its base. But such events had become normal misfortunes in sea warfare. They were no longer signs that long-distance deployments were inherently impossible.

The consequences of this technically based change were far-reaching. Warfare at sea became interregional and even global. European states and commercial interests might send fleets to areas far from their bases, undertake prolonged blockades and launch attacks on trade and cities in distant waters. They could also defend long-distance trade in convoys protected by warships or by merchantmen armed with guns. This meant that power based on local resources was relatively reduced while the ability of a sea power to defend its interests and project power at long distances correspondingly increased. Naturally, it remained an advantage to have bases close to operational areas but the importance of that advantage had been reduced and was markedly less important than in warfare on land. As guns came warship they were the embodiment of sea power in a period when business interest was behind much of both the violence and protection which was the routine of warfare at sea.

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A second important consequence of the fact that guns could be a substitute for armed men at sea was that an invading army could no longer transform its manpower into efficient armed force at sea. Earlier, the fighting power of a navy carrying an invading army was the army itself. A defender might organise his own naval force and send it to sea with his army in order to stop the invasion by a decisive battle at sea but this was only one alternative. It was often not the best option for a weaker defender who would normally prefer to use the terrain and the attacker's logistical difficulties during an extended operation to beat off an invasion. The defender often found it a better alternative to concentrate his army in defensive positions on land rather than exposing it in a forward position at sea. With gun-armed warships a defender with a weaker army might prefer to meet the enemy at sea and try to defeat the invader while his stronger army could not act. In the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries the infantry became the dominating force in the armies and its reduced importance at sea meant that armies and navies became sharply distinctive organisations. Even inferior navies were often effective as anti-invasion

deterrents because army commanders were normally reluctant to expose their forces to attack at sea until the enemy fleet was decisively beaten or effectively neutralised by blockade. With gun-armed ships the sea had become an excellent theatre for stopping or delaying an invading army.

A third consequence of the introduction of guns at sea was that warships acquired the ability to attack targets onshore. Ships might bombard fortifications and support army forces along the coast. Guns could of course also be used from land against ships but at least in our period when heavy guns were scarce and immobile and many old fortifications highly vulnerable to gunfire, the mobile firepower carried by ships was often important in seaborne attacks against cities and fortresses close to the sea. As cities and coastal areas became more vulnerable to seaborne guns, gun-armed navies also became more important in the defence of such areas. The states which could maintain such naval forces gained in power.

Technology, politics and economy interacted in the transformation of warfare at sea. The introduction of guns at sea and the development of efficient sailing ships created new tactical opportunities which in their turn created new strategic conditions which had important political and economic consequences. But economic and political factors in Europe were also favourable for the evolution of new technology. It was not a simple relationship of new technology creating a new world (technological determinism) but rather a case of a rapidly changing world in which new technology was easily adapted, developed and integrated with the society. The fact that efficient guns and gunarmed warships for centuries remained practically a European speciality, which only to a limited extent was used by Asian seafarers, is a strong indication that technology in itself was not enough. The society must also have the necessary flexibility and dynamism to absorb technology and change the institutional framework in order to make the best possible use of them. There were also differences in adaptability within Europe. All European states were able to adapt to guns but there was no uniform efficiency in producing and using the new weapon system.

Much of the technical change must have been driven by ambitions to achieve tactical advantages and more ambitious strategies. The origin of the innovations, however, has been rather obscure. British authors have often taken it for granted that they had their origin, or at least achieved its practical breakthrough, in England. Henry VIII is regarded as a pioneer while John Hawkins, Francis Drake and other privateers and naval administrators who combined guns with swift and versatile ships developed the weapon system that defeated the Spanish Armada in 1588. Some (not all) students of the Portuguese activities in the Indian Ocean have found it obvious that gunnery was already the key instrument of long-distance oceanic warfare from around 1500. In that perspective, King Joao II (r. 1481–95) has been regarded as a great innovator. He sent gun-armed ships to sea in order to deter interlopers who interfered with the Portuguese trade to West Africa, but the same combination worked in the Indian Ocean.²¹ Those (very few) who have seriously studied the naval wars in the Baltic of 1509–12, 1534–36 and 1563–70 have found that major battles were repeatedly fought with guns and that certain Nordic kings and admirals had a fairly clear grasp of the potential of the new technology. On the other hand, the experienced Dutch sea commanders whose gunnery defeated another Spanish Armada in the Channel in 1639 tried to use boarding during the war with England in 1652–54. The decades around 1650 were also the heydays of fireship tactics in battles at sea. The extensive use of fireships from the 1630s to the 1690s is a sign that contemporary tacticians were aware of limitations in gunnery tactics and were searching for alternatives.

In several respects, guns were revolutionary weapons, but there were considerable difficulties in making full use of their potential power at sea. At present there is uncertainty

about how guns were mounted and loaded in sixteenth- and early seventeenth-century sailing warships. There are a number of problems which remain to be investigated before we have a clear picture of how guns were handled in different navies and how this affected tactics. Up to the early seventeenth century there is scattered evidence that guns had to be loaded with one man working outside the ship, that is, in a very exposed position. Guns may have been lashed to the side rather than allowed to recoil for reloading. There might be more than one reason for this. Some guns (especially the long culverins) might have been so long that they could not recoil fully in a small ship. Second, armed merchantmen might have had so much cargo on their decks that there were no space for the guns to recoil. Third, some ships (especially armed merchantmen) had such small crews that they could not haul out the heavy guns if they were allowed to recoil. Fourth, the current tactical doctrine might, under these circumstances or other limitations, have presumed that guns should not be reloaded under enemy fire.

One interpretation of the Spanish manner of fighting in 1588 is that many of their guns were mounted in gun-carriages which were unsuitable for rapid reloading and that the Spanish crews were not trained to reload under fire and were consequently unable to achieve even a moderate rate of continuous fire. On the other hand, early sixteenth-century naval gunnery was dominated by breech-loaders which could be reloaded fairly quickly from inside the ship. Is it conceivable that all navies would have adopted muzzle-loaders if this meant a dramatic decline of the rate of fire when all guns had to be loaded from outside the ship? Studies of ammunition expenditure in naval battles, to improve our knowledge of the realities of warfare in this period, would be welcome.

Tactics and fleet formations

The tactical consequences of guns in galley warfare are well known. The main difference from earlier galley warfare was that galleys now had a weapon for stand-off fights and for attacks on coastal fortifications. In battles between two galley fleets which were determined to fight, heavy guns became a useful additional weapon in the first stage of a battle before close combat with infantry weapons was joined. No change in the basic oared tactics, with galleys formed in line abreast formation, was necessary. Oared fleets could act with a certain sophistication in formation as they were not dependent on the wind. Galley fleet commanders might, for example, form the line of battle in a crescent in order to turn the enemy flanks or place one or more reserve formations behind the main line in order to concentrate the forces at a critical point as the battle progressed. Guns also allowed two galley fleets which were reluctant to fight a decisive battle to fight at a distance. In a chase battle, the chasing galley had an advantage as it could fire its guns from the bow while the fleeing galley had no guns aft. This may have made galley commanders with an inferior force more cautious to expose it to situations where battles might be difficult to avoid.

The tactical formations used in sailing-ship battles are less well known. We have already seen that there are unresolved questions about how guns were actually handled. There are few surviving contemporary instructions and manuals about how to fight with sailing ships and those which exist have seldom been compared. The accounts of what actually happened during battles are often brief and fragmentary. Many battle reports have not been compared with each other and with accounts of ammunition expenditure. It is, however, obvious that commanders of sailing fleets in this period faced three major problems. Sailing ships were inherently better in defensive than in offensive actions, major fleets were often heterogeneous and improvised, and it was difficult to keep the fleet in a coherent formation throughout a battle.

Guns could only be used effectively if the gun-carrying ship was able to bring them to bear on the enemy. Against enemy ships built to resist gunfire only repeated hits would have any serious effect. This posed a problem in combining effective and decisive firepower with offensive tactical movement, a problem never fully solved with sailing warships. During the sixteenth century sailing tactics emphasised the importance of forward fire, so as many guns as possible were mounted in a forward firing position. The foremost broadside guns might also be canted in order to fire as close as possible to the axial direction of the ship. This combined fire power with offensive movement. Similarly, guns in the stern were important during retreats, but in both cases the amount of fire power was limited.

Broadside guns – which were probably few in number originally – may primarily have been regarded as an anti-boarding device. For a fleet which acted defensively broadside gunfire provided a new first zone of defence which had been largely absent in the age of infantry warships. To use the same guns for tactically offensive purposes – continuous fire in order to defeat an enemy – was more difficult. Our knowledge about how contemporary naval commanders thought about this question, before the general introduction of the battle-line after 1650 is deficient. The general impression is that for a long time they were thinking more in terms of the moral and material effect of hits from a limited number of well-aimed guns than of the effect of rapid broadside fire from well-drilled gun crews. This philosophy was realistic in duels between lightly built galleys and against merchantmen with hulls easily shattered by heavy guns. However, against purpose-built warships only a massive amount of gunfire would have decisive effect.

The heterogeneous and improvised character of major fleets was a problem typical of this period. It was largely eliminated in the decades after 1650 when major investments in battle fleets, the formation of permanent officer corps and the introduction of detailed fighting instructions provided naval tactics with a new framework. In the earlier period naval commanders had to do what was possible with combinations of specialised warships of greatly differing sizes, and temporarily employed armed merchantmen with different fighting qualities. The ships were commanded by an equally heterogeneous collection of more or less professional officers (often with an army rather than navy background), aristocrats with or without military or naval training, and civilian shipmasters with or without fighting experience. During the sixteenth century armed merchantmen were often armed only with light guns and were added to fleets primarily as carriers of infantry for boarding. As such they might assist purpose-built warships with additional soldiers when the fleet became engaged with the enemy. During the seventeenth century merchantmen serving in navies were built to carry a substantial gun armament, but they were inferior in fighting qualities to purpose-built warships of the same size. With ships and commanders of very different backgrounds and with little experience of co-operation, advanced tactical performance was not to be expected. Established doctrines of tactical behaviour were at best rudimentary.

With heterogeneous fleets and without a fighting doctrine which emphasised the decisive effect of continuous broadside fire, fighting instructions of this period seldom attempt to impose formations which the fleet could maintain once battle was joined. The signals systems in use were too primitive to enable commanders of large fleets to exercise any effective command when the fleets were actively engaged. Offensively minded commanders who attempted to fight decisive battles with sailing warships saw no alternative to close combat and *melée* tactics, where individual ships or small groups of ships would attack individual enemy ships and do their best to defeat them with guns, musketry, boarding or fireships.

Fighting instructions are often emphatic in their demand for support of ships heavily engaged with the enemy and they are often careful to divide the fleet into squadrons and groups of ships and to appoint senior officers in command of each sub-division of the fleet.

Unlike later periods when this practice was intended as a command structure for the battle-line, the subdivision of fleets in this period seems to have been made mainly for reasons of morale. The senior officer of a group normally had a large ship, while other captains in the group had ships of inferior strength. The large ships were supposed to provide a kind of vanguard and break into the enemy formation, and the smaller ships in their group would support them to the best of their ability. Cohesion within groups of ships and loyalty to a group commander might compensate for the lack of professional training and the difficulties of controlling a major fleet from a flagship.

The choice between gunnery tactics or boarding might be made at a fleet level, as well as by individual commanders of ships. It was natural that a fleet which had a comparative advantage in infantry should try to board or fight at musket range while a fleet with a similar advantage in guns tried to fight a stand-off battle. Fleets with approximately the same fighting capability might leave it to the individual ship and squadron commanders, and the tactical circumstances, to determine how best to defeat the opposing enemy ships. The heterogeneous composition of the fleets made it impossible to give permanent and centralised instructions about which tactic every ship should use. However, there was not a free choice between the two systems of fighting. Gradually it became clear that a gun-armed warship was difficult to close and board by a ship of equal size and sailing qualities, especially from a leeward position. Attempts to board might normally be fought off with guns, as long as the ship remained manoeuvrable. Boarding might be attempted against damaged ships or against a numerically inferior enemy, although it was normally not to be expected that a much inferior enemy would join battle if it could be avoided. Especially from the 1630s, specially prepared fireships manned by well-trained crews provided another method of attacking unarmed ships with small vessels.

Naval commanders, however, were frequently careful in preparing formations which their fleet should keep when battle was joined. Like other questions connected with the naval tactics of this period these formations are imperfectly known. Still, a few main types of fleet formation may be discerned:

- 1 Line abreast formation inspired by army tactics and galley warfare. These formations were intended for boarding tactics after initial gunfire. The only formations of this type which are known with certainty are those of the English fleet in 1545 and the Spanish Armada of 1588.

- 2 Groups of three ships (one large and two smaller) which might be formed into a wedge-formed column or a line of three-ship groups when the fleet attacked from windward or into one or two lines ahead when the fleet sailed close-hauled and awaited an enemy attack. The Danish and the Swedish navies developed such formations during the Nordic War of 1563–70.

- 3 A group tactic where ships sailed in a line ahead formation and fired in succession at the enemy with bow guns and the broadside. After having fired, each ship tacked and reloaded her guns at a distance from the enemy, while the other ships in the group fired their guns, one ship at a time. This was the usual English formation against Spanish fleets and it assumed a passive and defensive enemy from which it was easy to gain the wind. Against ships of equal sailing quality it would hardly work.

- 4 Line ahead formation. Essentially a defensive formation in this period, used for example by the Dutch against the Spanish fleet in the battle in the Channel in 1639. Its use by the Portuguese in the Indian Ocean in the early sixteenth century is disputed.

The fact that none of these formations had achieved a predominant position by 1650 suggests that they were far from ideal, especially for offensive action against serious resistance. Indeed, the first half of the seventeenth century seems to be especially barren

in tactical innovations. Warship technology had by now developed to about the constant level it would retain until the end of the seventeenth century: warships were fairly manoeuvrable; they had an increasing number of broadside guns; and enough staying power to fight prolonged gunnery actions against ships of equal size. Up to 1650, naval commanders seem to have been little interested in the problems and opportunities which this increasingly sophisticated weapon system posed during major fleet engagements. Instead, they may have been increasingly interested in finding determined and loyal captains who could train efficient crews of good sailors and gunners. This was the most important requirement for normal naval duties in this period of long wars over the sea lines of communication: patrolling, escorting, blockading and attacks against enemy shipping. Major fleet contests were rare and if individual ships were manned by good teams of officers and men they would probably have the advantage in a *melée* type of battle. Naval commanders were responsible for decisions about when and where battles should be fought, and their tactical skill might be tested in preliminary manoeuvres to gain the wind from the enemy, but when the battle was joined the individual skills of the captains and their crews would be decisive.

It would require a period of intense and repeated fleet engagements, and a dose of tactical inspiration from the new type of warfare on land, to achieve a new tactical paradigm in the European navies. This occurred during the period 1650–80, with the three Anglo-Dutch wars as especially important trend-setters for naval reorganisation. Somewhat belatedly, guns were acknowledged as the main and decisive weapon at sea, and tactics were determined by the overriding importance of achieving massive and decisive effect on the enemy through continuous broadsides fired by well-drilled gun crews from battleships formed in line ahead.

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Why are Lifeboats Killing Seafarers

By Nick Yatsenko, Master Mariner

During my life at sea, I was always anxious during lifeboat drills. One of my relatives was employed on a MSC container carrier as an Engineer Watchkeeper, and during his routine inspection inside the free-fall lifeboat, the craft suddenly released and fell into the water while a ship was underway. He was lucky enough to survive and suffered only severe injury to his knee, and since the vessel was close to the shore so he was evacuated by the helicopter. In the hospital, he had a surgery and then spent another year recovering. When I was working for Maersk Line, one of our ships reported that a rescue boat accident resulted in one crewmember being killed instantly. Another crewmember was seriously injured. Unfortunately, there is no comprehensive statistics on lifeboat accidents, but there is an ample amount of research showing a scary outcome. To name a few studies, from 1992-2004, marine insurer Gard "recorded 32 cases of accidental release of lifeboats. Five cases were without injury to people (there are certainly much more, but these five have been reported because they involved P&I claims), the others caused 12 deaths and injury to 74 people. Among the people injured there were several very serious cases of head and spine injury, some causing paralysis or possibly leading to death at a later stage. There were also a few cases where members' vessels have picked up drifting lifeboats at sea – boats which had obviously fallen from the ships they belonged to." In 2001, the Marine

Accident Investigation Branch (MAIB) published a review of a lifeboat and launching systems accidents covering a 10-year period from 1991, where seven people were killed and 10 injured.

Some of the recent cases of lifeboat accidents:

- Thomson Majesty Accident – Five Crew Killed During Lifeboat Drill on Cruise Ship
 - Lifeboat Drill Accident: One Killed, Four Injured in Fall Aboard Harmony of the Seas
 - Rescue Boat Accident on Norwegian Breakaway Injures Four.
 - Lifeboat Accident on NCL's Pride of America Sends Two Crew Members to Hospital
 - MTM Westport: Fourth Seafarer/Lifeboat Death in Two Months
- One seafarer died and two were injured on Friday, 21 November in an incident involving what appears to have been a fast rescue craft. It is the fourth lifeboat/FRC fatality in the past two months.

Details of the incident remain sketchy. German-language newspaper Spiegel says that the boat fell 11 metres, 30 feet, into the water from the chemical tanker MTM Westport resulting in the death of a 57 year old seafarer and injuries to two others who were thrown out of the boat on impact. The Hong-Kong-flagged vessel with officers and crew from Myanmar, Ukraine and Russia, was at anchor in the North Sea off the Elbe estuary.

In May 2014 MTM Westport was detained in Argentine due to nine deficiencies, none involving lifeboat or FRC equipment

- Sailor Killed, Two Others Injured in Apparent Lifeboat Accident Off Germany
- Lifeboat Failure Leads to Fatalities Aboard Enesco Rig



As the most of the accidents occurred during routine drills and maintenance activities, the main causes are design failure, lack of maintenance, and lack of proper training. "The equipment failure was reported to be the most common cause of accidents, within which quick release mechanism failure was identified as the most frequent cause," according to a report by the Nautical Institute. In response to the growing number of lifeboat accidents, the IMO has released new SOLAS Regulation III/1.5 and the amendments to Chapter IV of the LSA Code concern on-load release mechanisms fitted to new and existing cargo and passengers vessels. SOLAS Regulation III/1.5 also specifies other important dates: "For ships constructed on or after 1 July 2014, on-load release and retrieval systems shall comply with the LSA Code, as amended by Resolution MSC.320(89); and Member Governments are encouraged to ensure that ships constructed on or after 20 May 2011 but before 1 July 2014, on-load release and retrieval systems shall comply with the LSA

Code, as amended by Resolution MSC.320(89).” For vessels constructed prior to 20 May 2011, any on-load release systems that do not comply with paragraphs 4.4.7.6.4 to 4.4.7.6.6 of the revised LSA Code must be replaced at the first scheduled drydocking after 1 July 2014, but no later than 1 July 2019. For the ships which are awaiting for the modification or fitting of the new design on-load release mechanism, the IMO has issued the “Guidelines for Evaluation and Replacement of Lifeboat Release and Retrieval Systems” and advise that Fall Preventer Devices (FPDs) are to be used with each existing RRS, in accordance with MSC.1/Circ.1327 “Guidelines for the Fitting and Use of Fall Preventer Devices (FPDs)”. Some of the current requirements for the lifeboat/rescue boat inspections and maintenance are:

- Davit-launched lifeboats weekly moved from stowed position (SOLAS III/20.6.3)
- Monthly rescue boats other than a lifeboats launching (SOLAS III/19.3.3.6)
- Quarterly launching lifeboats & rescue boats (SOLAS III/19.3.4.3 & .6, MSC/Circ. 1206)
- Six monthly free-fall lifeboat drill (SOLAS III/19.3.4.4, MSC/Circ. 1206)
- Considering all the accidents, do you think it is viable to break the boats from its stowed position every week? Or even worse to launch them with the crew inside every 3 months



The Marine Accident Investigation Branch (MAIB) went even further and recommended that the IMO undertake a study on the present value, need and desirability of lifeboats. While I’m not ready to argue the present value of the lifeboats, I’m confident that only a change in on-load hooks design is not good enough. Many accidents occurred due to the failed winch operation, damaged wire or some minor imperfection such as remote wire control. I believe more radical changes are required, for example: Reduce requirement for the davit-launched lifeboats to be moved from stowed position from weekly to monthly or even quarterly. Reduce the launching of the lifeboats & rescue boats from quarterly and monthly respectively to annually. Or even more radically, test the off-load and on-load release mechanism by shore contractor only while the boat in stowed position, of course with the additional securing arrangements. Therefore completely removing the requirements to launch the boat with the crew inside. The crew has been trained how to use the survival craft during their STCW courses which are compulsory. During the external inspections the inspector, such as port state control can test the knowledge by asking relative questions. I’m very confident that in a case of emergency the crew would be able to lower the boat, start the engine, let go the hooks and steer away from the vessel.

Source : Gaptain

Lifeboats: born to be unsafe?

... incidents were regularly occurring with lifeboats as a result of: Design of release mechanisms; Training of crew; Maintenance of lifeboats; and Poor operational practices ...

The wave of emotional criticism and difficult to answer questions driven by The Sewol disaster prompted many discussions about safety of passengers on board of ferry vessels and usage of lifeboats as the main mean of survival. Clay Maitland on his web page puts a number of questions about use of lifeboats in "[Back to the future](#)" article. In particular he says:

One of the main problems seems to have been the use of all-enclosed boats, which make it infinitely harder to operate their launching mechanisms. These arrived on the scene with the very best of motives – to provide protection and shelter for the occupants against the elements, but is any of this really needed?...

Enclosed boats, with their on-load hooks, might seem to answer so many problems, but do these difficulties really exist? Free-fall boats are said to terrify a good proportion of seafarers who find themselves sailing with them. It never used to be so frightening, or so complicated, when open boats that weren't death traps were carried and crews could familiarise themselves with them without prayers for preservation. But year after year, as the talking goes on, so have the accidents. They happen on well-maintained ships, and those less so. They involve expert seamen and relative novices ...

From my experience as seagoing master mariner with more than 30 years at sea I can suggest two from possibly many answers Why situation is like this?:

1. Life boats came to the twenty first century from sail-ship era when they served much smaller vessels and much more trained (in use of boats) crews. It has to be remembered that ship's boats (barges, longboats, cutters, whaleboats, gigs, jolly boats, launches, dinghies, punts, etc.) were in constant, every-day use those times and for many purposes such as: mooring and anchoring operation, delivery of crew and stores to and from shore, bringing goods (cargo) on board of ship, towing the ship in calm weather, abandoning of vessel in case of danger, etc. One can see that life-saving duty, which today is the only assignment for the ship's boats, was one from many and not the most important one. I mean that boats were not especially designed for life-saving operations as they designed today. Just to the contrary, they were primarily designed for the mercantile utilisation and whenever necessary were also used in case of emergency. Obviously routine use made crew very familiar and professional in operation of these boats. This tradition of training by usage was dying hard but steady. So, even in the second part of twentieth century boat practice was compulsory element of marine education. Nowadays it does not exist anymore because the boats themselves ceased to exist and gave way to enclosed lifeboats. But if in former times ship's boats were relatively light and either towed astern or were secured on deck and then lowered down from 2-3 meters high, today's reality is that heavy lifeboats made of plastic have to travel 10-20 (or more) meters down the ship's hull to reach water. Just have a look at the modern car carrier, tanker and container ship and one will readily understand why operation of such boats is "so frightening, and so complicated".

2. The problem with modern lifeboats is primary in the multi-function goal they were supposed to achieve: "to answer so many problems". In general, they have to be enclosed, self-propelled, with sprinkler fire-fighting system, able to be lowered remotely from inside, have falls and painters cast-off from inside and, finally, must be equipped with on-load release mechanism. And of course be of reasonable price. Naturally, all these difficult to meet criteria became a birth trauma of this adopted child of ship's architects whilst cost

effectiveness prevented any positive improvement all these many decades since its birth. Thus, clumsy original design was later attempted to be patched by equally unsuccessful modifications. Ineffective in the bigger part because of licensing problem, when each manufacturer has to improve his own licensed device which makes uniform approach impossible. Because of IMO strict but in many cases ill-founded and technically difficult to achieve requirements, lifeboat which was designed to serve the purpose of saving human life, is in fact, a device which is very dangerous in operation, almost useless in case of distress, very expensive in service and undoubtedly subject for many more future circulars, recommendations and other 'Improvements' all futile and senseless but giving enough space for bureaucrats to show their activity.

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Shipbuilder VR App now available in Play Store

A demo of the Shipbuilder VR module launched at the end of June is now available to the public as an app in the Play Store. "Following the module's successful launch we received various requests to enable users to look around in the virtual reality environment," says Geert Schouten, director of the Dutch ICT company Shipbuilder which developed the module. "In order to allow as many people as possible to discover this groundbreaking product we have now made it available in a demo environment. This takes people on board a vessel and shows them all the data relevant to each area."

Worldwide demos

The demo VR environment offers a fine impression of what the Shipbuilder module has to offer. "This is simply the beginning of the demonstrations we aim to give," says Cees Verkerk, manager of Marketing & Communications. "We can show the possibilities of Shipbuilder live to anyone with an internet connection anywhere in the world. If, for example, we change the displayed pump or drive shaft of the vessel, the visitor will immediately be able to see this happen live in the virtual reality environment. This clearly illustrates the benefits of Shipbuilder VR." The demo app is available for Android smartphones and tablets, while the full Shipbuilder VR module can also be used on a PC.

Benefits for yards and operators

Shipbuilder VR offers many benefits for yards and operators alike. Even before technicians go to a yard to work on the construction or maintenance of a vessel, they can examine the space where they will be working and immediately see which materials will be required. Operators also have many advantages if the yard where they are having their vessel built or maintained offers Shipbuilder VR, as they can see in real time whether the planned work, materials and parts correspond to their wishes, and follow the progress live.

See It Live -instructions-

[Click here to download Shipbuilder VR](#) in the Play Store and install it on an Android smartphone or tablet. Once installed, open the app and choose a demo with or without VR goggles or Cardboard. If the app is used without virtual reality glasses, you can simply tap

your fingers on the Shipbuilder logos to open the menus. Of course, you will get the best experience if you use Shipbuilder VR with Google Cardboard or a VR headset such as Samsung Gear VR. If the app is viewed with VR goggles, the menus can be opened by moving the white dot to the Shipbuilder logos. For the best experience, however, simply contact Shipbuilder for a demo. Shipbuilder is a pioneering ICT company and the developer of the intelligent online Shipbuilder platform. Integrating all data related to a project, Shipbuilder is a game changer for the maritime industry. It enables users to easily and efficiently specify, design, build and maintain all types of vessel. The Shipbuilder platform is unique in the maritime sector for the way it provides insight into all the required data in an integrated environment, and a trendsetter in the field of data management. It applies the smartest IT technologies within the maritime industry in an optimal, well-structured way by replacing separate files and excess e-mails with a knowledge bank that can be used during the entire lifespan of a maritime project. The Shipbuilder team has over 20 years of hands-on experience in the maritime sector, combined with a very clear vision for the future.

Inséré 14/09/17 BOEKEN LIVRES BOOKS Enlevé 14/10/17

“Een eeuw Radio Holland 1916-2016”

BOEKBESPREKING door : Frank NEYTS

Dit boek gaat over de geschiedenis van Radio Holland. En dus over spannende, baanbrekende technologische ontwikkelingen in de twintigste en huidige eeuw. In 1916 werd het bedrijf opgericht onder de naam Nederlandsche Telegraaf-Maatschappij Radio-Holland. Het detacheerde radiotelegrafisten op koopvaardij schepen en leverde en onderhield de apparatuur aan boord van schepen en kuststations. Na de Tweede Wereldoorlog ontwikkelde Radio-Holland zich tot een maritieme serviceprovider en ontplooide het activiteiten aan wal, zoals landmobiele communicatie en de installatie en onderhoud van beveiligingssysteem. De geschiedenis van Radio-Holland gaat ook over mensen. Over radiotelegrafisten (later radio-officieren), technici, service engineers, inspecteurs en directeuren. En over mensen ‘buiten’ het bedrijf, zoals scheeps- en werfeigenaren en enkele belangrijke leveranciers. En ze reflecteert belangrijke gebeurtenissen als de uitbreiding van de Rotterdamse haven, de hoge vlucht van de Nederlandse scheepvaart en bedrijfs- en pleziervaart en de doorbraak van de computer. “**Een eeuw Radio-Holland**” geeft een fascinerend overzicht van de begindagen van de radiotelegrafie tot de allernieuwste ontwikkelingen als satelliettechnologie en de alsmaar toenemende ‘connectivity’. Anno 2016 is Radio Holland Group BV met zijn werkmaatschappijen, waaronder Radio Holland Netherlands, een van de grootste wereldwijde spelers als het gaat om geïntegreerde communicatie- en navigatiesystemen en de bijhorende ondersteuning aan boord van schepen. “**Een eeuw Radio Holland 1916-2016**” (ISBN (978-90-5194-519-5) telt 272 pagina’s werd op groot formaat als hardback uitgegeven. De tweede titel, “**A century Radio Holland**”, geeft aan dat het boek tweetalig (Nederlands-Engels) werd uitgegeven. Aankopen kan via de boekhandel. Of rechtstreeks bij Uitgeverij Van Wijnen.

Inséré 14/09/17 DOSSIER Enlevé 14/10/17

New Fuel Regs Drive Scrubber Business

By Tom Mulligan

The Exhaust Gas Cleaning Systems Association and its members are preparing to meet higher demand for gas scrubbing systems to bring SO_x emissions in line with the targets set by the IMO's 2020 fuel sulfur content proposals. As previously reported by this correspondent in Maritime Reporter and Engineering News (December 2016 issue, page 24; January 2017 issue, page 28), the IMO has come in for some severe criticism over its proposals to introduce a global marine fuels sulfur content cap of 0.5 percent (mass/mass) by the year 2020. However, the organization can take some encouragement for its ideas from the reactions of the Exhaust Gas Cleaning Systems Association (EGCSA) and major marine scrubbers manufacturers, most of which have expressed their satisfaction with and support for the proposed regulations. "In October, IMO made the only correct and sensible decision. No delays – from 2020 the global limit on marine fuel sulfur outside of ECAs will be 0.5 percent," enthused Don Gregory, Director of the EGCSA, while Roger Holm, President of Wärtsilä Marine Solutions, observed that "the introduction of dual-fuel engines and the increasing use of LNG as a fuel will provide a viable means of complying with the sulfur cap requirements." Gregory went on to say that it was not only for EGCSA members that the proposals bring certainty, but also the whole marine industry and its supplier base. He called it a "definite" decision that was beneficial to human health and the environment, and one that opens the door for businesses to take action.

Start Planning Now

"So, is that job done?" he asked. "Action plans must be put in place now. IMO's Marine Environment Protection Committee has also tasked its next sub-committee meeting with developing a work plan to ensure a smooth implementation, and the EGCSA and its members are ready and able to take full part in these preparations. "EGCSA strongly believes that communication, transparency and co-operation between all stakeholders will ease the changeover process. After some 350 ship installations, scrubbing is now well-established and can no longer be considered a new technology. Needless to say, technology and regulatory development is ongoing – in reality it does not stop and there is always a need to build on experience." With this in mind, the EGCSA recently hosted a second workshop, in which members, associate members and a number of guests viewed presentations from marine industry stakeholders outside of the Association to provide a platform for discussion on shipowners' perspectives of scrubbing, scrubbers and the environment, and of the refinery and fuel suppliers' view of the 2020 proposals.

Future Fuel Prices: The Reality

"With significant overcapacity, low freight rates and poor vessel values, many sectors of the shipping industry have faced a very tough time of late. It is therefore unsurprising that financial uncertainty was one of the themes of discussion," Gregory stated. "EGCSA's view is that the future price realities of low-sulfur fuel should not be underestimated and that it is vital that ship operators carefully evaluate all the various payback scenarios when considering how to comply. Although using low-sulfur fuel may seem the obvious choice, it could easily render a vessel uncompetitive at the price differentials expected in 2020 and the easy option may well not be the best."

Washwater Discharge Quality

Working with Euroshore, the association of European port reception facility providers, the EGCSA has been taking a science-based approach to the quality of scrubber washwater discharges. A new washwater sampling program is currently underway for the European Sustainable Shipping Forum to address the type, source and concentration of material discharged overboard and the results of laboratory analysis are available for both the European Commission and the IMO to view. The EGCSA has said that it was reassuring that if the washwater discharge criteria were to be revised there would be a waiver in the Exhaust Gas Cleaning System Guidelines for those early adopters that have taken part. Within the research program to date, no samples have exceeded the IMO's limits on polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons (PAH) – these chemical compounds are an indicator of oil content and analyses have shown that the concentrations of these substances can be up to 30 times less than in water discharges from oil and gas production platforms.

“Knowledge, Not Rhetoric”

The aim of the EGCSA/Euroshore sampling programs is to enable a clear and even application of scrubber discharge rules across Europe and in locations where open and closed loop scrubbers can be used: “Residual fuel and scrubbers can be the most cost-effective and environmentally sustainable method of SOx compliance and EGCSA will use knowledge and data rather than rhetoric to answer questions and explain the benefits,” stated Gregory.

Scrubbers offer the only alternative to compliance by fuel, not only controlling SOx but also particulate emissions,” he added. “EGCSA members have the capacity and resources to meet demand, market conditions are favorable and we have had the green light from IMO for 2020. It is now investment decision time: this is an opportunity for shipowners.”

Manufacturers Poised for Action

Meanwhile, Wärtsilä Marine Solutions President Roger Holm has said that the company's proactive development of exhaust gas cleaning systems and broad offering in gas and dual-fuel engine technologies means that the company is in a strong position to help ship owners implement plans for compliance with the new regulations: With its technology certified to IMO gas cleaning systems standards and with the recent approval of its exhaust gas cleaning systems by the Singaporean flag state authorities (an approval recognized across all Asian flag states), Holm said that the introduction of dual-fuel engines and the increasing use of LNG as a fuel will provide a viable means of complying with the sulfur cap requirements. DuPont has also been quick off the mark in promoting its marine scrubber technology as a viable solution to meet the global sulfur cap: “Abatement technology such as a DuPont Marine Scrubber is the only way to continue shipping operations as usual with heavy fuel oil of up to 3.5 percent sulfur content while remaining in compliance come 2020,” the company said. “A DuPont Marine Scrubber enables any vessel to meet sulfur emission limits without switching to expensive low-sulfur fuel when entering an ECA. This economic and highly reliable compliance option allows for ‘business as usual’ bunkering. With a scrubber, there is no need for fuel-switching,” it asserted. “The DuPont Marine Scrubber has ‘run-dry’ capability and no by-pass, allowing vessels that travel in and out of ECAs to comply with regulations: a single scrubber can meet 0.1 percent and 0.5 percent sulfur requirements.”

Compliance and Retrofit: Key Concerns for Shipowners

Technology solutions provider Goltens had this to say on the subject: “The looming deadlines and pending approvals for a variety of environmental emission regulations are making compliance and retrofit a key concern of most shipowners around the globe. In a

proactive response to this, Goltens has expanded its competency beyond the ballast water space and made further investments to help shipowners navigate this complex and costly compliance process. Compliance with IMO ECA regulations is becoming a large concern for owners, and, with additional deadlines approaching, for the existing fleet this means retrofit and the consideration of possible compliance solutions ranging from exhaust scrubbers to fuel conversion and boiler retrofit options. Goltens Green Technologies (GGT) is using its proven process to consult and retrofit these technologies with a strong focus on limiting the cost and operational impact on owners." One option is to modify vessels to run on emissions-compliant fuel types like LNG or low-sulfur marine gas oil (LSMGO). Goltens said that outside of the LNG fleet, conversion to LNG is rarely cost-effective in a retrofit situation but that conversions to accommodate the use of LSMGO can generally be made with only minor modifications and significantly less capital investment. These options include LSMGO cooler installation and LSMGO fuel conversion for LNG main boilers.

(As published in the March 2017 edition of Maritime Reporter & Engineering News) Source : Marinelink

Inséré 16/09/17 NIEUWS NOUVELLES NEWS Enlevé 16/10/17

Underwriters get ready for crewless ships

Autonomous ships are being explored by the cargo industry, giving marine insurers about five years to determine the costs of covering a crewless ship for risks that can occur at sea. And the lack of historical data typical of any new technology is complicating the process of underwriting the risks of unmanned ships. "As insurers, we need to get data," said Andrew Kinsey, a former ship's captain and now a New York-based senior marine consultant at Allianz Global Corporate & Specialty S.E. "We need a method to safely and effectively implement unmanned vessels and get the data we need," Mr. Kinsey said. He suggested a convoy scenario, where several unmanned vessels would be chaperoned by a manned vessel, "riding herd, like a sheepdog," he said.

An autonomous vessel would be best suited to replace dry-bulk carriers that operate in intercontinental trade, according to three-year research project Maritime Unmanned Navigation through Intelligence Networks, as these ships travel slowly, transporting cargo such as timber or steel in long, uninterrupted ocean voyages "

The insurance industry has been at the forefront of most pioneering projects now covering drones, satellite launches, satellites in orbit, test flights, remotely controlled underwater vehicles and a number of other automated products," Sean Woollerson, London-based senior partner at JLT Specialty Ltd., said in an email. "But a vessel being operated remotely from onshore will bring unique challenges in the developing of a fully automated complex key component for the supply chain. Those challenges include pirates, a fire at sea and the time involved to reach the ship if a computer malfunctions Alan Jervis, founder of Marine, Transportation and Energy Insurance Experts, a consultant to the worldwide insurance, risk management, shipping and transportation industries based in Toronto, points out that a ship is different than other vehicles that may operate autonomously.

For one, a cargo ship will be isolated on the ocean. "One of the duties of the crew is to ensure the cargo is inspected, that it doesn't leak or break through and cause a fire," Mr. Jervis said. Shipping services provider Clarkson P.L.C. puts the number of cargo ships operating now at 9,600. Though none are unmanned, crewless smaller vessels are

expected to be in use in three to five years, with larger merchant ships, those carrying oil and heavier cargo, arriving in 10 to 15 years, according to the Royal Institute of Naval Architects, a London-based professional organization whose members work in the design, construction, maintenance and operation of marine vessels and structures. Europe is prime territory for their use, facing issues such as increased cargo volume and environmental requirements and a decline in the number of sailors. So the Europe Commission funded the three-year MUNIN research project to investigate the possibilities of unmanned ships. MUNIN, completed in August 2015, used 10 years of global manned ship data to compare risks of manned ships to those of unmanned ships and projected that an unmanned ship would have one-tenth of the risk of a manned ship in foundering and collision, in which human error often plays a role. The analysis also predicted a savings of \$7 million over a 25-year period per ship in fuel use and crew supplies and salaries.

This is less about pros and cons of a crew and more about how insurers can analyze risk," Tom Hoad, London-based head of innovation at Tokio Marine Kiln Group Ltd., said in an email "Undoubtedly one of the benefits is that better informatics means that insurers might be in a better position to calculate risk," Mr. Hoad said of the advanced modeling tools risk managers use to determine risk. "Perhaps one of the downsides, though, is the question of what new risk emerges from not having a crew."

To Mr. Jervis, liability and a credible backup plan if something goes wrong at sea would be paramount to cover the millions of dollars of cargo generally on ships. "There wouldn't be anyone there if there was a breakdown of the computer systems," Mr. Jervis said. "You could have a train break down in the city of Chicago and a crew could come in minutes, but the Atlantic can be a one-week voyage and the Pacific two to three weeks."

When it comes to drone technology in any line of transportation, there is no "one-size-fits-all" approach. "Insurers have to look at every risk on a case-by-case basis and decide what the individual threats are," Mr. Hoad said.

Typically insurers calculate risk by comparing the known volatility of a similar class to the new one, he said. For example, light aircraft gave the industry more data about unmanned aerial vehicles.

But vessels have unique risks, such as pirates. Although the Royal Institute of Naval Architects considers pirates to be "virtually a nonissue for fully unmanned ships," it cites the lack of crew to take hostage and the ease of creating control systems that cannot be operated by nonauthorized personnel. "Pirates would need an ocean-going tug to steal the ship or cargo," the organization said in a January statement. With 23 years in the Merchant Marines, including 13 as captain of five vessels, Mr. Kinsey disputes that, saying an unmanned vessel at sea would be at higher risk of piracy. Speaking from experience with pirates, he said: "I believe that a human presence on board with active piracy measures in place is an effective deterrent to a pirate boarding."

Source: Business Insurance

Inséré 18/09/17 HISTORIEK HISTORIQUE Enlevé 18/10/17

Warfare at Sea 1500 - 1650 (part IV)

SEAMEN, SOLDIERS AND CHANGING MARITIME SOCIETIES

The sea – a violent place of work

For the individual, warfare and violence at sea were connected with opportunities and risks. The opportunities were the possibility of upward social mobility through success in warfare, profits from trade protected and promoted by violence, and the spoils of legal and illegal plunder. The risks were those usually connected with early modern warfare: death or illness due to hardship and contagious diseases and, less commonly, by wounds inflicted during combat. In addition, seamen had to face the risks of the sea: shipwreck and accidents at work. Many seamen became victims of violence. They were killed, robbed of their possessions, held as prisoners or enslaved.

Although many sailors must have preferred to earn their wages through peaceful seafaring, the European mercantile and seafaring communities were not uniformly peaceful and innocent victims of violence and wars. Violence, used in acts of aggression as well as for protection, was part of the tradition and the professional skill of seamen. Coercion of competitors and various restrictions on trade, which had to be upheld by armed force, were common in medieval and early modern Europe. The long-distance sea lines of communication within Europe were controlled by the groups which were most efficient in protection and coercion. Private violence made the seas insecure and transportation more expensive for the European economy, but it was often profitable for those who used it with skill. This behaviour was also part of the profit-orientated use of violence which characterised European overseas ventures in trade, colonisation, piracy and the slave trade. From around 1500 the scope for such ventures increased dramatically and European seamen became involved in violent activities on a global scale. It is not an unjustified simplification to say that the chief European export product in this period was violence, and the technology and organisation associated with violence. To most non-Europeans of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, Europeans were men who came in ships in order to conquer, plunder, trade and enforce protection.

European sailors were bred in this environment where they were expected to use violence. They had to defend valuable goods and the ship against predators and they had to sail into areas where they, as foreigners, might be met with hostility and coercion. Neutral shipping was often captured during wars unless it was well protected. The seas were largely beyond the control of the states, and the coastal regions and maritime cities were often on the fringe of centralised control from territorial states. The states were either too weak to control maritime violence or allowed it in some tacit understanding with the pirates, smugglers and interlopers in monopoly trade who lived in the coastal regions. As long as these seafarers did not use violence against the rulers' subjects, states might close at least one eye to how they were earning their money abroad. The eye which was kept open often looked more for how the state and the ruling elite might share from the profits of violence rather than for how the state should suppress it. Civil wars, rebellions and religious conflicts which for long periods reduced the power of centralised states also had their consequences at sea. Seafarers were deeply involved in these wars and combined the search for profit with religiously and politically motivated actions against domestic and foreign enemies. To a large extent the sea had the character of a violent and lawless frontier zone.

Private violence at sea might also be perfectly legal, at least within the area where the seafarers had their domicile. The state might empower a shipowner or a merchant to seek compensation for ships or goods lost to foreigners by capturing ships from the country which was responsible for the losses. Such 'letters of reprisal' could be issued in times of peace and they naturally often caused counter-reprisals. If formal war was declared the state might empower privateers to carry out trade war and other acts of violence against enemies of the state. States might also give commercial monopoly rights to chartered companies together with legal rights to uphold the monopoly by violence. This violence might be directed against other Europeans or against non-Europeans who might be forced to trade under threat, subjected to European 'protection', or simply robbed. In practice,

the legal and illegal uses of violence at sea were mixed and intertwined in a complicated way during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Privateering and piracy were not fully separated and the legal questions surrounding European behaviour beyond Europe were not settled in this period. The concept of 'no peace beyond the line' was invented to limit the political consequences in Europe of violence between Europeans in America, Africa and Asia (that is, in areas considered to be 'beyond the line'). Even in the Mediterranean, an area which had been a centre of trade for many centuries, private and unofficial violence, small-scale wars and piracy were common, and a serious threat both to peaceful trade and the coastal population.

In this world, seamen in well-armed ships who were able to fend for themselves had better possibilities of surviving and get a share of the profit from violence, protection and high-risk activities. European merchants and investors often looked for profit from 'discoveries', colonisation, slave trading, longdistance trade in dangerous waters, interloping trade in trade monopoly areas as well as piratical or privateering activities against European ships and colonies, but they had to find seamen who were willing to sail on these high-risk ventures. There are few signs that the number of such seamen was a serious limitation on their activities. Violence usually gave the individual seaman some chance of sharing the spoils, and wages on high-risk ventures were probably better than in other occupations. However, there must also have been a special culture and mentality in many European seafaring communities in which the use of violence against foreigners and people with different culture, language and religion was tolerated or even encouraged. Behaviour which would have been socially upsetting and morally revolting at home (pillaging of more or less defenceless ships or villages, for example) was acceptable if the victims were foreigners with a different language, religion or race.

Seamen, societies and states

The often intimate connections between private profit and efficient use of violence were important as a framework for the developing European navies. Much of the practical experience of warfare at sea, especially at long distance, accumulated within the private sphere of the societies. Merchants and investors in various ventures at sea gained considerable competence in how ships should be built, equipped and manned in order to be successful in defensive and offensive undertakings. The European tradition of convoys organised by merchants and cities was strong and continued in the early modern time both as a private form of protection and as an activity organised by states. State-controlled navies were developed as instruments for power projection, as anti-invasion and coast-defence forces, and as escort forces for trade. But the latter function of the navy was something the mercantile groups were likely to have to pay for and they might prefer to protect themselves rather than pay a state for a service which they could not control. The rulers of the states might on the other hand use this mercantile competence by hiring private ships for their navies and let the private interests organise provisioning and manning. They might also use it by integrating the private interests into the machinery of the state and give them the authority to organise navies with the competence they had gained in the private sector.

One or more of these forms, as well as intermediate forms of integration between the states and the private groups, were tried by nearly all European states in this period. The growing navies of the state could thus profit from the wide range of experience which European seafarers had gained in their attempts to profit from their skills in using violence. Nations with a dynamic private maritime trade seldom had great difficulties in creating and expanding navies at surprisingly short notice. The human element in naval warfare, the experienced seamen and the maritime entrepreneurs were available. States which lacked such domestic resources might hire them from other parts of Europe. The most successful

maritime economy of our period, the Dutch Republic, created a state navy around the traditional private competence of convoy escorting but retained a highly viable sector for private violence at sea. Offensive warfare was to a large extent left to chartered private monopoly companies, the East and West India Companies.

Private entrepreneurs in warfare at sea had a market because the states often lacked the necessary administrative competence to run a navy. One of these competencies was the skill to create efficient teams of seamen to man the ships. Private shipowners normally had close contacts with the seafaring communities. They were in a good position to find skilled and experienced masters, pilots, boatswains and quartermasters who in their turn might find seamen with the combination of maritime and martial skills which made the crew efficient. Shipowners and masters, who were often members of the local elites, might have a good or bad reputation among seamen and this must have influenced their ability to recruit efficient crews. When the state searched for entrepreneurs who might supply a ship or a squadron for the navy they may often have been looking for persons who had a good reputation in a seafaring community. Such men could attract the often scarce resource of skilled seamen willing to serve, and they were also able to create efficient teams of these seamen. Even when navies searched for captains and crews of their own warships they might prefer men who had well developed networks in the maritime communities.

Some early modern states had ambitions to centralise and organise this competence for warfare at sea. Most gun-armed sailing navies began with investments in ships and guns. Gradually rulers found that these instruments of modern naval power could be markedly better used with efficient administration and a systematic organisation of the skills required to fight with sailing gun-carriers. Many of these skills already existed on the private market. If the state were to use its strategic position in the society for developing sea power it had to develop new social frameworks for the recruitment of seamen and the training of efficient leaders of warfare at sea. Arguably, this was the decisive element in a really efficient navy. The new framework had to provide incentives to make the seamen and the leaders disposed to act efficiently in the service of the state. It must also create bonds of loyalty to the state. However, unlike permanent armies and their soldiers (which required basic training in the use of weapons and continuous drill to become an efficient battlefield unit), seamen were a social group which already existed. They had a profession which made them useful on the civilian market and states which were based on viable maritime communities felt no urgency in hiring seamen permanently. What they required were mechanisms for the transfer of existing skilled seamen from civilian society to a state-controlled organisation for warfare at sea when this was required. The mechanism should also send them back to the civilian market when they were no longer required by the state. The recruitment of leaders was another question. Men who led large numbers of subordinates in combat and warfare had normally been part of the elite group, the nobility or (at sea) a mercantile oligarchy. A position among the social, political and military elite made them effective as leaders, partly because their families had the means to provide them with military training, and partly because members of the elite could protect and help the men who fought under them. This combination of skill and patronage gave authority, an authority which of course was strengthened if the leader was brave, successful and inspiring. The loyalty of this elite to the state was often more dubious – they might instead use their power over men in their own interest. The transformation of military leaders from noblemen (and mercenaries who often were noblemen) into the modern officer corps is an interesting question but we are here only concerned with how it affected warfare at sea.

The technical changes in warfare at sea created problems but also opportunities for the states. Except in Mediterranean galley warfare – and that is an important exception – members of the traditional elite were seldom professional seamen. A young nobleman might begin an army career as a common soldier to learn the profession, but he was much

less likely to enter a navy as a common seaman. Some medieval noblemen were experienced sea commanders who understood naval strategy and tactics, but it is unlikely that many of them could have handled a ship without a master who had learnt his profession since his early youth. The increasing sophistication of ships and their new armament, the gun, made technical skills and the ability to organise teams of seamen more important in naval warfare. At the same time, the role of infantry in naval warfare declined and with that the importance of military skill at sea. The problem for the state was that traditional forms of mobilising social resources for warfare did not work well if the link between social status and the ability to command in actual warfare was weakened. Commanders of ships had to enjoy both the loyalty and confidence of the crew if the crew were to work as an efficient team. If the commander was not a natural leader it might be difficult for him to uphold discipline without high status in society, either through family connections or through the power given him by the state to punish or reward.

But the possibilities for success in war created by the new instruments of naval warfare also meant that a new path to the elite was opened for those who were skilled in shiphandling and modern combat at sea. It also gave the state an important role in promoting men with new competencies to the elite or to give members of the elite an opportunity to gain new skills by learning shiphandling, naval gunnery and command of fleets. Service to the state might give social status and even nobility to skilled seamen, thus making them members of the elite. Service to the state might also give increased status to the seaman's profession, thus making it attractive for young members of the elite for the first time. The long-term practical solution was the creation of a new hierarchical elite group closely connected to the state, the permanent sea officer corps. For traditional and new members of the elite, the officer corps provided a framework giving them social status, salary and a share of the patronage controlled by states. For the states the creation of a hierarchical and bureaucratic officer corps proved to be an efficient way of increasing the loyalty of the elite group to the states. The officers controlled violence on behalf of the state, but they were also dependent on the authority of the state which legitimised both the taxes raised to maintain the armed forces and the authority they had over their subordinates.

The men who actually worked, fought and commanded at sea from 1500 to 1650 comprise a surprisingly neglected group in historical scholarship. There are also great gaps in our knowledge of social institutions connected with war and violence at sea: incentives and compulsion in recruitment of sailors; the social status of sea officers and seamen; and the professionalisation of sea officers. For later periods we have penetrating studies about social conditions in the navies, recruitment of seamen, the relations between officers and men, galley slaves, professionalisation and the naval career as a ladder for social advancement. For this period, however, major studies about seafaring men are almost exclusively limited to biographies of famous fleet commanders. Some of them are important case studies of the problems in naval command and administration of this period. But there are other interesting topics to study in a period which saw the initial phase of European seaborne expansion, the foundation of permanent navies and the shift of the maritime and economic centre of Europe from the Mediterranean to the Atlantic. As usual in maritime and naval history, comparative studies would be especially valuable.

Such studies, however, are more complex than for later periods when state navies provided organisational frameworks as employers of officers and men engaged in maritime warfare. Men engaged in early modern warfare at sea were often not employed by navies. They belonged to seafaring communities, often living on the fringe of state control and having a dynamic of their own in projecting seaborne violence around the coasts of Europe and to other parts of the world. Economic incentives or the need to protect themselves, their community and perhaps their country made seamen into fighters on state warships, on

armed merchantmen, on ships armed for piracy or privateering, or on ships hired by a state. The men who fought at sea were by no means always seamen. Medieval and early modern sailing warships often had crews where the majority were soldiers, not sailors. Most of the crews of the Mediterranean galley fleets were oarsmen – some of them free, others convicts, prisoners of wars or slaves. The fighting members of the galley crews were soldiers and gunners, while the skilled seamen were a small minority. The remainder of this chapter is intended only as a brief overview of two of these complexities: officers and the institutions for recruitment of crews.

Command of ships and fleets

Around 1500, fleets organised for war were platforms and means of transportation for soldiers. Galleys were traditionally fighting platforms for soldiers with only a small number of skilled seamen. In sailing fleets mobilised for full-scale wars the number of soldiers was usually larger than the number of seamen. Merchants, who wished to provide better protection for their ships than the self-defence which armed seamen might offer, hired professional soldiers who sailed on the merchantmen as a guarding force. Infantry soldiers provided this fighting force at sea as on land, and soldiers at sea were commanded by officers who often were noblemen. Large forces of soldiers at sea were usually commanded by members of the ruling aristocracy who had the status to enforce their will on other noble officers. Naturally, these aristocrats were also the most likely commanders of the fleets.

Sailing ships – merchantmen as well as the few state-owned warships that existed – were commanded by masters and a small hierarchy of men with specialised maritime skills: pilots, master's mates, quartermasters, boatswains. The masters were seamen who knew the profession and who could supervise and command the crew by virtue of long experience at sea. The shipmasters and their subordinate officers were specialists who could handle the ship's complicated rig – one of the great inventions of this age – and convert the often dangerous and capricious wind into a safe and efficient motive power. This also enabled them to manoeuvre a ship and direct its guns during a battle. As they were responsible for a valuable ship, its cargo and its maintenance, masters were respected members of the seafaring and trading communities. But in societies dominated by landowners, and with chivalric ideals and military skills as the paradigm for social virtue, experienced masters of ships definitely belonged to a lower stratum of the social hierarchy.

The practical consequence of this was that warships and merchantmen fitted out for war had a command structure which often seems rather confusing. The officers of the embarked soldiers, and the shipmaster and his subordinates, represented two separate command structures. The latter was responsible for the handling of the ship and its navigation, while infantry officers commanded the soldiers during battle. The details of these command arrangements have been little studied. Permanent armies were often as much in their infancy as the navies and many of the officers who commanded troops were actually aristocrats and gentlemen, with limited military experience but with a social position which made them suitable for command. If every ship were to have a captain in command of both seamen and soldiers – we cannot be sure that this was the rule everywhere as joint command was possible – a gentleman with or without a background as soldier might often be preferred to a master. But masters might have a prestige and social standing derived from family connections with rich merchants or from their experience as fighting seamen. They might also be regarded as suitable for command of a warship in the service of a state.

The circumstances under which a particular fleet was organised might have determined much of the real (possibly informal and probably often muddled) command structure. If a hastily assembled fleet of armed merchantmen embarked an organisationally coherent

army with a firm command structure, it would be natural if that command structure took precedence over the individual masters of the ships. If a more or less established navy with ships commanded by masters or gentlemen officers with some experience of the sea embarked temporarily assembled units of soldiers, it seems rather natural that the soldiers were subordinated to the existing command structure of the ships. If the fleet were to be divided into small squadrons, or individual ships were to be sent out for cruising or escort duties, this command structure seems to be almost necessary. When army officers were in command we should not take it for granted that every ship in a fleet had a military 'captain' who commanded in each ship. The soldiers had to be divided according to the size of the ship and their officers may have preferred to stay on the larger ships which would be the most important units during battle.

Officer corps in their modern sense had their origin in our period. The creation of a new corps of professional men who combined the skills of 'seamen' and 'warriors' with a hierarchical structure suitable for various levels of command and with a loyalty linked to the state seems so 'rational' and 'modern' that we may wonder why it took many generations to develop. We may explain this by arguing that states were for a long time too weak to create permanent structures of men with generous salaries that the inertia and resistance created by the existing systems of social status were strong and that contemporary decision makers had greater difficulties than we have in perceiving the advantages of the modern officer corps. We must, however, also remember that men with skills as warriors at sea existed on the private market and that states might be satisfied with more informal bonds of allegiance, and contractual relationships with these groups. In the Mediterranean world, contractual relationships between galley officers of fairly high social status and various states were well established before 1500. The system survived up to the end of our period in a strong contractual structure within the Spanish sailing and galley fleets.

In western and northern Europe, maritime cities preferred to employ their native masters as commanders at sea, usually in combination with professional mercenary officers who commanded soldiers. The kings who began to create permanent sailing navies around 1500 were the rulers who were most likely to make experiments with new solutions. We may guess that they were the power-holders who had most to gain by creating a more permanent organisational structure which might compensate for a relative lack of maritime skills within their states. But in several of these navies the fully-fledged corps of sea officers did not appear until several decades or even more than a century after the state began to create permanent navies. There might have been a genuine lack of suitable commanders or it might have taken time to develop the idea that the state might create such men by giving them the opportunity to make a life-long career in the navy.

Nevertheless, from 1500 to 1650 the command structure and status system connected with warfare at sea underwent radical changes. In 1500 the professional commissioned sea officer hardly existed. By 1650 sailing warships were commanded by men who formally and often also in reality were sea officers, that is, professional sailors and professional leaders of men in combat. The modern career path of the sea officers was barely established and only some navies had begun to give officers a permanent commission and rank. However, most navies had a pool of men who served as officers more or less permanently and these probably acted as a powerful interest group to which the states ultimately had to give permanent commissions in order to ensure their loyalty. Even large warships often had only a few officers – a captain and one or a few lieutenants. Some mid-seventeenth-century sea officers were noblemen who had chosen the navy as a career path, sometimes after they had tried the army. Other sea officers were of the same social background as masters and they might have secured a commission as officers as a reward for good service in the navy or because the expanding navies lacked sufficient experienced

men to command their ships. Masters of merchantmen were often given a temporary commission as sea officers in times of war and the most successful of them might be rewarded with permanent commissions.

Masters, pilots and the old hierarchy of command based on experience of the sea still existed on warships in 1650 and, as the number of commissioned officers was small, they must often have had responsibilities which in later periods belonged to officers. However, the old hierarchy with its origin in merchantmen were now regarded as warrant officers and were subordinated to a new hierarchy of officers specialised for warfare at sea. We may now refer to this group as sea officers. A new group of specialists with their own small internal hierarchy had been added during the sixteenth century, the gunners. Warships still had soldiers in their crews, but they were now normally a minority. In most navies they were commanded by junior army officers who were subordinated to the sea officer commanding the ship. After 1650, some navies (England, the Netherlands, France) began to create regiments of marines which organisationally belonged to the navies.

Sea officers in most mid-seventeenth-century navies were apparently still primarily regarded as leaders during battle and as upholders of discipline. A good knowledge of the skills of the master, the pilot and the gunner was useful but officers were primarily leaders of men. They were also the representative of the state and as such they were responsible for the ship executing orders given by admirals or the government. Furthermore, they were responsible for the crew obeying laws and naval regulations, and the handling of money and victuals issued to the ships.

These tasks were not a formality in a period of relatively weak state power and many opportunities for private enrichment through plunder and speculation. An armed ship was a source of power which might be appropriated for various private uses if it was not properly controlled by the state. On sea as on land, warfare meant opportunities for enrichment by plunder. States had no illusions about their officers and crews, and their right to a share in the spoils of war was generally acknowledged. However, in a well-disciplined navy captured merchantmen were supposed to be taken to port where their legal status would be determined by a court. If it was declared a lawful prize the crew might divide the prize money according to the law.

Warships were also supposed to operate according to strategic demands and not in order to enrich officers and men. They should, for example, escort friendly merchantmen or blockade enemy ports, even if cruising for rich enemy prizes might be more profitable for the captain and the crew. If they captured a ship in a fleet combat they should continue to fight the enemy and not bring the prize to a port without the admiral's order. These were rules and norms of behaviour which it took a long time to establish and enforce and the rise of a professional officer corps was part of this story. Finally, a warship represented the power and dignity of the state and in contact with other states it was useful to have a commanding officer with a certain knowledge of diplomacy and international politics. Gentlemen were normally supposed to have such qualities in a higher degree than men with a background as plain seamen.

Much of the typical sea officer skills of a later period – shiphandling, gunnery, navigation – still primarily belonged to the specialists. This explains why men with no experience of the sea might yet often be given command of ships. If their social status or previous conduct in other appointments made it probable that they could command men in combat, enforce discipline and obey orders from superior officers, they might be suitable as sea officers. But the idea that the ships should be commanded by sea officers and not by officers who commanded soldiers was generally established by 1650. Increasingly, such officers also began their seagoing careers as young men and received at least basic training in shiphandling, gunnery and navigation before they obtained a commission as a sea officer. Towards the end of the seventeenth century this career path had become practically

compulsory for future sea officers in the European navies, even for men from families with a high social position. The new professional sea officer must have the same competence as a master of a merchantmen in handling his ship.

The professional and bureaucratic corps of sea officers was a phenomenon which developed in the permanent navies. These navies had to 'invent' the sea officer in order to create a group of leaders who could combine a socially respectable position (which also gave authority over the crew) with the technical and maritime skills traditionally connected with men of a lower social position. Professionalisation meant that these sea officers became a well defined group – very similar in character in all navies – with special skills and a special code of conduct. Bureaucratisation meant that they were servants of a state who used the armed force of the state according to rules and orders given by the state. It also meant that orders were passed down a formal, hierarchical chain of command. This was in itself something of an innovation as it meant that the social hierarchy was subordinated to that of an organisation. A junior officer from an aristocratic family had to obey orders given by a senior officer who might not even be a nobleman. The rise of the sea officer was also closely connected with the rise of gunnery tactics and the decline of infantry as the decisive fighting force at sea. In many countries the army officer corps developed in much the same way in this period, but this development was less complicated as infantry and cavalry officers could relatively smoothly inherit and merge with the traditional military role of the nobility. Sea officers were more comparable to the technical branches of the army, gunners and engineers, and just like them they were often of a less aristocratic origin.

In Denmark-Norway a group of royal sea officers developed gradually during the sixteenth century. Some were noblemen who chose the sea to fulfil their obligation to serve the king, others were commoners who were paid more or less permanently by the king to command ships. A similar development took place in Sweden. During the wars in the 1520s and 1530s the Swedish navy was commanded according to old principles with 'army' officers and shipmasters. The next time the navy was fully mobilised for war, in the 1560s, ships were commanded by men who were called sea officers. It was not until the early seventeenth century that this corps of officers became a formally permanent service, but by then the modern career path of officers had been established in both the army and the navy.

The English navy followed a more complicated line of development. In the early sixteenth century warships were commanded by captains (that title was already in use), who might be shipmasters or gentlemen with or without experience of the sea or command of soldiers. Fleets and warships were often fitted out on a more or less contractual basis. During the sixteenth century naval shipmasters, merchants with experience of armed trade, gentlemen and socially rising seamen with experience in private warfare, were used by the navy as captains. In the early seventeenth century gentlemen became predominant as sea officers, but during the Civil Wars in the 1640s (when the navy was controlled by the Parliament) these were almost entirely replaced by masters, often men with experience from armed merchantmen. The formalisation of a permanent corps of English sea officers had to wait until the second half of the seventeenth century. In these three kingdoms, some members of the aristocracy and the gentry (the lower nobility in Scandinavia) were interested in becoming sea officers and, as such, they had to mix with men of more humble social origin. Members of the English gentry and a few aristocrats did, at least in the latter half of the sixteenth century, show a genuine interest in the seaman's profession and the social prejudices against manual work connected with the sea – at least warfare at sea – seem to have declined. In the Dutch Republic the navy of the state developed in a distinctly maritime and non-noble environment and here almost exclusively masters with a mercantile background were hired to command the warships of the state. Many of these masters had considerable experience of fighting from service in

armed merchantmen or privateers. From 1626 a corps of captains were given life-time employment, but the Dutch admiralties (or rather their captains) continued to hire junior officers on the open market, an arrangement that was still possible in the world's leading maritime power.

In the Mediterranean world the profession of sea officer, in a sense, had already had a long history before 1500. The galleys were often commanded by men who had chosen this occupation as their career. They usually belonged to the nobility or its equivalent among the patriciate in city states. Service as galley officers was prestigious and attractive for younger sons of noble families. In the Mediterranean many Italian, French and Spanish noblemen served as entrepreneurs in galley warfare. As such they were owners and commanders of one or several galleys. Venetian (state-owned) galleys were commanded by members of the aristocratic families who ruled the republic and they sent out their young sons to serve as cadets on the galleys in order to qualify as galley commanders. The Order of St John on Malta developed into something of a cadet school for young noblemen from various European countries, primarily France and the Habsburg kingdoms in Spain and Italy, who wished to gain experience of the sea in a socially acceptable environment. Galley officers were primarily commanders of soldiers and their skills in shiphandling was probably limited, but service in galleys undoubtedly gave experience of the sea and of naval gunnery.

The traditions of galley warfare have often been used as an explanation for the difficulties Spain experienced with the development of a professional corps of sea officers. This conclusion is a bit doubtful, however. It is obvious that far into the seventeenth century Spain had problems with the status and authority of men specialised as sea commanders. The galley tradition might have been an advantage if the highly regarded galley officers had primarily been identified as sea officers with an alternative role as commanders of sailing warships. Instead, Spanish warships were for a long time predominantly commanded by infantry officers. The early appointments to commands in sailing ships in sixteenth-century convoys to the West Indies were often given to men with military experience. In the permanent sailing navy which was established in the late sixteenth century two paths of career developed, one as seaman officer and another as infantry officer. Habsburg naval forces often had ships with a dual command of two officers, one from each hierarchy. Gradually, a command structure with single command – one officer in overall command on every ship – became predominant. Up to the mid-seventeenth century, however, it was much easier for an infantry officer – often but not always with seagoing experience – to be appointed to *capitan de mar y guerra*, that is commanding officer of both the seamen and the soldiers on a ship.

Men who had begun their careers as seamen had great difficulty in becoming accepted by the Castilian social elite, in spite of receiving support from the Habsburg kings who had realised the importance of an efficient corps of sea officers. The social elite of Castile had an ethos fostered in the *reconquista* ideals where military service on land was the norm. Seamen officers were primarily recruited from the mercantile and maritime groups on Spain's Biscay coast. Here it was entirely possible for a man who was regarded as a member of the gentry or lower nobility to serve as a sailor and learn the seaman's craft before he became a master and sea officer, but in the Castilian nobility this meant that he had been occupied with socially degrading manual work. Whether such men were to be preferred to men with army experience when commanders of ships and squadrons were to be appointed was often debated with some heat in the Spanish central administration. The low status of Spanish sea officers without an army background has often been used as an explanation for the relatively poor performance of Spanish warships in battle with English and Dutch ships.

Spain had, by the early sixteenth century, already established a permanent army with a highly qualified, disciplined and politically reliable corps of infantry officers. This may have made the development of another corps of officers with different professional ideals more problematic than in countries without strong army traditions. Spanish infantry officers had, at least until the early seventeenth century, a well-deserved reputation as the best officer corps in Europe and this reputation appears to have been a strong argument in favour of giving these officers a wider field of authority.

The situation in Portugal seems to have been similar to that in Spain, although much less is known about it. Most of what has been written about the command structure on Portuguese warships is actually about the ships that sailed to the Indian Ocean. As these ships belonged to the Portuguese royal navy we may presume that they reflect the general conditions in this navy, but we cannot be certain. After Portugal's break with Spain in 1640 the new monarchy made attempts to reform the sea officer corps and promote experienced seamen to leading positions, but this ran into serious difficulties due to social prejudices.

In Atlantic France, the seafaring population traditionally had low social status, although late medieval French kings tried to raise it. The social history of the officers of the sixteenth-century French navy during the Valois dynasty is little known.¹⁸ When the ships of the navy disappeared in the turmoil of religious civil wars the officer corps continued to exist, as sea officers' commissions were among those offices which the French crown sold to provide revenues. When a real navy with ships was recreated by Richelieu in the 1620s these officers were little used. Instead, men with maritime and seagoing experience in trade and private warfare were preferred, many of them Huguenots from the coastal provinces. It seems to have been a matter of expediency – the state required a working navy quickly – rather than a conscious effort to prefer commoners. In the large French navy created by Louis XIV and Colbert (himself born as a commoner), noble officers dominated. In the Mediterranean galley fleet, noblemen had already been dominating as officers early in the seventeenth century. French noblemen with experience from the Order of St John at Malta played a large role in the seventeenth-century French navy, first in the galley fleet, but increasingly also in the sailing fleet.

Venice and the Ottoman empire show the great structural difficulties in transformation of competencies from oared warfare to warfare under sail. In the sixteenth century both powers had had excellent galley forces commanded by highly skilled galley officers but their origins were markedly different. Where Venice recruited her galley commanders from the ruling oligarchy the Ottomans appointed their commanders either from professional sailors who had served in lower ranks on the state galleys or from men with privateering experience. In the seventeenth century the two Levantine navies were compelled to use sailing warships, but they both lacked the technical ability to build such ships and men suitable to command them. Venice had to hire Dutch and English armed merchantmen with crews and officers and the Ottomans became much dependent on their North African vassals, who adopted the sailing ship technology in the early seventeenth century, partly with the help of renegades from western Europe.

The high command of the navies was a somewhat different problem from command of ships. Even by 1650 it was far from natural that admirals should be recruited from the sea captains. The commander-in-chiefs of major fleets and the positions as permanent heads of navies (Lord High Admiral in England, Amiral de France and other high admiral charges in France, Riksamiral/Rigsadmiral in the Nordic countries, Admiraal-Generaal and his deputies in the Netherlands), especially, were appointments where social and political considerations were important. Aristocrats were preferred and men with an army background were often preferred to sea officers. A few aristocratic families, such as the Howards in England and the Flemings in Sweden, produced several admirals. Some of these aristocratic admirals gained considerable experience as flag officers and showed

notable success as strategists and tacticians. Denmark-Norway during the reign of Christian IV (r. 1588/96–1648) was a unique case in this period as the king (who was proud of being regarded as a professional seaman) often personally took command of the fleet and closely supervised its administration.

The Dutch Republic was the first European state where seamen officers of humble social origin reached the rank of commander-in-chief of a major navy. Piet Hein was appointed to that rank in 1629 and Maarten H. Tromp in 1637, but even in that bourgeois republic noblemen were appointed commanders-in-chief without much seagoing experience. In England, some of the Elizabethan privateering heroes, primarily John Hawkins and Francis Drake (who were both knighted), had come close to similar positions, but in the early Stuart navy social rank mattered more. In the latter half of the seventeenth century it became common in most European navies to select admirals from the experienced sea captains. By the early eighteenth century most admirals were men with a long career as professional sea officers, a career usually begun with a period when they had to learn the basic skills of a seaman. The modern career path of the permanent corps of sea officers was a fact.

Spain represents something of a paradox, as this navy surprisingly often appointed admirals with considerable seagoing experience. The best known Spanish admiral of this period is the Duke of Medina Sidonia who commanded the Armada of 1588. He, however, was a typical European naval commander-in-chief of the period, a leading aristocrat with a reputation as an energetic and reliable administrator, but without any experience of high command at sea. But Medina Sidonia was appointed as a last minute replacement for the deceased marquis of Santa Cruz, a man with a long seagoing experience who rose to the aristocracy in naval service. This Armada had several experienced seamen officers among its squadron commanders. Seventeenth-century Spanish and Portuguese admirals are little studied but it seems that some of them had spent a considerable time at sea before they obtained senior commands. Most of them seem to have been galley officers or army officers who had had an appointment as sea captain before they were promoted to admirals but several came from the coast of Biscay and may have been experienced seamen.

The officers of the Ottoman navy represent a different tradition as hereditary nobility in the European sense did not exist in the Ottoman power structure. The Ottomans were pioneers in creating permanent corps of officials who served the sultan as officers on land and at sea and in positions as provincial governors and administrators. Their admirals were recruited from these high-ranking servants of the sultan or among successful privateers. Important expeditions might also be led by viziers, the most senior ministers. At least three of the sixteenth-century commanders-in-chief of the Ottoman navy, including the famous Hayreddin Barbarossa, had a background as corsairs in Algiers. More than any European navy of the age, the Ottoman navy was a social escalator for men of humble birth to leading positions.

To be followed

Inséré 20/09/17 DOSSIER Enlevé 20/10/17

**Sailing in the Polar Region – requirements
for seafarers**

Vessels sailing in cold conditions are affected by the Polar Code which enters into force on 1st January 2017. Ship owners already preparing for the new code will realise that besides technical requirements also operational aspects have to be considered. One of them is appropriate training for the crew. The Polar Code is adopted by resolution MSC.385(94). The Polar Code applies to the areas around Antarctica, south of latitude 60°S and around the Arctic. In principle these are the waters north of latitude 60°N with the exemptions off the coast of Iceland and northern Scandinavia as well as parts of Russia. A detailed definition is given in SOLAS regulations XIV/1.2 and XIV/1.3.

What does the Polar Code define regarding manning and training?

This is answered in Chapter 12 of Part I-A Safety Measures. For the details for the qualification the Polar Code refers to Chapter V of the Convention and Code on Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping (STCW). We will analyse this amended chapter later below. The Polar Code sets the framework for the application who, when and where needs to have which qualification. As normal condition it is required that that the navigational watch officers, including the master, have received sufficient training and following this have a basic or advanced certificate of proficiency. The requirements are separated between the ship types and the local conditions they sail in. Depending if it is a tanker, a passenger ship or another ship type and depending if the ship sails in ice free conditions (not any kind of ice is present), in "open waters" (defined as navigable water in which sea ice is less than 1/10) or in "other waters" (waters others than ice free or open waters) they have different requirements for training.

- } The easiest is the ice free condition where no certificate is required for anybody.
- } In "open waters" only tanker and passenger ship's navigational officers on operational and management level need a basic training and the appropriate certificate.
- } When any ship enters "other waters" any navigational officer must have received basic training and hold the related certificate while masters and chief mates must have received advanced training and holding the related certificate.

Does the Polar Code allow substituting certificate holders with other personnel?

Yes, this is mentioned in Chapter 12.3.2 of the Polar Code: "the administration may allow the use of a person(s) other than the master, chief mate or officers [...]" under certain conditions.

These conditions require that the other person is qualified as nautical officer according to STCW (reg. II/2, section A-II/2). Therefore, only qualified nautical officers may substitute the requirements.

Furthermore, it is required that enough persons on board must hold an appropriate certificate in order to cover all watches. This means that only one person alone cannot substitute several missing certificates. There have to be enough persons to cover all watches, keeping in mind the minimum hours of rest at all times. Two special requirements apply in addition to the above.

When operating in waters other than open waters or bergy waters, the master, chief mate and officers in charge of a navigational watch on passenger ships and tankers shall meet the applicable basic training requirements.

When operating in waters with an ice concentration of more than 2/10, all nautical officers including the master on cargo ships other than tankers shall meet the applicable basic training requirements. Even having hired in additional persons to satisfy the requirements for training does not relieve the master or officer of the navigational watch from their duties and obligations for the safety of the ship.

What does STCW require the seafarer to do?

As defined in the Polar Code STCW sets the details of what should be trained. Therefore, STCW will be amended with a new regulation V/4 on "mandatory minimum requirements for the training and qualifications of masters and deck officers on ships operating in polar waters" which is expected for entry into force on 1st July 2018 according to circular letter No 3641.

Who needs to do which training?

Following the Regulation V/4 there are two main trainings defined: The basic and the advanced training.

The basic training is applicable for masters, chief mates and officers in charge of a navigational watch on ships operating in polar waters. They have to do an approved basic training course in order to apply for a Certificate of Proficiency (CoP).

The advanced training is applicable for masters and chief mates on ships operating in polar waters. They have to have a basic certificate, at least two months of approved seagoing service in the deck department at management level or while performing watchkeeping duties in the operational level and of course completed the advanced training course. At intervals not exceeding five years every master or officer shall establish continued professional competence. As for other competencies this could be done by approved seagoing service or an approved course or other means approved by the administration.

Are there transitional provisions?

If you are already an experienced sailor STCW has included transitional provisions for the first two years after the entry into force which will be then until 1st July 2020. Nautical officers may apply for the basic certificate according to these transitional provisions if they have approved seagoing service on board a ship operating in polar waters or equivalent approved seagoing service for a period of at least three months in total during the preceding five years; or have successfully completed a training course meeting the training guidance established by the organization for ships operating in polar waters. This guidance is laid down in section B-V/g of the STCW Code. For the advanced certificate seafarers may apply according to the transitional provisions if they have approved seagoing service on board a ship operating in polar waters or equivalent approved seagoing service for a period of at least three months in total during the preceding five years; or successfully completed a training course meeting the training guidance established by the organization for ships operating in polar waters (sec B-V/g) and having completed approved seagoing service on board a ship operating in polar waters or equivalent approved seagoing service, for a period of at least two months in total during the preceding five years.

How to handle the two entry into force dates?

As the amendments to STCW enter into force only one and a half year after the Polar Code enters into force it is strongly recommended to consult the flag state if they aim for early implementation of the STCW amendments and local port authorities to discuss a solution which is accepted.

For the flag state it may be considered that they refer to the transitional provisions in order to issue certificates at least to existing seafarers. Maybe they have approved also training in compliance with the future regulation V/4 or with the guidance given in section B-V/g.

It is recommended to follow up the outcome of the next IMO meetings in case additional guidance might be provided. An overview to latest statutory technical and regulatory news can be found here

Source: DNV GL

Inséré 22/09/17 BOEKEN LIVRES BOOKS Enlevé 22/10/17
“Navigation Assessments”

BOEK BESPREKING by : Frank NEYTS

The Nautical Institute recently published a new title in its series 'A guide to best practice' entitled "Navigation Assessments". Author is Captain Harry Gale FNI. Many maritime incidents could have been prevented by the use of a navigation assessment which, through careful observation, evaluates how the navigation of a ship is being conducted. An effective assessment should take place over several days and provide practical feedback to the bridge team as well as guidance to shore-based management. This handbook provides a step-by-step guide that will enable the assessor to carry out a fair, objective and positive assessment that properly takes into account human element issues. Case studies of maritime accidents and incidents provide valuable learning points. The book is also intended to help mariners understand the assessment process. If it is properly conducted, an assessment will provide insights that contribute to navigator's continuing professional development.

"Navigation Assessments. A guide to best practice" (ISBN 978-1-906915-51-3) is issued as a softback and counts 88 pages. The book can be bought from the better bookshop, or one can contact The Nautical Institute, 202 Lambeth Road, London, SE1 7LQ, UK. Tel. +44.(0)20.7928.1351, Fax +44.(0)20.7401.2817, pubs.admin@nautinst.org, Web: www.nautinst.org.

Inséré 22/09/17 NIEUWS NOUVELLES NEWS Enlevé 22/10/17

Dockwise Vanguard loaded Aasta Hansteen spar in Korea

In Busan Korea the Heavy Lift Vessel DOCKWISE VANGUARD loaded the the AASTA HANSTEEN FPSO spar, The AASTA HANSTEEN FPSO spar is a Spar gas platform designed by Technip-USA, which platform is built by Hyundai Heavy Industries in South Korea.



And after loading on its side onboard the DOCKWISE VANGUARD the large spar will be transported to a fjord in West Norway. The Spar hull will be upended in the fjord, topsides installed using floatover technique and then towed vertically to the Aasta Hansteen gas field 300 km off the coast of Norway. The spar will be tethered north of the Arctic Circle using polyester moorings to the seabed 1300m below. At a height of 198m (of which 177m will be submerged) and diameter of 50m the AASTA HANSTEEN is the biggest spar platform hull ever built in terms of diameter and displacement. The spar hull is a Truss Spar type allowing condensate to be stored in the hull beneath sea level and offloaded to a shuttle tanker. The produced gas will be exported to the shore with rigid Steel Catenary Risers (SCR). The Production import risers will also be SCRs, first time of application of SCRs in North Sea. Photo's : Sergii Iemelianov 3rd Engineer Terasea Eagle (c)



Inséré 24/09/17 DOSSIER Enlevé 24/10/17

Is the Shipping Industry Overreacting About Regulation Timing?

Since last Fall, many stakeholders in shipping have been running a barrage of “doomsday” scenarios about implementation of the BWTC, followed by outrage over 2020 SOx. Now it is about EU’s decision to preemptively “threaten” the IMO for 2023. In the two later cases, the outrage and stress are often misguided or shortsighted, whether purposely or not. In the BWT case, the timing is bad due to the prevailing state of the freight market in most sectors, but this we will analyze a bit later.

Plenty of industry players speculate that refineries and bunker supplies will not be ready on time by 2020 and a sudden global change on 1/1/2020 will be too much of a shock. Those that say so are ignoring the fact that even if the date were set for 2050, refineries would still only bother doing anything until right before. Similarly, most shipowners would only even start to look into their options until the last minute, no matter what date was used. In BWT owners had some excuse that the USCG had not approved any systems, but

this will not be the case for Scrubbers and LNG, which are already being used in ECAs and technical unknowns are being sorted over time. With regards to the "shock" factor of an overnight emissions cap, it seems everyone has forgotten the very important point of the leniency afforded to owners back in 2005, when the first SECA was put in place in Northern Europe. Bunker suppliers were not ready, and owners were not sure what to expect, even more so than will be the case in 2020. Similarly, the worrying ahead of the 1/1/2015 change turned out just as unfounded. For the first few months of 2005, as long as an operator could prove they tried to source the proper fuel grades, within reasonable cost and time, authorities would offer exemptions and allow the vessels to enter the designated areas. Obviously owners abusing this leniency raised red flags that were quickly addressed. Overall the bunker suppliers were given the time to catch up to demand without penalizing owners.

Undoubtedly, this same leniency will be witnessed come 2020. Not unlike the deferrals owners have received for BWT due to the USCG's lag. New regulations are often not perfect, but those charged with executing them understand this too and show the proper leniency until things smoothen out over time. As for those who are worried it will not be a level playing field, a global sulfur regulation will be much easier to control than ECA's. If you don't have a scrubber or other acceptable alternatives, then if you have high sulfur fuel in your tanks, you or your suppliers are at fault. Some will try to go around this, but this happens with every regulation. That doesn't justify everyone else dropping to the level of these exceptions. Some owners look for excuses to push blame on others. One valid excuse is the lack of funding, as a result of the bad market. But funding is available for retrofits from various sources, like Ursus offering financing based on the savings, or from export credit agencies, each minimizing cash outlay. Moreover, those owners who cannot afford a BWT are only going to help the market recover by accelerated scrapping. Well, as long as not too many new outside funds decide to jump into the extremely distressed market, buying up oldies and reducing scrapping momentum. The latest unreasonable outrage is against the EU's vote on February 15th. It is hard for me to comprehend the reactions to this. The IMO has continuously dragged its feet on GHG emissions regulations, and only finally acted following the pressures after Paris. At MEPC 70, it felt like the IMO reluctantly kicked the can down the road to 2023, as if by then they will have collected the perfect data to create the perfect measures for the future. Even for data collection, if it wasn't for EU's MRV push, the whole concept of gathering and analyzing emissions data would never have been on the table at MEPC. It is the same case now. The EU is evidently fed up, and is using its power to gently nudge the IMO to action. The EU does not want to enact these regulations they know would disadvantage European trade. They just want the IMO to do what it should have already done on its own, and I am certain that this will now not be postponed further. If the IMO does not act quickly, others will follow the EU and we will unfortunately be faced with regional rules, moving us to the same disaster seen with the BWMC. This opinion is also shared by the International Chamber of Shipping's chairman, Esben Poulsson. Environmental regulations in shipping tend to be very reactionary, often only after outside pressure or after catastrophic events. When this happens, regulations rarely have a chance to be thought out sufficiently. If shipping wants laws that are more favorable for its stakeholders, we must learn to be preemptive. Look at the double hull concept, which was not the ideal design. The Colombi Egg design was far better environmentally, but given the urgent need for action from public outrage the IMO implemented whatever gave the best "sense" of security. In the end, even Double Hulls proved better than further inaction. You cannot perfect a regulation a priori without practical data. Like they say in the Tech community "release fast and iterate often". An early but better than perfect change is still better than delayed action, as long as regulators are aware that they will have to reiterate over time. Providing the shortcomings are not in

terms of insufficiently considering safety concerns, then the outcry is unfounded and the benefits significantly outweigh the risks or costs. Maybe if the IMO had taken action on its own accord and implemented emissions regulations beyond just newbuildings and EEDI, then maybe all the Shipping Banks would not have clung onto their aging, idle, and inefficient fleets for so long (i.e. "stranded assets"), hoping for a recovery only to land in even deeper waters. Instead, due to the sunk cost fallacy, these banks as well as many owners, held onto these ships and artificially kept secondhand prices up, making newbuild prices seem comparably like much more attractive investments for the new funds itching to enter the market. We all know the results. Even the shipbuilders that looked to be winning from this are now only alive by way of subsidies. From each of these recent major regulations, it's obvious that shipping's stakeholders and the IMO often need this nudge to get something rolling. Whether that is bringing the sulfur date early, or not postponing BWT implementation further, or the EU pushing the IMO, external pressure seems to be the usual way for this industry. That is why Cruise ships are the most efficient, given their greater exposure to the public. Things will inevitably be bumpy at first, but as has always been the case throughout shipping's modern history, we will find a way to make it work effectively for everyone despite any regulations shortcomings.

Source: Article Written on Behalf of Hellenic Shipping News Worldwide, By Mr. Nikos Petratakos, Environmental Shipping Expert MSc – Naval Architect

Inséré 26/09/17 NIEUWS NOUVELLES NEWS Enlevé 26/10/17

Shippers brace for new rules to cut deadly sulphur emissions

By Roslan Khasawneh and Keith Wallis

The global shipping industry is bracing for a key regulatory decision that could mark a milestone in reducing maritime pollution, but which could nearly double fuel costs in a sector already reeling from its worst downturn in decades. The shipping industry is by far the world's biggest emitter of sulphur, with the SO_x content in heavy fuel oil up to 3,500 times higher than the latest European diesel standards for vehicles. To combat such pollution, the International Maritime Organization's (IMO) Marine Environment Protection Committee will meet in London on Oct. 24-28 to decide whether to impose a global cap on SO_x emissions from 2020 or 2025, which would see sulphur emissions fall from the current maximum of 3.5 percent of fuel content to 0.5 percent. "One large vessel in one day can emit more sulphur dioxide than all the new cars that come onto the world's roads in a year," said Thomas Koniordos, head of business line environmental solutions at Norway's Yara International. "That is reason enough to cap emissions," added Koniordos, whose firm makes scrubbers used to clean exhaust emissions. Large container ships of 15,000-18,000 TEUs (20-foot equivalent units) consume up to 300 tonnes of high-sulphur fuel a day at sea, while a 300,000 deadweight tonne (DWT) supertanker guzzles up to about 100 tonnes per day. Health experts say sulphur is responsible for deadly heart and lung diseases. The issue has been brewing for more than a decade and shippers said the industry was now bracing for tighter regulation to be introduced sooner rather than later due to political pressure "The decision will likely be a political one - the European Union is pressing strongly

for 2020," said Arthur Bowring, managing director of the Hong Kong Shipowners' Association. The European Union has already agreed that the 0.5 percent sulphur requirement will apply in 2020 within 200 nautical miles (370 km) of EU Member States' coasts, regardless of what the IMO decides. China, home to the world's busiest container ports, is also demanding cleaner fuels. Authorities in Shenzhen, the world's third biggest container port, introduced tighter controls this month, demanding that ships calling there do not use fuel with a sulphur content of more than 0.5 percent. Ship owners can comply with the tighter controls either by switching away from the sludgy and sulphur-rich so-called bunker fuels to diesel or liquefied natural gas (LNG), or by fitting scrubbers to clean exhaust emissions. A fuel-switch would impose extra costs on an already troubled shipping sector, which has seen high-profile defaults like South Korea's Hanjin as well as cases of stranded ships with crew left onboard ships unpaid and unsupplied. Using low-sulphur diesel instead of bunker fuel on a very large crude carrier (VLCC) class supertanker would boost fuel costs by around 44 percent from an average of \$212 per tonne this year for heavy fuel oil to \$379 per tonne for gas oil, according to figures from shipping broker Clarkson. For traded oil markets, the shift to low-sulphur fuel will "substantially reduce demand for bunkers in the run up to 2020 and increase demand for gasoil and alternative fuels including LNG," said Christopher Haines, head of oil and gas at BMI Research.

Source : Reuters (Editing by Henning Gloystein)

Inséré 28/09/17 HISTORIEK HISTORIQUE Enlevé 28/10/17

Warfare at Sea 1500 - 1650 (part V)

SEAMEN, SOLDIERS AND CHANGING MARITIME SOCIETIES

Impressment, volunteers and chained oarsmen

The mass of the sailors, soldiers, gunners and oarsmen who went to sea in this period did not enter a career path that took them to a higher social position. Some made the sea their occupation and they might develop skills which placed them a little above the bottom of the social scale. Others went to sea in hope of easy profits from plunder and violence, but many probably chose the sea just because this was a usual way to make a living in their community, at least for young men. Many were not especially skilled as seamen, but useful for heavy labour in a crew where other men could supervise them.

Unskilled men were especially useful for warships which needed large fighting crews. Most navies conscripted men for service at sea in national emergencies and this might have brought considerable groups of men with little or no seagoing experience to the sea. Navies were, however, primarily interested in skilled seamen and they used various political and social mechanisms to transfer them to warships at the lowest possible cost. It is interesting that while the militia tradition declined in importance on land in this period and was more or less replaced by mercenary and professional armies, its maritime form, the duty of seamen to serve the state at sea, increased in importance. In most states, the explanation is probably that seamen were professionals with an expanding civilian market. States, or mercenary army entrepreneurs, had to recruit and train men in order to get professional

soldiers, but professional sailors already existed as a skilled labour force on the open market.

Throughout this period soldiers were an important part of the fighting force at sea, but their relative importance declined with the increased importance of guns. Even in battles where no boarding took place musketeers were useful in close-range actions and a force of trained infantry was essential if a fleet were to attempt an opposed landing, for a raid or for an attack against a fortified place. Special forces of marines did not exist before 1650, although soldiers serving in the Mediterranean galley fleets must be considered as specialised amphibious forces with considerable experience of fighting at sea. Soldiers embarked in sailing navies might also become used to war at sea if they served on ships for longer periods. They might do unskilled seaman work and they could be used as gun crews.

The most typical professional seaman in sailing ships was the young, agile and skilled topman who went aloft in the rigging to handle sails and carry out repairs. The importance of the topmen must have increased dramatically with the fifteenth- and sixteenth-century development of the full-rigged ship with its tall and complicated sail plan with two or three sails on every mast. Medieval ships with one large square sail or one or a few lateen sails did not need many men who could work aloft, as the sails could mainly be handled from the deck. The skilled topman could probably often hope for an appointment as petty officer and perhaps a career as master's mate and master when he grew older and less suited for work aloft. The step to the position as master did require other qualities as well, however, probably including the ability to read and write and a talent for business. Skilled topmen were usually a scarce resource in wartime, when the navies competed with merchantmen in securing their services.

Gunners were necessary in combats with the new gunpowder weapon. Originally, everyone who could handle and fire guns was regarded as a qualified specialist. Gradually, gunners declined to the status of ordinary seamen with some special training, and only the warrant and petty officers with gunnery training retained the status of a specialist. A gunner was usually supposed to lead a team of men who handled a gun. He was responsible for how it was loaded, aimed and fired, while the other members of the gun crew mainly supplied muscle-power to haul out the gun and train it on the enemy. The development of gunnery tactics in this period is still obscure and it is possible that it was not until the seventeenth century that such gun crews became the basic fighting teams of the warships. Carpenters and sailmakers were other specialists necessary for the maintenance of the ship and its propulsion apparatus. Their skills were especially necessary for repairs of damage caused by battle and gales.

We know little about how men were trained to become skilled specialists and to what extent the states took responsibility for the training of young men in naval service. When states became large shipowners they gained an interest in the maintenance and transmission of various skills connected with the sea and warfare at sea. In a fully-fledged naval organisation we would expect the navy to create these skills through training programmes and the early hiring of young men and boys as apprentices. We know that such systems existed later in the sailing navies, but to what extent they developed in our period has been little studied. J. F. Guilmartin in his seminal study of sixteenth-century Mediterranean galley warfare has suggested that we should look upon the specialised galley crews as parts of a social system in which men were trained through life-time experience rather than by military drills organised by the state. He emphasises that these skills were difficult to reproduce and that severe losses of skilled manpower in major battles might have serious long-term consequences in crippling the galley navy's operational capability. This, rather than the loss of galleys, might be the critical factor which made a galley battle

decisive in a longer perspective. Galleys might quickly and relatively cheaply be built to replace losses, but if the cadre of skilled men were thin the vessels were of limited value. Guilmartin has not investigated how these skills were actually learnt, though he leaves us with the impression that they, like other traditional skills, were reproduced in social systems, perhaps within families where fathers and uncles brought up young men at sea. His suggestions do, however, reveal how little we actually know about essential parts of both sailing and oared warfare and their relations to the states of this period. We cannot say if the early modern state had gained control of the basic skills in modern warfare at sea or if they belonged to a maritime society outside the organisational framework of the state.

Practically all seaman skills connected with early modern warfare at sea did exist in the private maritime spheres of the European societies. When states mobilised their maritime resources for war these resources might be used, but the usefulness of a mobilised navy depended on how far the administration could concentrate these seamen with various skills and transform them into well-balanced teams, one for each ship. Gunnery might originally have been closely connected with states, but early modern gunners worked in an international labour market. This made it impossible for states to monopolise their skills and by the late sixteenth century both privateers and armed merchant men were armed with high-quality guns and had qualified gunners. A state might invest in maritime skills by hiring more men and apprentices than immediately necessary for seagoing service. In later periods navies normally did that as part of the contingency planning for a possible mobilisation. There are few systematic studies of this subject and practically none available for this period.

Much work on a ship did not need specialised skills. Pulling and hauling on falls and tackles could be done from the deck by organised teams of unskilled men supervised by petty officers, the weighing of anchors required a lot of muscle power, boats required oarsmen and guns required a team of men to haul them out and point them. In a warship or a defensively armed merchantman unskilled but able-bodied men were useful as a fighting force. Navies, privately armed warships and armed merchantmen were therefore often dependent on the labour market for unskilled men and they had to attract them with wages and the prospect of more or less legal plunder. The growing navies of the states seem to have been unable to rely only on these market forces to meet demand. Instead, most European states attempted to use their legal right to compel their subjects to contribute to the defence in order to recruit men to the navy.

Denmark-Norway and Sweden conscripted men from towns and other maritime communities, but it is possible that some of these men were more or less voluntarily recruited and that the state primarily required the local communities to pay them and provide them with lodgings during winter. Desertion does not seem to have been a great problem although little research has been done on the subject of naval conscription in Scandinavia. Conscripted men often stayed in the navies for several years, although they might stay at home when they were not required for service at sea. The Danish navy, at least, also relied on a force of permanently employed volunteers. When the navies were mobilised for full-scale wars they also tried to recruit foreign seamen in the Baltic area and in adjacent countries.

In England, the navy also filled most of its demand for seamen through impressment although normally only for shorter periods. At least in the sixteenth century it does not seem to have been very difficult to persuade men to serve, and just as in Scandinavia pressed men were supposed to turn up for service without being put under some kind of guard. In the first half of the seventeenth century, however, the English navy faced a more difficult situation where seamen became notorious for protests, riots and mutinous behaviour. This was apparently the result of increased mismanagement which left seamen

unpaid for long periods, but it may also have been caused by changed attitudes to impressment, better wages in the mercantile marine or fewer opportunities for plunder than in the Elizabethan age.

Spain and Portugal in the sixteenth century were great maritime nations with considerable seafaring populations, but, as already mentioned, the status of seamen was low in the Iberian peninsula. The great maritime enterprises, stagnating population growth and the attractions of the colonies strained the maritime populations beyond their ability to produce and reproduce skilled seamen in sufficient numbers. Up to the late sixteenth century, the Spanish state relied to a large extent on hired and requisitioned merchantmen to form fleets in the Atlantic. Apparently this method also solved the administrative problem of recruiting sailors. When the state began to create a sailing navy the scarcity of skilled seamen became an increasing problem. In the early seventeenth century, the Spanish state made an interesting attempt to recruit young boys to schools where they were to be trained into seamen, but this turned out to be a failure. With increasing difficulties in recruiting volunteers, various forms of conscription became more common, especially from the 1620s, when an ambitious attempt at systematic registration of the seafaring population in matriculas was also started. The Spanish monarchy was composed of several constituent parts with different laws and customs and the possibilities of conscripting men for seagoing service differed considerably in various parts, even within Castile itself

The only navy which seems to have been able to rely on the market for mass recruitment of sailors was that of the Dutch Republic from the late sixteenth century on. During the sixteenth century the Netherlands developed into the largest concentrated labour market for seamen in the world and the Dutch mercantile marine, the East and West India companies and the navy attracted large number of foreigners, especially Germans and Scandinavians. The navy did not need to create a substantial permanent cadre of warrant officers, petty officers and skilled seamen as these were available at short notice. The key to their availability was, of course, high wages and the republic's good reputation as a reliable paymaster. The demands of naval warfare sometimes strained the manpower resources and the state frequently had to use a mild form of compulsion by prohibiting merchantmen from leaving the Dutch ports until the navy had found a sufficient number of seamen. But compared to other European navies, the Dutch system was a remarkable achievement for a state based on a limited population, especially if it is remembered that the same state also maintained one of Europe's largest armies through voluntary recruitment.

Little attention has been paid to how the French navy manned its ships before the system of *classes maritimes* was developed in the age of Colbert. It is probable that the maritime regions and their traditional forms of manning were important for the navy but it has not been studied, in spite of the great interest for regional studies in French historiography.

While most sailing navies had to rely on systems for conscription which were ultimately based on principles of militia service or levies against national enemies, the oared galley fleets in the Mediterranean increasingly came to rely on chained oarsmen as their propulsive power. The use of convicts, prisoners of war and slaves as oarsmen had its breakthrough in the sixteenth century. Late medieval galleys – the period when Italian galley fleets dominated the Mediterranean – had volunteers or militiamen at the oars. Such oarsmen were also part of the fighting crew. Venice continued into the seventeenth century to find as many oarsmen as possible through agreements with guilds (oarsmen in wartime in exchange for privileges to the guilds), or through voluntary or militia type recruitment in Dalmatia and on the Greek islands under Venetian control. But the steep rise in the number of oarsmen required by the growth of large permanent galley fleets under Spanish, Ottoman and French control outran the possibilities of recruiting free men to the oars. One consequence of this was a general change of the system of rowing the galleys. The

traditional system, with one oar for each oarsman was replaced, from the mid-sixteenth century on, by a system where the three (or more) men on each bench served one oar. This was less efficient but required less skilled oarsmen which made it suitable for forced labour.

No existing study gives a satisfactory answer to the question of the interconnections between sixteenth-century Mediterranean warfare and the development of large forces of chained oarsmen. The change began in the western Mediterranean where rapidly increased wages in the first half of the sixteenth century forced the Spanish fleet to use chained oarsmen. In the east, where wages were lower, the Ottomans continued to use a combination of chained men, salaried Christians and conscripted or volunteer Muslims as late as the 1570s. The economic problems of finding manpower for a dramatically increased number of galleys are obvious. But was it really good economy to have a huge number of chained men on the galleys who could only be used for propulsion and not as fighters? Why was it not better to have fewer galleys, with trained infantry serving at the oars? How was the type of oarsman affected by the introduction of guns as a partial substitute for infantry? Were the chained oarsmen of this period primarily prisoners of war belonging to another religion or were they criminals and vagabonds sentenced to the galleys as punishment? To which extent were they slaves, that is, men captured from civilian populations in order to supply forced labour? The development of large Mediterranean galley fleets powered by forced labour was one of the major changes in early modern warfare, a development from market-orientated and militia-based systems of recruitment to a brutal and degrading use of human beings. What does it say about changes in mentality and economy in the Mediterranean world?


Jan Glete

Inséré 30/09/17 BOEKEN LIVRES BOOKS Enlevé 30/10/17

Frozen in Time: The Fate of the Franklin Expedition

by Owen Beattie & John Geiger

A fully updated edition of the amazing true story of a doomed Arctic exploration – and of the secrets found preserved in ice.



What happened on Sir Franklin's ill-fated Arctic expedition of 1845-48 was one of the great maritime mysteries, until, in 1981, part of a bleached human skull was found by the team working with Dr Owen Beattie. Further scientific expeditions unravelled the circumstances by which the members of Franklin's elite naval forces came within sight of the Northwest Passage, only to perish in a manner as terrible as the mind can conceive.

Frozen in Time is a breathtaking record of scientific detective work, using forensics on three perfectly preserved Victorian seamen discovered on Beechey Island. It also makes the case that their deaths were due to the crews' reliance on a new technology – tinned foods – which not only exposed the seamen to lead poisoning, but also left them vulnerable to scurvy, the ancient scourge of seafarers.

This fully revised edition updates the research, and confirms Beattie's lead hypotheses, along with his

discovery of physical evidence for both scurvy and cannibalism. It also has a new introduction by Margaret Atwood who has long been fascinated by the Franklin Expedition, and has made a pilgrimage to the site of the graves on Beechey Island.

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New legislation could impact on scrapping decisions

Will the ratification of the Ballast Water Convention mean a clear out of some of the older tanker tonnage?

It is probably too early to say but a tanker that is say 17 years old when the convention enters into force next year, would in theory have another five years before it need to be retrofitted, depending on its special survey dates under the five year drydocking cycle.

Tankers, which are able to drydock prior to its entry into force will not have to fit a BWTS until their special survey after September, 2017 and are thus likely to continue trading for the time being. However, the focus has to be on ships which are due to drydock after September 2017, and thus will be required to fit BWTS.

Over the first eight months of this year, tanker deliveries amounted to 20 mill dwt, according to Gibson Shipbrokers' figures, which take into account vessels of 25,000 dwt and over, while another 19 mill dwt are due to join the fleet over the remaining four months of 2016. A further 37 mill dwt is scheduled for delivery in 2017.

Last year, shipbuilders received orders for 50 mill dwt of tankers, just shy of the 51 mill dwt seen in the heady days of 2008. Thankfully, for the tanker market, orders placed so

far this year amount to a mere 50 (25,000 dwt and above) equivalent to 7 mill dwt and this occurred in a record low newbuilding price environment.

However, Gibson said that it was aware of several owners who are considering placing orders either as an investment opportunity or just part of their fleet renewal programmes. Some newbuilding delivery slippage can be expected, but slippage just means - delayed. So the delivery profile hangs over the tanker market like a very dark cloud, which could remain overhead for some time to come.

Since the start of this year, we have seen a mere 1.4 mill dwt of tanker sales for scrap, which is hardly surprising given the strength of most tanker markets over the first half of 2016 and the poor lightweight values on offer, the shipbroker said.


Another recent support for the VLCC sector has been 'operational' storage for both crude and fuel oil, which was as high as 38 units in May but had diminished to 22 by the beginning of September (excluding Iranian storage).

So it is difficult to find many positive things to say about the tanker market in the short term. The BWMC will have an impact on older ships, as many may not be considered viable to retrofit in terms of costs versus age and earnings potential.

In addition, next month the IMO will probably announce the timing of the implementation of the new global sulphur cap for marine fuels. Many 'pundits' believe the global maximum permissible sulphur limit on marine fuel will be 0.5% (lower limits for the ECAs) and implementation will be brought forward to 2020 from 2025.

Both these pieces of legislation will impact on owners in terms of the expenditure required to comply with these regulations, meaning that they will boost the prospects for increased scrapping, similar to the impact of the introduction of double hulls in the 1990's.

Age profile change



Going forward, the current tanker fleet age profile will start to change, with more vessels approaching scrapping age. Today, 85% of the fleet is below 15 years of age, with 62% below 10 years. However, over the next five years, we will see an increasing number of tankers becoming over 10 years old, Gibson said.

By 2020, around 50% of the fleet will still fall below 10 years of age (versus 62%

today); however, the percentage of 11-15 year olds will increase substantially from around 15% currently (depending on the sector) to around 35%.

There will also be a growing number of tankers crossing into the 15-20 and over 20 year age brackets.

Much could depend on the prevailing freight market conditions that coincide with owners having to make investment decisions.

Our projections indicate that tanker earnings could bottom out over the next few years before recovering in the latter stages of the decade, therefore we may see a heavy period of scrapping in 2018/19, Gibson said. If owners believe that there will be a phase out of

older, less fuel efficient tonnage, lacking ballast water systems, then it could soon become attractive to invest in replacement tonnage.

Inséré 02/10/17 NIEUWS NOUVELLES NEWS Enlevé 02/11/17

New sampling guidelines for the sulphur content of fuel oil

The IMO has published a recommended method for sampling of liquid fuel oil used on board ships to assist with effective control and enforcement of the sulphur content requirements under MARPOL Annex VI. IMO's "Guidelines for Onboard Sampling for the Verification of the Sulphur Content of the Fuel Oil used on board ships" was approved in October 2016 at the Maritime Environment Protection Committee's 70th session (MEPC70) and has been issued as MEPC.1/Circ.864. Although the guidelines are a recommendation only, they set forth an acceptable sampling method for inspectors to determine the sulphur content of fuel oils, both with respect to location of sampling points and handling of the samples. It is worth noting that the ship's representative should, in the absence of a dedicated sampling point approved by the flag state/classification society, be able to propose a location and arrangement for sampling that is safe and representative of the fuel. According to the IMO guidelines, this sampling point should comply with all the following requirements:

- be easily and safely accessible;

- take into account the different fuel oil grades used for the fuel oil combustion machinery item;

- be downstream of the in-use fuel oil service tank;

- be as close to the fuel oil combustion machinery as safely feasible taking into account the type of fuel oil, flow-rate, temperature, and pressure behind the selected sampling point;

- be located in a position shielded from any heated surfaces or electrical equipment and the shielding device or construction should be sturdy enough to endure leaks, splashes or spray under design pressure of the fuel oil supply line so as to preclude impingement of fuel oil onto such surface or equipment;

- and be fitted with suitable drainage to the drain tank or other safe location.

The IMO guidelines also draw attention to the importance of only taking the fuel oil sample once a steady flow is established in the fuel oil circulating system as well as thoroughly flushing through the sampling connection with the fuel oil in use prior to drawing the sample. Members and clients are advised to revisit their onboard procedures for fuel sampling and consider if the recommendations contained in the IMO guidelines should be implemented. Following an inspection involving sampling, it is also advisable that the ship's representative verifies that all sample bottles are properly sealed and labelled. For each sample drawn during the inspection, one bottle should be retained onboard the ship for a period of not less than 12 months from the date of collection. Additional guidance and recommendations are also available in our Loss Prevention Circular: Onboard verification of fuel sulphur content dated 30 September 2016.

Source: Gard

Inséré 04/10/17 DOSSIER Enlevé 04/11/17

Can decommissioning cause more harm than good?

As operations in the North Sea enter a new phase and widespread decommissioning begins, can we expect oil rigs to be removed without a trace? Given the damage decommissioning itself can cause, should we want them to be? A significant number of projects in the North Sea are approaching the end of their life cycle, as the basin has matured and the oil price crash has made production uneconomical in many cases, and large-scale decommissioning is beginning to take place.

Decommissioning is the fastest-growing activity in the North Sea oil and gas sector, with more than 100 platforms due to shut down before 2025. This will include more than 1,800 wells and 7,500km of pipeline being decommissioned at great expense to both the companies involved and the UK Government. The basin has matured and the oil crash has made production uneconomical in many cases. However, decommissioning on this scale will be challenging and problems are already arising. Not only is it extremely expensive, with estimates for the decommissioning of the North Sea ranging from £50bn to £100bn, but the lengthy process also poses environmental challenges.

Due to regulations introduced in 1998 in the OSPAR convention, oil companies can no longer abandon their platforms but instead must fully remove them. But can an installation ever be removed without a trace, and if so, is this actually the best option? One of the first major decommissioning projects in the North Sea will be the removal of the Brent platforms owned by Royal Dutch Shell. But instead of removing the entire platforms, Shell has sought an exemption from OSPAR that would allow it to abandon the platform legs, 64 storage tanks and oil-contaminated drill cuttings.

The legs on three platforms are constructed on concrete and steel, and weigh 300,000 tonnes each, presenting logistical difficulties for their removal. This raises the question whether it would be better for the environment to leave the legs behind. Shell argues it is, claiming that the platforms were built quickly and without considering decommissioning, unlike many platforms which were always designed to be removed. The company therefore proposes that instead of disrupting the surrounding environment, the legs should be left jutting out of the water as navigational tools for fishermen. Not everyone agrees with Shell's assessment, however. WWF Scotland has criticised the company's approach, arguing it is grounded in economics instead of environmental concern. "Oil and gas companies operating in the North Sea have a legal, as well as moral, obligation to clean up their mess," WWF Scotland director Lang Banks said. "Having once pushed the boundaries of science and engineering to secure the oil and gas beneath the seabed, the industry should show the same innovation when it comes to decommissioning."

"Oil and gas companies operating in the North Sea have a legal, as well as moral, obligation to clean up their mess."

While Shell's Brent field is by no means the first decommissioning project in the North Sea, it is one of the largest, and therefore has highlighted many of the challenges. Decommissioning technology has vastly improved in recent years, and ships have been

designed to carry entire topsides of platforms to shore for dismantling. Shell will use one such vessel to remove the 24,000-tonne topsides of the Brent platforms. But despite these advances, decommissioning is not an easy process, and environmental dangers are ever-present.

The dangers of decommissioning

Complete decommissioning comes with potential environmental hazards. Over the years oil platforms become part of the environment around them, often providing breeding grounds for fisheries. "In some locations, platforms may provide much or all of the adult fishes of some heavily-fished species and this contributes disproportionately to those species' larval production," says a study on underwater ecosystems conducted by the University of California, Santa Barbara.

An important aspect of complete decommissioning to consider is the removal of rocks dumped on the seafloor for the purpose of levelling the ground or protecting and insulating subsea pipes. "Rock dump can be a significant input into protected sediment habitats (including sandbanks) and at present proposed decommissioning works are resulting in larger post-decommissioning footprints than the infrastructure footprints during operation," a Joint Nature Conservation Committee report noted in September 2016.

"At present proposed decommissioning works are resulting in larger post-decommissioning footprints than the infrastructure footprints during operation."

Not only can decommissioning damage ecosystems; it also has broader environmental effects. Decommissioning requires tugs and barges which create a vast amount of CO₂ to transport the rig to shore. Once onshore, due to the wear the platform and legs have sustained, a lot of the metal is unsuitable for recycling, and therefore is simply broken down and taken to a landfill along with the concrete and other elements of the rig. It seems clear that an overzealous removal of all aspects of a rig can itself cause damage, but abandoning the platform entirely can be just as bad. Predominantly the dangers of lax platform abandonment revolve around the possibility of an oil leak, as although the wells are always plugged during decommissioning, these plugs can erode or be pushed out by changes in pressure. There are fewer dangers associated with the platforms themselves; although they will erode over time, their remote location ensures this is of little consequence.

Rigs-to-Reefs

In other parts of the world, where fields have already matured, alternatives to complete decommissioning have been used. Arguably the most successful alternative has been the Rigs-to-Reefs technique, which leaves some of the rig to become an artificial reef, providing a habitat for wildlife. Rigs-to-Reefs Exploration, a company which specialises in the technique, describes the approach: "Through this decommissioning process, the oil well is capped and the upper 85 feet of the platform is either towed, toppled in place, or removed."

Rigs-to-Reefs has already been used off the coast of California, where the large remaining structures were shown to provide viable habitats for marine animals. Not all platforms are suitable, and a full ecological survey is required before a rig can be considered. However, in cases where the approach is suitable, these abandoned rigs can become part of the ecosystems and save the company and the tax payer money, as Rigs-to-Reefs Exploration claims it costs less than a fifth of full removal.

Elsewhere, abandoned rigs have been put to use as hotels and resorts. Off the coast of Malaysia the SeaAdventures centre is an old oil rig converted into a 25-room hotel and diving school. This is one of the most successful examples of reuse, but other suggestions have also been made, ranging from luxury hotels to high-security prisons. While it seems

clear that complete removal is not always the most environmentally efficient option for an oil rig, there is often no alternative. Reuse of rigs, either as reefs or otherwise, depends on location and suitability. Furthermore the sheer number of rigs facing decommissioning means not all of them can find an alternative purpose in the future.

Ultimately there is no hard-and-fast rule about which level of decommissioning is best for a rig, as it depends largely on the location and environment. But it seems sensible to consider the alternatives before the complete removal process of a platform is set in motion.

source: offshore-technology

Inséré 06/10/17 NIEUWS NOUVELLES NEWS Enlevé 06/11/17

Five killed in Gadani Beach LPG carrier fire

Five shipbreaking workers were killed and one injured in another fire that occurred in a Gadani Beach recycling yard this week.

This fire broke out on board of the beached LPG carrier 'Gaz Fountain'.

The vessel's last beneficial owner was the Greek shipping company Naftomar. Her name was changed to 'Rain' and the Panama flag swapped for the Comoros flag just before her last voyage – a clear indicator of the use of a cash buyer, the NGO Shipbreaking Platform claimed.

Shipping newspaper TradeWinds asked cash buyer Wirana for a comment in December, when a first fire had occurred on the same ship. Wirana, one of the world's largest firms specialised in end-of-life deals, lists Naftomar as a client, the Platform said.

The accident occurred at yard No 60, owned by Rizwan Diwan Farooq, the former president of the Pakistan Ship Breakers' Association. According to local newspaper The Dawn, Farooq was detained after having fled the yard. The newspaper reported that the fire broke out due to a "chemical foam" present in the ship.

The local Environment Department said that all combustibles should have been removed before the cutting process started and that the accident signalled serious neglect. No worker was injured in the earlier fire that had broken out on the vessel on 21st December; however, that incident did not result in any further safety measures that could have prevented this week's accident.

"Less than three months after the worst explosion in the history of shipbreaking shook Gadani, five more men are dead. We wonder how many lives must be lost before the Government cracks down on the appalling working conditions," said Patrizia Heidegger, the Platform's executive director. "It is shameful for both the shipowner, Naftomar, and the cash buyer to benefit from a situation in which workers' lives are risked to maximise profits. We ask shipowners to ensure that their end-of-life ships are dismantled in clean and safe ship recycling facilities off the beach."

On 1st November, 2016, at least 27 workers were killed and 58 injured in an explosion on an FSO beached at yard No 54 at Gadani. Four more workers are still missing as their families have not been able to find their bodies in the mortuary, the NGO said.

After this incident, the Government stopped work at the shipbreaking yards, and several key persons were arrested. However, the yards were soon allowed to return to business as usual, and the Government has yet to prove that it will ensure that the Pakistan shipbreaking industry is moved to industrial platforms that can provide necessary safety measures for workers and prevent pollution of the coastal environment.

On 8th January, another worker was killed in a separate incident, when a lifeboat fell from the 'Snowdon', previously owned by the Zodiac Group.

In November, Platform member organisation Centre of the Rule of Law, Islamabad (CRoLI), filed a petition in the courts to press for further action and the release of information to which the Government of Pakistan and the Government of the province of Balochistan, the Environmental Protection Agency and the Labour department have to reply to. As a result, the Prime Minister has ordered an inquiry.


The Government's report is yet to be published.

"The death of 33 workers in these last months must be a wake-up call for the Pakistan Government," said Heidegger. "There is growing awareness amongst ship owners. In particular, investors, shipping banks and the clients of the shipping industry are growing weary of such gruesome accidents. If Pakistan does not want to lose this industry, the Government needs to ensure it is shifted to industrial sites off the beach."

It was later reported that the authorities had shut the recycling yards for 15 days.

Inséré 08/10/17 BOEKEN LIVRES BOOKS Enlevé 08/11/17

Elizabeth`s Sea Dogs



Elizabeth's Sea Dogs investigates the rise and fall of a unique group of adventurers - men like Francis Drake, John Hawkins, Martin Frobisher and Walter Raleigh. They sailed, fought, looted and whored their way across the globe; in the process, they established a lasting British presence in the Americas, defeated the Spanish Armada, and made Queen Elizabeth I very wealthy, if seldom grateful.

Author: Hugh Bicheno

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Inséré 08/10/17 HISTORIEK HISTORIQUE Enlevé 08/11/17

Warfare at Sea 1500 - 1650 (part VI)

THE PORTUGUESE IN MARITIME ASIA, 1498-1600

A small power in a great ocean

In the early decades of the fifteenth century the Indian Ocean was the scene of a remarkable case of maritime power projection. From 1405 to 1433 the Ming emperors of China sent seven large fleets into this area. Some of them carried almost 30,000 men and the major ships of the fleets were at least as big as the largest cargo carriers of Europe of that time, the Genoese and Venetian carracks. The aim of these huge expeditions was neither territorial conquest, nor mercantile hegemony. The fleets suppressed piracy, negotiated treaties with local rulers who were induced to pay tribute, they brought emissaries to the emperor and they promoted trade between China, South and Southeast Asia, Arabia and Africa. The presence of the mighty fleets must have given foreign rulers and seafarers a visible proof of the power of Imperial China. But the Chinese did not acquire any naval bases outside metropolitan China, nor did they permanently deploy any warships in the Indian Ocean.

Armed force and the ability to send large fleets far from their bases were not transformed into commercial profit or a Chinese maritime empire.

The most populous and technically advanced empire on earth in the fifteenth century had for a brief period turned its attention to the ocean south of its territory but it had not found anything which induced its rulers to create a permanent power structure in this area.

In fact, the naval expeditions were very expensive for the Imperial treasury and that in itself is an explanation for why they ceased. Chinese cargo carriers continued to sail to Southeast Asia as they had for centuries but they seldom appeared in the Indian Ocean and they were not protected by the Chinese state.

The lack of political or commercial legacy left by the Chinese naval efforts in the Indian Ocean stands in marked contrast to the intrusion into this area of the Portuguese which began with the arrival of Vasco da Gama's little fleet of three ships and around 150 men in 1498. Portugal did not count as a great power in Europe. It was not even one of the most important shipping nations of Europe. Technically, Europe was backward in many respects compared to Asia, and for centuries Europeans were more interested in Asian products than Asians were interested in importing from Europe. In shipping tonnage and number of men the sixteenth century Portuguese presence in the Indian Ocean area was smaller than that of the fifteenth century Chinese fleets. But, unlike the Chinese, the Portuguese had ideas of how naval power might be used with profit. The Portuguese introduced the European idea of using seaborne violence and protection as an export commodity. The Indian Ocean proved to be a surprisingly receptive market. The European innovation in maritime violence gave the foreigners a role as warriors and merchants in a multifarious and ever-changing political and economic environment. Various interest groups began to interact with the Europeans, fought them, sought their protection or shared their know-how about local conditions in exchange for their fighting abilities. Major rulers, such as the Mughals in India or the Safavids in Persia usually co-operated with the Europeans who were regarded for a long time as useful partners on the maritime fringes of their essentially land-orientated empires. The Ottomans sometimes challenged them but with relatively small forces.

Portugal projected a new combination of seaborne armed force, political control and economic ambition that had its impact on Asia. The impact may have been local and limited and hardly noticed by most Asians but it was the first step in a process where Europeans first gained control of the maritime lines of communication by armed force and then continued to take control over Asian and African territories around the Indian Ocean. In the nineteenth century this ocean had, politically, become a European lake bordering

European colonies and protectorates. This was only a transitional phase in the history of European-Asian relations but it must be regarded as important. Many of the formation processes behind the present states around the Indian Ocean have their origin in European sea power. It was the Portuguese who brought the European innovation of sea power as an instrument of state policy to this part of the world.

This chapter will mainly discuss the Portuguese use of armed force in Asian waters up to about 1600. Asian resistance to Portuguese power is mentioned only briefly as is warfare and violence at sea between Asians. This leaves much of the maritime interaction process between Asians out of the picture – Asia was for most of the pre-industrial period the main area for large-scale maritime trade. But available evidence shows that Asians were less accustomed than Europeans to using violence at sea. Major rulers in Asia were normally intransigent to maritime enterprise and traditions of organised naval defence or aggression were lacking. Piracy existed and seafarers were prepared to meet it but Asian merchants seldom used violence as a mean of competition. In the Indian Ocean, Islam had for centuries acted as an integrative force among merchants from different nations. Further east, maritime trade was dominated by Chinese merchants who preferred to co-operate rather than fight each other in foreign waters.

The Portuguese intrusion into the Indian Ocean was based on several factors that made the Europeans unique in their behaviour at sea. Trade, protection and plunder were closely related phenomena in Europe and the control of maritime trade had been the cause of major wars between states such as the late medieval wars between Venice and Genoa. Portugal also represented a recent European political ambition where rulers of states attempted to enforce a monopoly of violence at sea and if possible raise taxes for armed protection of seafarers. Furthermore, Portugal could profit from recent European innovations in sailing-ship technology and gunnery. Portugal also had an unusual know-how in long-distance sailing in unknown waters gained during the fifteenth century explorations of the Atlantic islands (the Azores, Madeira, the Canaries) and the African west coast. The ruling Portuguese dynasty, the House of Aviz, was interested in mercantile enterprise and had developed a small trading empire in West Africa. Finally, the Portuguese elite had a tradition of crusades against Muslims. During the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries it was kept alive with expeditions against Morocco where a network of coastal forts was maintained. In fact, Morocco drew more military resources than the spectacular power projection into the Indian Ocean. This venture would also end in a national catastrophe when the main Portuguese army was annihilated and king Sebastiao killed by the Moroccans at the battle of Alcácer-Kebir in 1578.

The final and systematic Portuguese attempt to find a direct maritime route between Europe and India was made in the 1480s and 1490s by the Kings Joao II (r. 1481–95) and Manuel I (r. 1495–1521). The driving forces behind the expeditions were to find eastern Christian allies against the Muslims and to create a profitable Portuguese-controlled trade in Asian goods, primarily pepper. Up to 1500 that trade went through Egypt and Syria, territories controlled by the Mamluk sultans who raised a considerable part of their incomes from customs on the trade in exchange for protection. In Europe, Venice had, after long struggles with Genoa, gained preponderance as middleman between the Levant ports and the European consumers. This position was based on the city's geographical position and its skill in trade protected by armed force. A direct sea route from the production areas to Europe, eliminating middlemen and armed protectors of trade might both be profitable for the Portuguese and financially disastrous for the Muslim ruler who controlled Jerusalem.

The last consideration was important for king Manuel who was driven by religious zeal and an intense desire to reduce Muslim power. The Portuguese enmity against Muslim groups greatly determined their Indian Ocean policy. It was not obvious that Portugal should

become a political and naval power in this area and this was probably not the original idea. If trade in pepper and other Asian goods had been the only consideration, economy might have induced the Portuguese to act as traders who only used force for defence. Maritime trade in the Indian Ocean was open to anybody who could pay for the goods and a combination of diplomacy, capital (partially from Genoese and Florentine investors) and restrained shows of force against Muslim competitors might have given the Portuguese the opportunity to organise a fairly peaceful trade. As events were to show, Asian competitors were unable to defeat well-armed Portuguese ships. But Portugal soon found that seaborne trade in the Indian Ocean was dominated by Muslims: Arab, Indian and Malay traders who usually belonged to the religion that stirred up Portuguese enmity and crusading zeal. During da Gama's first explorative voyage of 1497–99 and the second and more ambitious expedition sent out under Pedro Alvares Cabral in 1500, serious conflicts had already arisen, mainly in contacts with the Hindu ruler of the great entrepôt city Calicut on the west coast of India. He was sympathetic towards the Europeans as merchants but he rejected Portuguese demands that all Muslim traders should be banished. When Muslim merchants began to attack the Portuguese in Calicut, its ruler was held responsible. The Portuguese quickly began to use their guns against Muslim and Indian ships and cities in order to enforce their will. In this they were successful and these successes set off an aggressive pattern of behaviour. The Portuguese had understood that no strong naval forces were available to resist them if they resorted to offensive actions. Furthermore, they had found that the lightly built Asian ships were highly vulnerable to gunfire.

The third Portuguese expedition, which sailed under Vasco da Gama in 1502, was instructed to leave a squadron in the Indian Ocean as the first permanent Portuguese fleet there. It was a fateful decision and a remarkable proof of the self-confidence and ambition, which now prevailed in Lisbon. Da Gama came with well-armed merchantmen and caravels and quickly began to assert his position with naval power. Blockades, patrols with cruising vessels, bombardments of cities and acts of pure terror were used to control the trade on the west coast of India. Asian ships had to buy licences (*cartazes*) from the Portuguese if they wished to trade in this area. The ruler of Calicut and the Muslim traders assembled a large fleet of both major ships with several hundred men and a large number of small craft which, in February 1503, attacked da Gama's fleet off Calicut. With a vast superiority in manpower the Indian-Muslim fleet naturally attempted to board the Portuguese ships but this was successfully repulsed with gunfire. It was a clear demonstration that the new European combination of easily manoeuvrable sailing ships and heavy guns really worked. From 1503 Portugal sent squadron after squadron of ships into the Indian Ocean and gradually built up a large naval power in the area. The show of force began to pay off when minor rulers along the Indian west coast, primarily that of Cochin, allied themselves with the Portuguese and provided them with bases, ports for trade and access to the pepper producing areas along the coast.

In a few years, Portugal seriously disrupted the trade in pepper and other Asian products through Mamluk and Venetian controlled ports and re-routed it around the Cape. The Mamluk rulers naturally responded in an attempt to regain the trade which had been such an important source of tax incomes. With technical help from the Ottoman empire an Egyptian galley force armed with guns was created in Suez for use in the Indian Ocean. It arrived in 1508 at Diu in northern India where it joined the naval forces of the Sultan of Gujarat.

Gujarat was a major Indian state whose merchants had a large stake in trade throughout the Indian Ocean. Initially the fleet defeated a small Portuguese force which attacked, but it failed to launch the offensive along the west coast of India that would have been necessary to break Portugal's naval control in that area. In spring 1509 the main

Portuguese fleet under the viceroy Francisco de Almeida attacked Diu and destroyed the Egyptian-Gujarat fleet.

This ended the last seaborne attempt to oust Portugal from the Indian Ocean before the arrival of the Dutch East India Company a century later. A gun-armed European battle fleet had taken control over a large ocean at a vast distance from Europe.

Up to 1509 the Portuguese presence in Asia had been purely maritime and no territorial conquest had been attempted. Lonely islands and ports controlled by friendly rulers were used as naval bases. From 1509 to 1515 the governor-general, Afonso de Albuquerque, led a campaign to create a maritime empire where a combination of a permanent fleet and fortified entrepôts and naval bases at strategic choke points would give Portugal control of the major lines of trade in the Indian Ocean. In 1510 he captured Goa on the west coast of India. This city was developed into a centre of trade and it became the capital of Portugal's *Estado da India*. In 1511 the Portuguese fleet sailed east to the city of Malacca (Melaka) which was also taken after a siege. Malacca was the most important entrepôt for spice trade in Southeast Asia and its location in the narrow straits which controlled the most convenient route between the Indian Ocean and the China Seas made it into a strategically very important base. In 1513 a siege of the equally important city of Aden at the entrance of the Red Sea failed. Portugal was never able to gain full control over the Red Sea route and in the latter half of the century this would become a serious gap in their control of the pepper trade. However, in 1515 Albuquerque was able to stage a coup by which he took control over Hormuz (Ormuz) at the entrance of the Persian Gulf, another very important entrepôt and strategic city.

In fifteen years, Portugal had established a new power structure in the Indian Ocean. The Portuguese crown had gained control of the pepper trade in the Arabian Sea and much of the pepper production along the Malabar (western) coast of India and channelled it to the new route around the Cape of Good Hope. Pepper trade became a royal monopoly (periodically leased to private investors) and all trade around Africa had to be carried in armed merchantmen owned by the king. Gradually, these grew in size until, by the latter half of the sixteenth century, they had become the largest European merchantmen in use. The huge *naus* (often called carracks) were a return to fifteenth-century technology when size rather than guns served as defence of cargo carriers. Size was useful in Asia, where the threat often came from small ships using boarding tactics, but it made the ships unwieldy sailers and vulnerable to more manoeuvrable European ships armed with guns.

Apart from the pepper trade, Portugal had also established herself as the seller of protection to Asian seaborne trade and to several small principalities around the Indian Ocean. The Asian merchants in this area had not asked for Portuguese protection and originally the *cartazes* sold by the Portuguese provided little but protection from the Portuguese themselves (sometimes not even that). Portuguese naval control was normally fully effective only along the western coast of India and in the straits of Malacca, but even that was a remarkable achievement in the sixteenth century. Gradually they organised the trade along the Indian west coast in convoys, perhaps as much in order to control it as to protect it from pirates.

From the 1510s Portugal began to use specialised warships, galleons (*galeaos*), to exercise naval control, together with the smaller caravels. The latter type was also developed into a larger form of cruising warship, the *caravela redonda*. For local patrols, light oared and sailing craft were used, including vessels of local type. The number of Portuguese in the east was small, possibly never above 10,000 men (including Eurasians) available for naval and military service. Naval control was therefore essential to supply and reinforce forts and enclaves threatened by local rulers.

The Portuguese were unique as the only sea power with a presence throughout maritime Asia. No Asian power attempted to establish a similar position but they were sometimes successful in resisting or challenging Portuguese power. In 1517 the Portuguese fleet failed when it attacked a Muslim galley squadron in the port of Jiddah in the Red Sea under unfavourable tactical circumstances.⁸ An attack against Diu in 1531 also failed although three years later the Portuguese were able to gain the fort in this important port in exchange for help to the Gujarat ruler against the Mughal invaders. Portugal thus gained better control over the flourishing sea trade of Gujarat. By this time, however, another imperial power, the Ottomans, had begun to show interest in the Arabian Sea. In 1516–17 the Ottomans defeated the Mamluk rulers of Egypt and added Syria, Palestine, Egypt and Mecca to their empire.

This was partly an unintended result of the loss of Mamluk customs revenues which King Manuel of Portugal had hoped for when he attacked the Muslim spice trade in the east.

Neither in the East or West was there any Christian power with the necessary armed force to benefit from the decline of Mamluk power – it was the Ottomans who gained.

In contrast to the Mughal rulers in India, the Sultan in Constantinople had a large navy and could re-direct considerable maritime resources and skills to the Indian Ocean. Potentially, the Ottomans represented a combination of skills, resources and ambition which might have defeated the Portuguese, but the threat never materialised as the rulers in Constantinople had other priorities. However, in the 1530s a substantial Ottoman Red Sea fleet was created and used for offensive purposes. The Sultan of Gujarat allied with the Ottomans who, in 1538, sent a large galley fleet from Suez with an army and strong siege artillery. It first took Aden from its local ruler and then sailed to lay siege to Portuguese-held Diu. This operation ended in a conflict between the two Muslim powers and an Ottoman retreat, however, but the latter had gained control over the Red Sea. This they were determined to retain, not the least because it was necessary for the protection of the holy cities of Mecca and Medina from Christian attacks. An ambitious Portuguese naval attack against their base in Suez in 1541 failed. The Red Sea was difficult to navigate with large sailing ships and they did not return to it. In the early 1550s the Ottomans were active with a fleet based at Basra in the Persian Gulf. They made successful attacks in 1551–52 but were defeated when they attempted to take Hormuz in 1554. In 1585 and 1588 the Ottomans made raids along the east African coast which forced the Portuguese to establish firmer control there.

Ottoman seapower in the Indian Ocean mainly consisted of Mediterranean-style galleys which were unable to challenge the Portuguese sailing fleet far from their bases. This may be attributed to limited maritime ambition as well as to technical conservatism, but the galleys were powerful in the areas where they could operate. Ottoman control of the Red Sea made it possible for Asian merchants to reopen the trade between Asia and the Levant. The most active oceanic challenge to the Portuguese from the 1560s on came from the Sultanate of Aceh on northern Sumatra. Aceh could buy spices from the Moluccas islands in the eastern Indonesian archipelago and the Sultan co-operated both with Gujarati merchants from whom he gathered advanced sailing-ship technology and the Ottomans from whom he received gunfounders and artillerymen. For the Ottomans, the alliance with Gujarat and Aceh became a method of challenging the Portuguese using limited means. Well-armed Aceh ships (some possibly owned by Gujaratis) began to break the Portuguese attempts to enforce naval blockades on Aceh and the Red Sea. Aceh also established a network of trade in the Bay of Bengal which was beyond Portuguese control. The Sultan of Aceh even became a serious threat to the Portuguese base in Malacca which was attacked in 1568 and repeatedly in 1571–5. The Portuguese navy was able to counter these threats but various plans for blockades and sieges of Aceh were not fulfilled.

Aceh represented the most serious maritime threat against the Portuguese in the sixteenth century precisely because this state imitated their own technology – strongly-built sailing ships armed with heavy guns. Interestingly, neither of the two Muslim powers from which Aceh received support, Gujarat and the Ottomans, themselves used this combination of modern technology with success, a fact which illustrates that new combinations of skills may develop more efficiently in areas where the established technology is less firmly entrenched in the power structure.

Apart from the *carreira* trade around Africa and the protection selling empire, Portugal also had a mercantile presence in maritime Asia. The crown organised a number of intra-Asian *carreiras* which were gradually replaced by trading voyages contracted out to Portuguese, usually to officers and administrators who recognised the possibility of gaining commercial profit as a reward for their service to the crown. When the Portuguese acquired knowledge about this part of the world and its opportunities for profit, many of them also began to act as traders and mercenaries to Asian rulers without permission from the state. This type of activity was common around the Bay of Bengal where the Portuguese state exercised less control. Portugal also began to establish a presence in Southeast Asia (Indonesia) and the Chinese hemisphere. In Southeast Asia pepper and other spices were the most important products. The Portuguese never claimed any monopoly in this area but with well armed ships they were able to establish profitable trade and gain influence over local rulers of islands such as Ternate and Tidore. Attempts to use force against the Chinese in the early 1520s were repulsed but special circumstances soon made it possible for the Portuguese to develop a profitable trade in this area. The Chinese emperor had forbidden his subjects to trade with Japan, but the imperial bureaucrats in southern China began, in their own interest, to allow the Portuguese to act as middlemen. From c. 1557 they were also allowed to create a trading factory at Macao. The yearly voyage with one great *nau* on the route Goa-Macao-Nagasaki became the most valuable of all concessionary voyages. In this part of the world, the Portuguese acted as peaceful traders who used arms only in defence against pirates.

Few efforts have been made to prove whether the armed protection of the Portuguese state really was necessary to give the Portuguese the opportunity to trade profitably in maritime Asia. It is possible that Portuguese merchants might have been able to use European technology (ships and guns) profitably as a mean of defence even if their state had abstained from monopolistic protection selling. Trade east of Cape Comorin (the southern tip of India) where the *Estado* had a limited role was attractive for private entrepreneurs. But it was the kings who made the early investments in discovery and the gathering of maritime skills. Portuguese control over great entrepôts like Hormuz, Diu, Goa and Malacca may also have given Portuguese merchants advantage in information and the possibility of making decisions with greater certainty. The control of entrepôts ultimately depended on the armed force of the state, primarily the navy which controlled the sea lines of communication between them.

The organisation of a new trade route around Africa, the enforcement of a practical monopoly of violence at sea based on fortresses and a permanent fleet, and the development of European trade in Asia were remarkable achievements for a medium-sized European nation. The three facets of the Portuguese network of trade and power were based on the geographical, political, technical, maritime and mercantile skills and the control of major Asian entrepôts which the Portuguese state had developed during its dynamic drive to the east. Could this combination be developed into something which raised Portugal's position in Europe? Venice had earlier become prosperous on well-protected trade, the Dutch and the British later created positive circles of development around their overseas enterprises, and the Danish kings used the Sound Toll as a financial base for state formation. It might have been possible to achieve something similar if the

three components had been connected into a system that promoted Portuguese capitalism, enriched the Portuguese state and created know-how which had given the Portuguese a lasting role as naval and maritime innovators. This might have given Portugal political and economic leverage in Europe and a leading role in the union with Spain when the Habsburgs had to develop competence in naval shipbuilding, and professionalism in warfare at sea, for the European power struggle in the late sixteenth century.

Something went wrong. In early modern Europe a limited population was no serious obstacle against a European state becoming a great power. Venice, the Dutch Republic and Sweden are examples of that. In the early sixteenth century Portugal had the ambition, but after a promising start it left the game. The Portuguese navy did indeed play an important role in the Habsburg war effort in Europe, but it proved a blunt instrument for offensive warfare against the English and the Dutch who by the late sixteenth century had developed more advanced instruments of sea power. There is no definite historical explanation of why the Portuguese navy stagnated and there is also a serious lack of studies of this navy as an organisation: its technology, logistics and personnel and its role as an instrument of state policy. Studies of the anatomy of Portuguese sea power might be rewarding as they might increase our understanding both of the great Asian societies which did not develop naval organisations and the European societies which did. Recent research on the *Estado da India* has concentrated on other questions but we can try to find partial explanation by looking at various interpretations offered by recent scholarship.

Inséré 10/10/17 DOSSIER Enlevé 10/11/17

Culture, Competence and Certification in Crew Training

In this article, Capt Pradeep Chawla of Anglo-Eastern discusses the role of certificates of competency in safety training, the relationship between STCW competency standards and industry expectations, as well as the role of shipboard and organisational culture in the prevention of accidents

We all know that the reason for doing safety training is to prevent harm to people, environment, property and to prevent loss of profits.

The regulatory framework is fairly well established. We have the STCW convention; based on which each country is expected to make their national training standards. We have a 'white list' of countries who have been judged by IMO appointed 'competent persons' to have met the requirements of complying with STCW.

Each country has a system of quality assurance for their training institutions. To assist the teachers around the world and to achieve similar training standards worldwide, IMO publishes Model Courses for various subjects. The regulatory framework has also given powers to port states to verify that the seafarers visiting their ports are competent.

It is a framework that the maritime industry should be proud of, as there are few industries that have internationally agreed standards of competence. Just compare worker safety in the USA and Bangladesh.

In theory, all seafarers who have obtained their certification from any whitelisted country are competent to operate a ship. So, why are we discussing safety training in so many 'manning and training' conferences?

I guess it's because accidents continue to happen – and while the total accidents in the maritime industry have significantly reduced in the past 30 years, we all want to reach a goal of zero injuries, zero pollution and zero losses to property or profits.

In order to continuously improve, we then have to question whether the certificate of competency is a guarantee of competence and is sufficient to prevent accidents.

Any 'insider' in the maritime manning and training industry will agree that the certificate of competency is not enough.

The reasons are simple. While the efforts by IMO are well intentioned and commendable, the reality is that the training standards in different countries are not the same. The reasons for the variance are many:

- No government or shipowner support for training institutions
- A big differential in teachers' salaries and shipboard salaries
- A disconnect between shipping companies and colleges
- Poor markets and many shipowner's expecting someone other than themselves to pay for training

A detailed analysis of the STCW competences will also reveal that STCW mainly focusses on knowledge and skill required for the competence. Shipowners and ship managers complain that the maritime education and training institutes do not teach the 'practical' aspects of the job i.e. it's not particularly 'hands-on'.

The reason for this difference is that, while educators do their best to ensure that the seafarer is taught the knowledge and skills for the STCW competence, what the industry is looking for is the ability to do the job successfully and efficiently to prevent an accident. The industry is looking for competence in the workplace.

Competence

Competence, as expected by the industry, consists of knowledge, skill and attitude. A college can teach knowledge and skills, but the attitude of the seafarer while doing a task is affected by various factors. And in the case of an accident, the industry quite often alleges that the seafarer was somehow 'incompetent'.

PSC and charterers' inspections like SIRE / CDI attempt to check competence during their visits. Generally, judgment of competence is left to the company; who in turn rely on the Master, Chief Engineer and the ship superintendent to comment on each seafarer in the 'Appraisal Systems'.

The industry is slowly moving from appraisal systems towards a more structured 'Competency

Management System', which basically consists of defining critical competencies for each rank and laying down the guidelines and assessment method for each competency. Usually, the assessment is carried out by the Master and Chief Engineer by observing the seafarer performing the task on board.

At this stage very few companies in the industry have implemented a formal Competency Management System.

There have been attempts to sell CMS as a 'product' but this did not get much of a 'buy in' from the industry. The reasons for this included the administrative burden involved, the lack of visible and tangible commercial benefits, and the lack of willingness to accept the expected costs.

Intertanko is now working on a revised version of its 'TOTS' competency standards and hopefully the industry (including charterers) will support it.

Would a formal competency management system improve performance and prevent accidents? I believe it will bring about some improvements if companies believe in it and make genuine efforts to judge the competencies objectively.

One may argue that, as seen at times in cadet record books, Masters and Chief engineers may sign off a seafarer as being competent in the workplace without adequate and strict verification. But what about accidents that happen on ships manned by 'competent crew'?

Safety Culture

After an accident, investigations by flag / port states often criticise the company for a lack of 'safety culture' on board. This is often alleged if the knowledge or the experience of the seafarer is not being doubted.

What exactly is this 'Safety Culture'? There is no internationally agreed definition for 'Safety Culture' in the maritime industry or in other industries. Various definitions are used in different countries and within one country.

For the maritime industry, perhaps one appropriate one is the UK HSE definition, which states:

The safety culture of an organization is the product of individual and group values, attitudes, perceptions, competencies, and patterns of behaviour that determine the commitment to, and the style and proficiency of, an organization's health and safety management. Organizations with a positive safety culture are characterised by communications founded on mutual trust, by shared perceptions of the importance of safety and by confidence in the efficacy of preventive measures.

Not exactly an easy one to get common understanding among 1.5 million seafarers!

Safety culture on board a ship is more complex than in other industries because there is a change of team (crew) members on board on a continuous basis. One of the four management level officers could be changing every month.

If we consider that there may be a multinational crew on board, the complexity of the safety culture increases dramatically considering language, communication barriers and other differences amongst the nationalities employed. The ship-port interface is also global, unlike land based organizations.

Safety culture on board is therefore like a constantly changing cloud. This cloud is very easily affected by the instructions and directions given by the office. So if safety training has to be effective in preventing accidents, the role of the organizational culture must be clearly understood and accepted.

Accidents in general are not caused due to lack of knowledge or lack of skill. If you read the investigation reports, in most major accidents the crew was competent and were experienced – for example

EXXON Valdez, Braer, Maersk Svendborg, etc. Accident reports will often identify issues like complacency, lack of motivation, taking shortcuts and other issues.

The underlying reasons for these human factors are often to be found in the organizational culture. The 'Safety Culture' on board is a subset of the organizational culture.

Consider this model of human performance (table below) based on my ideas, after spending over 40 years in the industry, and let us discuss a few of its examples.



Pay & Benefits: Due to shortage of officers, a new Master is taken by the company at a higher wage than existing Masters in the fleet. How would it affect the morale of the Masters who are sailing in the company for a long time?

Respect given: A Senior Master or Chief Engineer is reprimanded for an initiative taken by the officer with the best intentions for the company, which failed for

some reason. Would the Master take further initiatives in the future?

Empathy: A seafarer is not relieved in time to reach home to look after an ailing child.

In situations such as those given in the examples above, the motivation of the seafarer drops. If the motivation of the management level officers is low, supervision and monitoring by the management team reduces and the general attitude on board can become complacent very easily and quickly. In such circumstances, safety is likely to be compromised.

Seafarers get the brunt of the criticism in case of accidents. However, if the causal analysis is deep enough, it is seen (in many cases) that poor organizational culture, rather than the safety training of the seafarer, is the root cause of the accident. Effectiveness of the safety training in prevention of accidents is thus very dependent on the organizational culture.

The main issue is not the variance in safety training in different countries. STCW is slowly getting there. The main improvement required is in the offices that direct and control the safety culture on board.

QHSE / ISM systems are the framework. Taking care of the human element is the key to a reduction in accidents.

The focus must remain on the individual seafarer and his inter-relationship with the organizational culture of the company.

Inséré 12/10/17 NIEUWS NOUVELLES NEWS Enlevé 12/11/17

Ships Slow to Protect Whales and Cut Emissions

Ten shipping companies have been recognized for their participation in an initiative to cut air pollution and protect whales in Santa Barbara, California. The shipping companies that participated are: CMA CGM, Evergreen, Hamburg Sud, Hapag Lloyd, Holland, K Line, Maersk, MOL, NYK Line and Yang Ming. The companies' ships reduced speed in the Santa Barbara Channel region to 12 knots or less. The program started July 1 and ended November 15, 2016.

With two of the busiest ports in the world, thousands of vessels travel through the Santa Barbara Channel and the Channel Island National Marine Sanctuary. Ships account for more than 50 percent of NOx emissions in Santa Barbara County and for more than 25

percent of NOx emissions in Ventura County. The program reduced more than 27 tons of emissions of NOx and more than 1,000 metric tons of greenhouse gases.

Ship strikes are also a major threat to recovering endangered and threatened whale populations, including blue, humpback, and fin whales. The incentives for the 2016 program targeted historically faster transits to achieve the most significant air emission and whale conservation benefits from the reduced speeds. Incentives ranged from \$1,500 to \$2,500 depending on historical speeds in the program area. Additional incentives up to \$1,250 were available for ships that slow to 10 knots or less, submit detailed whale sightings reports and demonstrate that schedules were adjusted so that the ships did not need to speed up elsewhere along the route. Response to this variable incentive scale was positive, with most companies electing to opt in on additional voluntary measures and some choosing to even go beyond what they're being asked to do. One example is K Line, whose captains and crew have regularly provided photos and annotated maps of all whale sightings along with the requested whale sightings report. In addition, more than 90 percent of the companies whose ships traverse the California coast indicated interest in participating in a Bay Area program in the future if one is offered. The program is a collaborative effort by the Santa Barbara County Air Pollution Control District, NOAA's Channel Islands National Marine Sanctuary, Ventura County Air Pollution Control District, National Marine Sanctuary Foundation and Volgenau Foundation. The partners are working on identifying funding sources for a 2017 incentive program, expected to start June 1, 2017.

source: MAREX

Inséré 14/10/17 DOSSIER Enlevé 14/11/17

Advantages of the new Panama Canal outlined



With the Panama Canal's new set of locks now open, shipping trades are affected since vessels up to about 180,000 dwt are now able to transit the newly expanded canal.

This will mean that not only vessels, which could not pass through the old locks will now be able to transit the Canal (eg Aframax and

Suezmaxes), but also existing vessels formerly transiting with a reduced draft will now be able to take advantage of the 3.16 m additional draft allowance of the new locks.

Marine consultants and surveyors Alpha Marine(AMC) gave an example of the Panamax/LR1 types. The draft and carrying capacity difference is outlined in table 1.

Panamax/LR1	Existing Locks	New Locks
Draft (TFW)	12.04 m	14.48 m (<15.20 m)
Draft (TFW) diff.	-	2.44 m
DWT	abt 57,480	73,580 full DWT
Source: Alpha Marine		

This would result in around 16,100 tonnes of additional cargo, which a Panamax/LR1 would be able to

carry by navigating through the new locks. This benefit increases with ship size. Most Aframax and all Suezmaxes did not have the ability to transit the old locks, but they will now be able to transit the Panama Canal, albeit at less than summer draft in some cases. AMC gave examples for Aframax and Suezmaxes able to take advantage of the new locks:

	Aframax	Suezmax
Draft (max-TFW)	15.46 m	17.81 m
Draft (Panama-TFW)	15.20 m	15.20 m
Draft diff.	0.26 m	2.61 m
DWT (max-TFW)	abt 118,000	abt 163,000
DWT (Panama-TFW)	abt 115,000	abt 134,000
Source: Alpha Marine		

Table 2

Looking at table 2, Aframax vessels may now transit the Canal almost fully laden, whereas Suezmax vessels may transit partially loaded with a dwt of around 130,000. AMC has already prepared the necessary technical documentation required for compliance with the new Panama Canal requirements (ACP OP Notice to Shipping N-1-2016) for more than 300 vessels of all types (more than 100 of which were tankers). The experience gained through all these projects allows AMC to optimise the design in terms of a) number/location of additional

fittings required (eg avoid new fittings over fuel tanks, reducing required staging, upgrading the SWL of existing fittings to avoid new ones, etc) and b) required under-deck reinforcements (for minimum added steel weight). AMC explained that each project is typically split into the following three phases:

Preparation of draft, updated Mooring Arrangement Plan in accordance with applicable requirements and submission to Panama Canal Authorities for approval. This enables operators to have a clear view with regards to the extent (and associated budget) of the required modifications at an early stage.

Review/preparation of necessary drawings as per ACP N-1-2016 requirements for determining each vessel's compliance. To this effect, the pilot boarding facilities, pilot shelters, blue steering lights, navigational instruments locations, minimum laden/ballast drafts, etc are checked so that approval may be granted from ACP. This does not apply to vessels already having transited the Panama Canal (old locks), eg Panamax vessels, since they already comply with the requirements.

Upon receipt of full approval from the ACP and after ordering the new required fittings, strength calculations as per applicable class requirements need to be prepared to determine the necessary under-deck reinforcements in way of new mooring/towing fittings, and preparation of relevant structural drawings for class approval.

Tanker Operator is indebted to Philip Tschlis, Naval Architect & Marine Engineer and Technical Director of AMC for providing this updated information.

Inséré 16/10/17 NIEUWS NOUVELLES NEWS Enlevé 16/11/17

Regulation suits majors as they alone can meet compliance costs: Anglo-Eastern


GREATER regulation benefits the big ship management companies like Hong Kong's Anglo-Eastern, because only major companies can meet soaring compliance costs, says company chairman Peter Cremers. "There is too much regulation in shipping today, but I must say that more regulation is good for us as ship managers, especially those of us that operate

on a large scale," he said. "Regulatory compliance costs are so high that only big players like Anglo-Eastern with its fleet of 600 ships can meet these expenses," he told the annual Anglo Eastern press luncheon at the Royal Hong Kong Yacht Club earlier this week. New ballast water treatment systems cost US\$3 million to \$5 million per ship. Then there is need for scrubbers to achieve new low-sulphur emission standards, he said. "The very size of our operations, means we can get prices from suppliers few others can," Mr Cremer said. "This benefits us - yes. But it is a benefit we pass on to our customers." Ship management has become more of a necessity than an option for shipowners, more so now after the Hanjin bankruptcy. Banks won't provide financing to shipowners unless they have a ship manager to take over a bankrupt fleet if owners become insolvent. Which makes it all look good for ship management in general and for the company in particular, said the company's new CEO Bjorn Hojgaard, who once headed Univan Ship Management, which has completed its merger with Anglo-Eastern over the last year. Mr Hojgaard said that Anglo Eastern would continue to trade under its old name, but Univan brand would survive in the name of the parent company as Anglo-Eastern Univan Group. While the merger had been painful at times, the union had instantly created Anglo-Eastern as a "major corporation" and settled the question of succession. Anglo-Eastern founder Mr Cremers, while still active as executive chairman, is in his early 70s and has handed over more functions to Mr Hojgaard. Executives at the luncheon also reported that piracy was less of a worry these days, Anglo-Eastern having reportedly paid US\$8 million ransom to free its tanker and its crew from Somali pirates in 2012. "Somalia has calmed down, though the violence in Nigeria is a problem," said one of the executive interspersed among the journalists at the horseshoe table. "The problem seems to be that the [Nigerians] have no safe place to go with the ships. So they are more violent before they cut and run," another said. Reports of piracy rising in the Philippines' Sulu Sea were dismissed as petty. "There was a fishing trawler, but no blue water vessels," said one executive.

source : Schednet

Inséré 16/10/17 BOEKEN LIVRES BOOKS Enlevé 16/11/17

1915 The First World War at Sea in Photographs



Submarines and blockades dominated the war at sea in 1915. The major event was the sinking by U-20 of the Lusitania, which edged America closer to war. The Germans had announced a blockade of Britain in February, using submarines to sink and harry shipping. A British blockade of Germany was announced in March in retaliation. Using its surface fleet to stop neutral vessels, the British attempt was more successful. The British submarine force was also successful, commanders leading patrols into the Black Sea and the Baltic Sea. Surface ship engagements would be fought by battlecruisers at the Battle of the Dogger Bank, and by cruisers off the coast of Chile as the German warship Dresden was sunk in the Pacific.

On the east coast of Africa, the raider Königsberg was sunk in the war's first instance of sea-air cooperation. Attempts to bully Turkey into surrendering saw numerous Allied warships sunk off the Dardanelles and an amphibious landing took place there in an attempt to create a supply route into the Black Sea. By the end of the year it was obvious that the invasion of Turkey had failed and the soldiers were evacuated. At the same time, Allied shipping was being used to evacuate the Serbian army from the coast of Albania, the biggest seaborne evacuation that there had ever been until Dunkirk.

Inséré 18/10/17 HISTORIEK HISTORIQUE Enlevé 18/11/17

"Sur la tombe d'un marin ne fleurissent pas de roses"

Par Saint Bernard du Spuikom

Il existe à Bruxelles, à l'ombre du Palais de Justice, une modeste place sur laquelle on peut admirer un très beau mémorial. Beaucoup de Belges ignorent l'évènement qu'il commémore.

Érigé place Jean Jacobs et inauguré le 21 juillet 1912, ce monument dû au ciseau du statuaire Charles Samuel, rappelle aux passants le tragique naufrage le 19 avril 1906 du COMTE DE SMET DE NAEYER, premier navire-école belge digne de ce nom.

C'est là qu'eut lieu le 19 avril dernier un émouvant hommage aux victimes. Cette manifestation marquait le 80e anniversaire de cette tragédie.



Le Vice-Amiral E. Poulet, rendant hommage aux victimes du COMTE DE SMET DE NAEYER. (Photo Fr. Philips)

De nombreuses gerbes de fleurs furent déposées par des personnalités parmi lesquelles on notait MM. Brouhon, bourgmestre de Bruxelles, le Vice-Amiral Ed. Poulet, chef d'Etat-Major de la Force Navale, Coppieters 't Wallant, le Comte de Smet de Naeyer, le Baron Daufresne de la Chevalerie, président du Cercle Georges Lecointe, à l'initiative de qui fut organisée cette commémoration, etc. Des détachements de la Force Navale, de l'Ecole Supérieure de Navigation d'Anvers (ESNA), de l'Ecole Supérieure de Radio-navigation de Bruxelles (ESRN), de l'Ibis, de Corps Royal des Cadets de Marine et bien d'autres associations rendirent également les honneurs en ce jour mémorable.

Parmi la foule se tenaient des adolescents; des jeunes gens, pour qui le nom du navire-école COMTE DE SMET DE NAEYER n'évoquait que .. bien peu de choses! Mais peut-on leur en vouloir, si personne ou presque en Belgique, ne le leur en parle ou les initie aux choses de la mer ?

Qu'ils sachent donc que le 29 décembre 1903 fut constituée à Anvers une société anonyme,

l'Association Maritime Belge - ASMAR - dont le but était d'armer un navire au commerce qui assurerait en même temps le rôle de navire-école pour la formation de nos futurs officiers de marine.

Après de nombreuses tractations, cette association passa commande d'un voilier en acier aux Grangemouth & Greenock Dock Yards & C^o en Ecosse. La quille en fut posée le 16 juin 1904 et le lancement eut lieu le 11 octobre de la même année.

Gréé en 3 mâts-carré, il mesurait selon le Loyds Register of British and Foreign Shipping: 267 pieds h.t.; 41,1 pieds de large pour 23,6 p. de creux de cale. Avec un exposant de charge de 3.030 tonnes (d.w. ou tonnes de 1.015 kg.), il pouvait embarquer 2.880 tonnes de grains dont 2.454 réparties dans les cales et 426 disposées au-dessus des water-ballasts.


Cinq cloisons étanches compartimentaient la coque, les cales 2 et 3 pouvant également faire office de water-ballasts. Cent et dix hommes dont 80 cadets pouvaient être logés à bord de cette majestueuse unité qui ne portait pas moins de 2.833 m² de voiles.

Il fut baptisé COMTE DE SMET DE NAEYER en hommage au gantois Paul de Smet de Naeyer (1843-1913), homme politique catholique qui fut ter ministre de notre gouvernement de 1896 à 1907 et qui assura de son soutien inconditionnel, l'œuvre de l'ASMAR, dès sa création.

Peu après sa mise à l'eau, notre nouveau voilier fut victime d'un accident. Il chavira dans le bassin James Watt le 29 octobre 1904 et tomba contre le quai, alors qu'il y était amarré par tribord avec tous ses mâts étambrés et étayés. Fâcheux présage !

Ce chavirage fut imputé à une fausse manœuvre de l'ouvrier Monroe, chargé de remplir partiellement des water-ballasts pour compenser une légère gîte sur tribord. Le sauvetage fut long et difficile.

Le 29 décembre 1904, doté de la plus haute cote de Classification octroyée par le Loyd's Register, le trois-mâts fut enfin accueilli à Anvers, son port d'attache.



Collection «Musée Nationale de la Marine., Anvers.

Il semble qu'avant d'entamer la première campagne, la nomination d'un capitaine apte à

commander le navire-école fut l'objet de controverses. Nombreux étaient en effet, ceux qui estimaient qu'aucun capitaine belge n'était assez expérimenté pour assumer ces responsabilités.

Le »DE SMET« fut finalement confié au capitaine A. Fourcault (né à Petit-Rechain, le 19 avril 1861) qui, depuis 1882, assurait le commandement sur des malles Ostende-Douvres pour l'État belge.

Certains capitaines belges de l'époque avancèrent même que celui-ci n'avait guère apprécié cette mutation.


Après avoir chargé en coke et ciment, le COMTE DE SMET DE NAEYER et son équipage de 60 hommes - dont 28 cadets - quitta Anvers le 12 février 1905 pour entreprendre sa première campagne.

Le 15 mai, après un périlleux passage du Cap Horn, il était rendu à Valparaiso du Chili et y déchargea une partie de sa cargaison.

Il remonta ensuite sur Iquique le 20 juillet pour y débarquer le solde, avant de relever sur Caleta-Buena pour y quérir un plein chargement (3.033 t.) de nitrates destiné à la Belgique.

Quittant ce port le 4 septembre 1905, il toucha Anvers le 11 janvier 1906, après une campagne de 11 mois, dont 225 jours passés en mer.

Le voilier passa ensuite en cale-sèche pour radouber et y effectuer diverses améliorations, recommandées par le capitaine A. Fourcault. Après quoi, affrété pour un transport de 2.752 tonnes de ciment pour Port Natal en Afrique du Sud, il releva d'Anvers le 11 avril 1906, mais alla mouiller en rade de Flessingue jusqu'au 14 avril, pour y attendre des vents favorables.



Collection Fr. Philips

Son équipage et l'État-Major se composaient comme suit : Rôle d'équipage du 2e voyage - 1906

1. Fourcault A., Commandant. Né le 19.04.1861(+)
2. Van Zuylen de Nyevelt H. (Baron), 1er. off., 28 ans.(+)
3. Wenmaekers W., 2e off., 25 ans.
4. Celis E., 3e off., 25 ans.
5. Van Esche G., 4e off., 22 ans.(+)
6. Cuypers Edgard, Aumonier, 34 ans.(+)
7. Van der Plas E.H., Professeur.
8. Vande Putte, Maitre d'équipage.
9. Rombauts A., Matelot charpentier.(+)
10. Van Strydonck V., Maitre voilier.
11. Boels P., Donkeyman.(+)
12. Van den Bossche Edmond, Professeur.
13. Molitor, Médecin.
14. Baronheid E., Steward.(+)
15. Devlieger J., Steward.(+)
16. De Wilde P., Cuisinier.(+)
17. Borra E., Cuisinier.(+)
18. Moreau J., Cuisinier.(+)
19. Brenchen, Electricien.(+)
20. Taymans, Matelot.
21. Robyn G., Matelot.(+)
22. D'Jong H., Matelot. (+)
23. Berbaix, Matelot.
24. De Necker, Matelot.
25. Vermeulen, Matelot.
26. Buyle, Matelot.
27. Van Maelen, Matelot.
28. Kennes E., Matelot.(+)
29. Huyghe H., Mousse.(+)

Cadets embarqués à bord

1. Charlemain Raoul, 1ère Promotion - 1904.(+)
2. de Ryckman Louis, 1ère Promotion - 1904.(+)
3. De Wallens Joseph, 1ère Promotion - 1904.(+)
4. De Lecroix Stephane, 1ère Promotion - 1904.(+)
5. Gheysen Emile, 1ère Promotion - 1904.(+)
6. Halsdorff Victor, 1ère Promotion - 1904.(+)
7. Piot Georges, 1ère Promotion - 1904.(+)
8. Tyberghein Paul, 1ère Promotion - 1904.(+)
9. Vendry Adelin, 1ère Promotion - 1904.(+)
10. Connerade C., 1ère Promotion - 1904. Dubois Abel, 1ère Promotion - 1904.
11. Beelaerts L., 1ère Promotion - 1904.
12. Van den Berghe E., 1ère Promotion - 1904.



Image pieuse du Rév. Edgard Cuypers, Aumonier.
(Collection commandant (e.r.) Albert Beelaerts.)

13. Meulemeester Jules, 1ère Promotion - 1904.
14. Hayez P., 1ère Promotion - 1904.
15. Netels H., 1ère Promotion - 1904.
16. Paquay F., 1ère Promotion - 1904.
17. Ulser M., 1ère Promotion - 1904.
18. Moutarde H., 2e. Promotion - 1906.(+)
19. André M., 2e. Promotion - 1906.(+)
20. Boutquin L., 2e. Promotion - 1906.(+)
21. Bischoff G., 2e. Promotion - 1906.(+)
22. Claessens F., 2e. Promotion - 1906.(+)
23. Gastadot A., 2e. Promotion - 1906.(+)
24. Lambrechts G., 2e. Promotion - 1906.(+)
25. Rambot Ch., 2e. Promotion - 1906.(+)
26. Jacques F., 2e. Promotion - 1906.(+)
27. Clerin W., 2e. Promotion - 1906.
28. Sacré H., 2e. Promotion - 1906.
29. Veys R., 2e. Promotion - 1906.

(+) = décédé au cours du naufrage

Sur un équipage de 59 hommes, il y eut 26 rescapés, 33 morts, dont 18 cadets, 11 matelots, 3 officiers, et 1 aumônier.

À peine arrivé en Manche, on remarqua que le voilier se comportait moins bien que lors du premier voyage. Par grosse mer en effet, il semblait moins lesté à s'élever à la lame. Mais rien d'anormal ne fut constaté dans un premier temps.

Sournoisement pourtant, l'eau s'infiltrait à bord.

Bientôt le commandant et ses officiers purent constater les faits sans toutefois en découvrir les causes. Leur inquiétude s'accrût quand le niveau de l'eau monta dans les cales, les pompes ne pouvant plus étaler efficacement. A l'aube du 19 avril, le commandant appela «All hands on deck», déclara le navire perdu et fit déborder les embarcations de sauvetage. Mais, la mer étant fort agitée, une seule put y être déposée sans se retourner.

Vingt-six hommes y prirent place. Ils furent recueillis le 22, à 40 kilomètres au sud-est de Plymouth, par le 4 mâts français DUNKERQUE capitaine Morfouace de l'armement A.D. Bordes, qui faisait route vers Hambourg.

Ce naufrage causa la mort de 18 cadets, 11 matelots, 3 officiers dont le commandant, et le l'aumônier Edgard Cuypers, qui jusqu'aux derniers instants, exerça courageusement son ministère de pardon.

Le 27 juillet 1908, la 2e Chambre du Tribunal Civil de Bruxelles, présidée par Mr. Boels, rendit un premier verdict. Elle dut tout d'abord convenir de son incapacité à déterminer les raisons de l'invasissement des eaux : «La cause du désastre, de la perte du bâtiment, est restée inconnue malgré toutes les recherches, toutes les investigations auxquelles on s'est livré. Rien à ce sujet n'a pu être établi. L'invasissement subit de tout le navire par l'eau est un fait véritablement inexplicable.

Le navire aurait-il touché, entre deux eaux, une épave flottante quelconque qui lui aurait endommagé toute une partie de sa coque ?

Ce n'est pas une impossibilité, et à défaut d'autre explication, il faut bien s'en contenter, bien que personne à bord ne s'en soit aperçu et qu'aucun des marins survivants n'ait pu relever un indice quelconque à ce sujet.

Mais ce tribunal déclara néanmoins le commandant A. Fourcault responsable du drame : Il résulte dans l'espèce des circonstances de la cause que les conséquences du naufrage doivent être attribuées à ce que les mesures pratiques pour la mise à l'eau des embarcations de sauvetage n'ont pas été prises - il fallait arrêter le navire au moment de la mise à l'eau des canots- et, subsidiairement, à ce que les appareils de déclenchement des canots, dont on n'a pas fait l'essai avant de prendre la mer, étaient défectueux.



On ne peut exiger des administrateurs d'une société d'armement qu'ils vérifient eux-mêmes ce fonctionnement. Ce soin incombait au capitaine.

Il fut fait appel à ce jugement ; le 12 mars 1910, la Cour d'Appel de Bruxelles acquittait le capitaine A. Fourcault et réhabilitait sa mémoire ...

Quant aux raisons exactes de la catastrophe, elles resteront à jamais inexplicables ou inexpliquées. Une fois de plus, le tribut payé à la mer par des marins était lourd!

Curieusement, certaines tragédies maritimes marquent la mémoire des hommes plus que d'autres.

Bien sûr, les TITANIC en 1912 (1.513 morts, 705 survivants); LUSITANIA en 1915 (1.198 morts); MEDUSE en 1816 (300 morts) TRESHER en 1963 (129 morts) et autres sont encore présents dans toutes les mémoires. Mais d'autres drames de la mer, plus importants en pertes de vies humaines, sombrèrent rapidement dans l'oubli. Ne relevons que celui du torpillage en Mer Baltique, le 1er janvier 1945 du paquebot allemand WILHELM GUSTLLOF par un sous-marin soviétique qui causa la mort, d'un seul coup, de 7.700 réfugiés.

Sans oublier les vapeurs EXPRESS OF IRELAND en 1914 (1.024 morts); GENERAL-LOCUM en 1904 (1.021 morts); MONT-BLANC en 1917 (1.600 morts) SULTANA en 1865 (1.450 morts) et autres TOYA - MARU en 1954 (1.172 morts).

On peut se demander pourquoi le COMTE DE SMET DE NAEYER marqua nos mémoires et surtout pourquoi sa fin tragique suscita tant de polémiques et de troubles ? Assurément, parce que des marins belges, parmi lesquels 18 jeunes cadets, perdirent la vie.

Certainement, parce que ceux-ci étaient le fleuron de notre jeune marine nationale. Parce que le sort injuste sauvait 26 rescapés et en condamnait 33 autres.

Mais nous croyons aussi que suite à cet accident, d'odieux détracteurs du navire-école voulurent prouver la véracité des rumeurs mettant en cause la stabilité et la sécurité de navigation de ce voilier. Bien qu'en fait ils n'étaient que leur ignorance des choses de la mer, cela suffit pourtant à semer le doute dans les esprits à controverse.

Aussi l'opinion publique attendit-elle longtemps les conclusions de la Commission d'Enquête et les attendus du procès, qui ne se termina qu'en 1910.

Toutefois, une partie de celle-ci ne fut pas satisfaite par les déclarations officielles.

À côté de l'énoncé des différents aspects matériels de cette tragédie se développa bientôt un autre volet. Celui formé par un ensemble d'indices ténus, d'éléments abstraits et impalpables qui, sans apporter de preuves concrètes, étaient pour certains, les catalyseurs occultes de la catastrophe.

Il est évident aussi, que la mer a toujours engendré des mythes, des légendes.(*). Des navires qui disparaissent sans que des raisons suffisantes (!) soient avancées excitent l'imagination des hommes. Des rumeurs sont alors colportées, des faits sont isolés de leur contexte, la croyance populaire s'en empare et cultive l'intrigue et l'invraisemblance.

Ce fut le cas pour le COMTE DE SMET DE NAEYER. Autour de son naufrage plana - et plane encore pour certains inconditionnels - un relent de mystère.



Par soucis d'objectivité, il nous a paru intéressant à l'occasion du 80e anniversaire de cette tragédie, d'aligner quelques-uns de ces éléments ou théories, qui constituent précisément un deuxième «volet et de laisser au lecteur le soin de juger.

Dans un article publié par un quotidien belge en date du 5 mai 1906, on trouve ces révélations :

«Un journal bruxellois reproduit en ces termes les confidences qu'aurait faites à un de ses amis, le commandant Fourcault: Lorsque le commandant revint de son premier voyage sur le navire-école, il fit un rapport où il signalait les vices de construction.

Le vaillant marin disait qu'il ne réembarquerait sur le COMTE DE SMET DE NAEYER qu'avec de vives appréhensions. On sait que le ministre Liebaert, sachant que Fourcault refusait d'assumer la responsabilité de commander un navire présentant si peu de sécurité pour l'équipage, le mandat à Bruxelles.

L'entretien fut très long, car Fourcault déclinait énergiquement l'offre qui lui était faite. Et le ministre, - c'est le malheureux Fourcault qui l'a déclaré à ses intimes - dut insister et faire appel à l'abnégation du commandant, qui en fin de compte, accepta, mais à contre-cœur.

D'autre part, Fourcault n'a pu s'assurer des conditions d'arrimage du navire, ni de la façon dont la visite de la coque avait été faite alors qu'il était en cale-sèche, puisqu'il ne fut nommé qu'au dernier moment.

Le pauvre officier, mort en héros, ainsi que nous l'affirmait hier encore un de ses matelots, a péri, ainsi que les cadets disparus, victime de l'incurie de ceux qui ont présidé à l'organisation du navire-école.»

Après avoir fait écho aux révélations de son confrère, le quotidien livrait à ses lecteurs ses propres constatations en ces termes : "Bornons nous pour le moment à dire que ces «confidences prêtées au commandant Fourcault ne cadrent pas avec certaines déclarations officielles et avec d'autres faits connus".

Précisément, un autre journal nous donne l'avis d'une de ces personnes les mieux à même de la place d'Anvers de donner des indications exactes sur les causes précises de la catastrophe, et d'après cette personne, ce ne serait ni la question de la stabilité, ni la question des qualités du marin qui se poseraient.

Le naufrage s'expliquerait par l'ouverture complète ou partielle de la vanne commandant l'admission de l'eau dans la soute à l'est.

Comment cette vanne s'est-elle ouverte ?

Est-ce à la suite d'un erreur ? ou à la suite d'un désarrimage de la cargaison, dérangeant le tuyau mettant en communication la vanne avec le pont ? Possible.

Ce sont là tous points qu'une enquête seule pourra établir. Il est à remarquer a déclaré à ce journal cette 'personne compétente' que le système de soute à lest d'eau pour les voiliers, s'il présente de grands avantages au point de vue de l'économie, présente d'autre part un très grave danger et on peut se demander si ceux qui ont fait construire le navire-école s'en sont rendu suffisamment compte. Et après avoir longuement expliqué les avantages et les inconvénients de ce système à bord de voiliers et de vapeurs, il concluait : "Après avoir rempli ces soutes, l'eau débordera, envahira la cale, submergera les autres marchandises et, montant graduellement finira, sous l'influence de la pression de l'air qui se trouvait dans la cale, par faire sauter les panneaux d'écotille, comme c'est arrivé pour le COMTE DE SMET DE NAEYER".

C'est aussi à cause du danger que présentent ces soutes à lest que beaucoup de personnes compétentes préfèrent l'ancien système de lestage (à l'aide de terre, sable etc.) qui, si parfois il présente des difficultés et donne lieu à certains frais supplémentaires (...) n'en

présente pas moins infiniment plus de sécurité et met en tous cas, le navire à l'abri soit de confusion, soit d'un oubli, soit d'un acte de malveillance.

L'Etoile Belge en date du 29 avril 1906, après avoir retracé la biographie du navire-école, prenait position en termes plus nuancés : «N'accordons aucun crédit aux rumeurs qui courent. Personne au moment où nous écrivons, ne connaît les causes de la catastrophe. Personne ne sait ce qui s'est passé entre le ciel et les flots. L'heure viendra sans doute où les responsabilités de chacun seront nettement établies. Si quelqu'un a manqué à son devoir, il faut qu'on le nomme. Sachons donc attendre, et ne nous hâtons pas de juger un procès dont le dossier n'est pas déposé.» D'autres voix commentèrent encore l'évènement au fil des ans. Telle, celle avertie, du capitaine au long cours français Louis Lacroix, écrivain maritime. On note dans son livre «Les derniers Cap Horniers français» Ed. Pierre Amiot - 1957: "En avril 1906, revenant du Chili avec le DUNKERQUE, à 300 ml. au large d'Ouessant, il (capitaine Morfouace) trouva une baleinière contenant 26 hommes affamés, seuls survivants du trois-mâts belge navire-école COMTE DE SMET DE NAEYER, sombré la nuit précédente. Parmi eux se trouvaient le docteur, le professeur de mathématiques, ancien lieutenant de l'armée belge, un chargé de cours de sciences, le maître d'équipage, 10 cadets, 12 marins. Ce naufrage resta toujours mystérieux. Le commandant belge Fourcault qui, toute sa vie avait navigué sur les malles Ostende - Douvres n'avait jamais mis les pieds sur un navire à voiles. Il disparut avec le trois-mâts, ainsi que l'aumônier".

Morfouace conduisit les rescapés à Hambourg et reçut des instructions formelles de ne rien répéter de ce qu'il avait pu apprendre des naufragés sur le sinistre.

Le gouvernement belge lui donna la Croix de Léopold ; le ministre de la marine marchande française, une médaille d'Or, son second M. Jaffré, ses deux lieutenants, MM Laurent et Baccoley, furent également récompensés.

En 1971, le journaliste Justin Gleissner interviewa, pour le compte du quotidien Gazet van Antwerpen, MM. Edmondus Van den Bossche (82 ans), et Jules Meulemeester (86 ans), tous deux rescapés du naufrage.

L'édition du 17 avril de ce journal fit écho aux péripéties vécues par ces deux hommes, au cours des derniers moments du voilier.

Il ressort de leurs souvenirs que lorsque J. Meulemeester se leva le 19 avril 1906 4 h. du matin pour prendre son quart, le plancher du poste des cadets où il logeait, était déjà sous eau.

Alors, accompagné de son ami Émile Van den Berghe, cadet comme lui, ils obéirent aux injonctions du commandant et abandonnèrent le navire. Ils ne durent leur salut dit-il, qu'en sautant dans la seule embarcation de sauvetage encore à flot.

Lorsqu'on lui posa la question de savoir s'ils se mirent ensuite à «nager» (ramer, pour les terriens !), l'ex-naufragé, judicieusement servi par sa mémoire, répondit qu'ils se trouvaient bien trop loin des côtes pour les atteindre en nageant et qu'il eut mieux fallu établir une voile. Et il ajouta, acerbe : «Maar wat wilt ge, we hadden geen zeilschipofficieren... ». Et de critiquer l'Administration de l'époque, qui selon lui, avait recruté un «cadre composé de gens incapables (')».

Il témoigna aussi que le voilier avait encore de l'erre lorsque les canots furent débordés, et que ceux-ci, n'étant pas munis de lignes d'embossage, chavirèrent en touchant l'eau. La seule grande baleinière, qui du roof, put être mise correctement à la mer, n'était pas pourvue dit-il, de biscuits de survie et la provision d'eau potable était saumâtre... Quant aux causes mêmes du naufrage, il ne voulut jamais rien en dire, si ce n'est que «les vraies raisons ne seraient jamais révélées». Edmond Van den Bossche, alors professeur à bord, se rappela avoir été réveillé à 5 h. du matin aux cris de «Alle hends aan deck!». Prenant alors contact avec le commandant,

celui-ci lui déclara, en français : «J'aimerais que tout le monde soit debout, car il fait mauvais».

Convenant des années après, qu' «Effectief, er stond een wilde zee», il fut rabroué par J. Meulemeester en ces termes : «Maar nee Mon, het was maar een beetje deining...». Et l'ex-professeur, qui ne navigua plus par la suite, d'ajouter qu'il vit de nombreux cadets se noyer en plongeant dans l'eau, ou se blesser gravement en sautant directement dans la baleinière.

Lorsque son tour arriva d'y embarquer, elle se trouvait à niveau avec le pont du voilier ; il n'eut qu'à enjamber les barres de théories pour se sauver. Plus étrange, cette opinion personnelle recueillie auprès d'un ancien cadet de la 21e Promotion. Il ne fut donc pas du voyage du «DE SMET», mais fit ses classes, bien plus tard, à bord du 4 mâts-barque L'AVENIR.



Carte postale remarquable, éditions -Nels- avec mention au verso -Wonderbare redding van L. Beelaerts tijdens de zeeramp van 16 april 1906- (sauvetage miraculeux de L. Beelaerts lors du tragique naufrage du 16 avril 1906). De la collection de Commandant (e.r.) Albert Beelaerts, neveu de L(eopold) Beelaerts.

Sa théorie sur le naufrage est assez singulière, car teintée à coup sûr, d'ésotérisme.

Selon lui, un acte de malveillance, téléguidé par les Anglais, ne serait pas à exclure. En effet, ceux-ci nourrissant un sentiment exclusif d'impérialisme et de colonialisme, étaient farouchement opposés à l'œuvre du Roi Léopold II, à celle du Congo belge et au fait que notre pays puisse disposer d'une marine.

Notre interlocuteur, se basant sur le texte d'une lettre adressée par le Roi Léopold II à son ministre en date du 3 juin 1906, prétend que le souverain, bien que parlant du Congo, utilisa à dessein, les termes «chavirer» et «riches épaves» qui furent aussi ceux de la perte du COMTE DE SMET DE NAEYER !

«Les adversaires du Congo poussent à une annexion immédiate. Ces personnes espèrent sans doute qu'un changement actuel de régime ferait chavirer l'oeuvre en cours de progrès et leur permettrait de recueillir de riches épaves». (cfr. Belgique et Congo : l'élaboration de la Charte Coloniale». Jean Stengers - 1963).

Il ne fait aucun doute conclut-il, que le naufrage du navire-école est une «affaire à secret d'état»; que de grands commis furent au courant et que ce sont là les raisons pour

lesquelles le procès fut tiré en longueur, jusqu'après la mort de Léopold II, le 17 décembre 1909.

Laissons-lui la paternité de cette théorie pour terminer par quelques éléments plus concrets.

De l'étude des causes et circonstances de naufrages qui eurent lieu au cours des ans - Selon le Bureau Veritas, rien qu'en 1905 pas moins de 1.038 navires de tous types sombrèrent de par les océans, et 13.000 furent recensés entre 1824 et 1962; causant la perte de 1.700.000 personnes - il ressort qu'au-delà des causes météorologiques, techniques et/ou mécaniques, de nombreux navires furent victimes d'intrigues socio - économique - politiques. Intrigues relevant de la corruption morale d'hommes. Et pour couvrir compromissions, laxismes, silences et faiblesses coupables, des rapports d'accidents furent altérés, plongés dans l'incohérence ou l'incomplet.. volontaire. Le pseudo-mystère sert à masquer complaisances et complicités. Lorsque de tels faits sont mis à jour, ce sont rarement leurs instigateurs, ces criminels de haut niveau, qui sont condamnés. Bien plus, ils désigneront lampistes et honnêtes capitaines pour endosser toutes les responsabilités de leurs bassesses.

Sans accréditer cette thèse plus qu'une autre au cas présent - qui le pourrait d'ailleurs ? - constatons une fois de plus, que les composants d'un naufrage sont souvent multiples et que la Vérité est toujours très complexe à cerner, lorsque l'on traite des choses de la Mer !

(*) N.d.l.r.: Il est toutefois à noter que le 1er off. Van Zuylen avait déjà navigué comme «master» sur des 4 mâts de la compagnie anglaise Bank Line, avant de rejoindre la Belgique.

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What you need to know:The 2020 IMO fuel sulphur regulation

Written by Lee Hong Liang, Asia Editor, Seatrade Maritime News

The bunker fuel supply and availability landscape is set to change when IMO's global 0.5% fuel sulphur content cap regulation is enforced from 2020. Shipowners have a few options to choose from for them to comply with the regulation, while refiners are expected make changes to refinery configuration and production in response to market demand. Thus far, there is no silver bullet solution ahead of 2020 and the involved parties will have to decide on the most appropriate approach to take so as to suit their operations and remain commercially sustainable in the long run.

The International Maritime Organization (IMO) will enforce a new 0.5% global sulphur cap on fuel content from 1 January 2020, lowering from the present 3.5% limit. The global fuel sulphur cap is part of the IMO's response to heightening environmental concerns, contributed in part by harmful emissions from ships.

The 2020 deadline was confirmed at the 70th session of IMO's Marine Environment Protection Committee (MEPC) held in October 2016.

The more stringent sulphur regulation has led to shipowners and operators mulling over which options they should choose in order to comply with the IMO regulation, and refiners

considering whether to produce more low-sulphur fuel to meet possibly higher demand, as both parties anticipate an unprecedented change in the marine fuels supply landscape.

The issue with the 0.5% sulphur cap regulation is that it has turned into a textbook conundrum for refiners (the fuel suppliers) and shipowners (the fuel buyers), caught in a quandary whereby suppliers are unable to commit on how much to produce as buyers do not know how much is needed, vice versa.

The refiners, though they are not regulated by IMO, cannot pretend that nothing has happened as they have a commercial interest to cater to market needs through changes to production configuration so as to maximise margins.


The shipping industry, the one on the receiving end of the IMO regulation, will have to deal with not only the upcoming global 0.5% sulphur cap, but also the existing 0.1 % sulphur cap in designated Emission Control Areas (ECAs).

There are three options set out in this paper that shipowners can consider in order to comply with the IMO regulations. First, shipowners can install exhaust gas cleaning systems on their ships. Second, owners can simply buy compliant fuels at higher costs. Third, ships can run on the clean gas LNG as fuel.



1A) The IMO fuel sulphur regulation: global cap

From 1 January 2020, the IMO Marpol Annex VI regulation on limiting sulphur content of bunker fuel to a maximum of 0.5% will enter into force. At present, the global sulphur content cap on bunker fuel is at 3.5%, a level considered easy to comply with for vessel operators.



'Prevention of Air Pollution from Ships', first adopted in 1997 and came into force in 2005, has established limits on sulphur content in bunker fuel, as well as the creation of ECAs in designated sea areas setting stricter sulphur content limits at just 0.1 %.

Marpol Annex VI started with a global sulphur cap of 4.5% before it was lowered to 3.5% in 2012. The steep reduction to a global 0.5% sulphur cap by 2020 was decided in October 2016 by the IMO Marine Environment Protection Committee (MEPC).

The IMO had commissioned a review to assess whether sufficient compliant fuel oil would be available to meet the 2020 date, and this review/study was carried out by independent research and consultancy organisation CE Delft. This study was then submitted to IMO member states to help them in their deliberations.


Going forward, MEPC will look into approving a new output on consistent implementation of the sulphur regulation of Marpol Annex VI. The scope of the work, to be completed during two sessions of the Sub-Committee on Pollution Prevention and Response, during 2018 and 2019, could include considering a number of preparatory and transitional issues surrounding the shift to the new 0.5% limit from 2020.

1 B) The IMO fuel sulphur regulation: ECAs

Ships trading in designated ECAs have to burn bunker fuel with a sulphur content of no more than 0.1 % since 1 January 2015, against the limit of 1 % when ECAs were first introduced in 2010.

The Marpol Annex VI ECAs are the Baltic Sea area, the North Sea area, the North American area (covering designated coastal areas off the US and Canada), and the US Caribbean Sea area (around Puerto Rico and the US Virgin Islands).

Further formation of country-based or continent-wide IMO-approved ECAs, however, is not an easy process. In the case of establishing a region-wide ECA, it may take up to five years to complete an entire assessment and consultation process including gathering agreement from all the Marpol Annex VI signatory countries and receiving submission of emission inventories.



Many emerging economies, and even some established ones, see designating their territorial waters on ECAs as discounting their ports' competitive edge. But there are exceptions as some countries have

voluntarily made positive steps to clamp down on shipping emissions in view of their own environmental agenda.

China has its own version of ECAs, enforced in phases since April 2016, requiring ships berthing at 11 ports to use 0.5% sulphur fuel. The 11 ports are Guangzhou, Huanghua, Nantong, NingboZhoushan, Qinhuangdao, Shanghai, Shenzhen, Suzhou, Tangshan, Tianjin, and Zhuhai.

Hong Kong has required all ocean-going vessels to switch to fuel not exceeding 0.5% while at berth starting 1 July 2015.

While Sydney, Australia has imposed a 0.1 % sulphur limit for cruise ships berthing at the port. Some areas touted as possible future ECAs include Japan, Norway, Mexico and the Mediterranean.

Heavy fuel oil (HFO), which is high in sulphur content and considered the bane in terms of emissions for environmentalists, is the traditional source of energy to power ships.



In 2016, global demand for HFO accounted for 70% of a mixed grade of bunker fuels, including the low-sulphur marine gas oil (MGO) with below 0.5% sulphur content and the ultra low sulphur fuel oil (ULSFO) of 0.1 % maximum sulphur content. The switch to burning either MGO or ULSFO is an option for shipowners to be in compliant with the IMO regulation, and two other alternatives are installing abatement technology such as

scrubbers or using LNG as fuel.

Unni Einemo, IMO representative, media and communications manager, International Bunker Industry Association (IBIA), warned that the global sulphur regulation is "not step changes but brutal changes", requiring "paradigm shifts on ship engines" that are designed to run on HFO.

"We are looking at a virtually overnight shift from 3.5% fuel sulphur content to 0.5%. There is a real risk that the change would cause a period of severe product shortages and inflated prices," she said.

Moreover, the production and supply of up to 3.5% sulphur marine fuels would need to continue until the day before the 0.5% requirement kicks in, and immediately demand for HFO will shrink dramatically the day after, creating a never before known situation of severe supply/demand mismatch.

Einemo said the transition from 3.5% to 0.5% is “not as easy as flicking a switch” as she highlighted the near-impossible undertaking for global refining to switch production overnight, the need for huge logistics involving transport between refineries, storage and delivery vessels, and the massive work for ships to clean out fuel systems to avoid sulphur contamination.

Analyst Wood Mackenzie suggested that the shipping industry would need to fork out an additional \$60bn annually by 2020, based on an expected rise in MGO and ULSFO demand and their premiums over HFO.

According to data from specialist bunker news and price provider Ship & Bunker, the premium of MGO over 3.5% sulphur 380 cst in Rotterdam, for example, has averaged \$255 per tonne over the last five years between 1 March 2012 to 1 March 2017. At present, shipping is consuming around 3.2m barrels per day (bpd) of HFO and 700,000- 800,000 bpd of MGO. From 2020, this proportion will change to 700,000 bpd of HFO and 3.4m bpd of MGO.

Sushant Gupta, director - Asia Pacific, refining and chemicals research, Wood Mackenzie, noted that switching to the use of the compliant low sulphur products is a costly solution for shipping, hence the industry will try to pass the cost to consumers and freight rates from the Middle East to Singapore could increase by up to \$1 a barrel.

Higher bunker bills, on the other hand, may make the installation of scrubbers a more attraction solution as the price differential between low sulphur fuels and HFO would widen and consequently the scrubber repayment period would be quicker.

What it means for the refiners



It is without doubt that the 0.5% sulphur rule will have huge implications for the global refining sector in terms of refinery configuration and operations. Simple refineries that produce a substantial share of their crude run into HFO may face margins pressure, while complex refineries may potentially boost margins with a larger production of low-sulphur products.

The International Energy Agency (IEA) mentioned that by 2020 the price of fuel oil is expected to drop in tandem with demand. This will in turn put pressure on (fuel oil) cracks and simple refineries with high fuel oil yields. On the other hand, it could become more attractive to modern, complex refineries who have the secondary units capable of upgrading fuel oil into higher value lighter products.

The IEA stated: “Global refiners will be put under enormous strain by the shifting product slate. If refiners ran at similar utilisation rates to today, they would be unlikely to be able

to produce the required volumes of gas oil. If they increased throughputs to produce the required gas oil volumes, margins would be adversely affected by the law of diminishing returns. In order to increase gas oil output, less valuable products at the top and bottom of the barrel would be produced in tandem, which would likely see cracks for these products weaken and weigh margins down."

The world's three leading oil majors -- BP, ExxonMobil and Shell -- have not mentioned anything on a mass production of 0.5% blends, neither have they announced commitments to invest in reconfiguring their crude runs on a global scale to produce 0.5% fuels. "At present, we have not heard of new refinery investments announced as a result of this regulation. It is too early to have that, as IMO's decision in July will influence many of these uncertainties," said Serena Huang, research analyst-downstream, Asia Pacific, Wood Mackenzie.

In general, oil majors and refiners are looking to support the shift in bunker fuel demand arising from the new sulphur regulation in various ways. Firstly, refiners can increase ULSFO production by extracting low sulphur fuel oil streams that are currently blended into LSFO or HSFO to be made available to the market as ULSFO. ExxonMobil, for instance, has launched a relatively new product, Heavy Distillate Marine ECA 50 (HDME 50), that can be handled onboard like HFO and has only 0.1 % sulphur content.

Secondly, refiners in general have an issue of managing their surplus residue. "In some instances, exploring residue destruction investments may make sense, but this option comes with higher risk on returns of investment, as gas oil demand is predicated on shippers' uptake of alternative options such as scrubber installation and LNG bunkering," said Huang.

Thirdly, refiners can raise LNG bunker supplies in major bunkering hubs. In Singapore, Shell and ExxonMobil are working with Maritime and Port Authority of Singapore (MPA) to supply LNG as fuel. In Rotterdam, Shell this year launched a LNG bunker tanker to supply LNG from Rotterdam's Gate Terminal.

Shipping options



4A) Abatement technology

The use of exhaust gas cleaning systems, also known as scrubbers, is a commercially available option for the shipping industry. Ships installed with scrubbers mean they can continue to burn high-sulphur bunker fuel from 2020 and comply with the 0.5% sulphur limit.

The abatement technology works by spraying alkaline water into a vessel's exhaust to remove sulphur and other unwanted chemicals, either via open-loop system, closed-loop system, or hybrid (open-and-closed loop) system.

The use of scrubbers will enable the eradication of almost all the harmful emissions from ships, with major scrubber manufacturers like Alfa Laval, DuPont and Wartsila having systems that eliminate 97-98% of sulphur oxides (SOx) and 70-80% of particulate matter (PM), which makes up most of the visible smoke.

Despite an initial hefty investment ranging from \$5m to \$10m per vessel, depending on the number and capacity of the main engines, installing scrubbers can potentially be an economically attractive option, according to Wood Mackenzie. Shipowners can expect a high rate of return of between 20-50% depending on investment cost, MGO-HFO price spread and ships' fuel consumption.

The uptake of scrubbers could be limited by access to finance, scrubber manufacturing capacity, drydock space and technological uncertainties. Wood Mackenzie forecast that the retrofitting or installation of scrubbers will not pick up substantially until 2020 while McQuilling Services noted that players with difficult access to financing for a scrubber can look to potential cooperation with trading companies as alternatives to banks and investors. The availability of dry-docking space at shipyards is definitely an issue if a large number of ships are sent for scrubber retrofit work.

4B) LNG

The viability for ships to burn LNG as fuel depends very much on the availability of a worldwide network of LNG bunkering infrastructure, which to-date is severely underdeveloped. Global LNG bunkering infrastructure is considered to be at an infant stage today, as most LNG-powered ships are mainly coastal vessels limited to European waters, and major bunkering ports in the world have yet to develop full-scale LNG bunkering facilities.


There continues to be interest in some countries such as Singapore, Japan and the Netherlands in pursuing the development of LNG bunkering infrastructure. But there has not been any indication that developments will blossom to a global scale to offer any real change for LNG to become a viable option come 2020.

The LNG option in itself is facing a 'chicken and egg' situation. There is a need for demand to increase in order to generate greater supply, but the same is true vice versa. LNG as bunker fuel continues to face issues such as the need for increased and dedicated storage space, a gap in supply chain logistics, and requirements for costly modifications to existing port infrastructure. Additional costs to carry out LNG bunkering include delivery of the clean gas to the import terminal, breakbulk charges, the need for shuttle vessels delivering to LNG bunker tankers, and the fee of bunker tanker delivering LNG fuel ship-to-ship. Moreover, there is the unforeseen factor of fossil fuel prices, which have now fallen and making the economic business case for LNG less attractive.

Another dampener is the retrofitting of ships to burn LNG as it is a sophisticated, complex operation that require modification of existing engines or addition of gas tanks, as well as the huge cost of fitting LNG tanks and gas piping systems. The LNG option makes more sense for newbuilds rather than conversions of existing ships. On top of these, a good-sized LNG bunker tanker costs \$60-80m to build, vastly more expensive than a fuel oil barge.

Last but not least, there is an absence of a global regulatory standard on LNG fuel propulsion. All the above factors make LNG as bunker fuel a distant option for shipowners.

4C) Compliant fuels



The most straightforward way for ships is to simply switch to burning MGO or ULSFO to meet IMO's sulphur limits. The operators will have to either absorb the cost of the higher fuels or pass it on to their customers whenever possible.

Baseload demand for fuel oil in Asia has already been steadily declining in recent years, falling by about 20% from 2011 to 2016. The HFO imports into Asia – mainly Singapore, China and Japan - averaged about 6.92m tonnes each month last year, down from the monthly average of about

8.5m tonnes between 2011 and 2012.

Operators can procure the ULSFO of 0.1 % maximum sulphur content, a grade that already exists and is used in the ECA zones as a cheaper alternative to MGO. The ULSFO is a category of fuel that sits between MGO and HFO. The ULSFO has lower sulphur content than HFO but higher viscosity and low volatility than MGO. The quality difference also means a price difference with ULSFO typically trading at \$20 pmt or more discount to MGO in Rotterdam, according to Platts data.

In 2016, the use of ULSFO has risen by 9% year-on-year in the North Sea and ARA (AmsterdamRotterdam-Antwerp) region and inched up about 2% on a worldwide scale, according to data from Veritas Petroleum Services (VPS).

By 2020, there will be around 900,000 bpd of ULSFO made available to the market by various stream optimisation, according to Huang of Wood Mackenzie. "In case there is a hard deadline from IMO in 2020, we expect the MGO demand could increase from 1.3m bpd in 2019 to 3.4m bpd in 2020. This will be new demand from the marine sector and meeting the compliant fuels demand from the shipping sector will bring a big step-change for refiners. Refiners will be challenged to increase global refining run rates to unprecedented levels."

Wood Mackenzie expects a shift in bunkering locations starting 2020 based on compliant fuels availability, with Singapore potentially losing some of its market share to China as fuel buyers look for alternative locations that have a surplus of compliant fuels.

China is anticipated to continue to hold ample MGO supply and will be well positioned to attract fuel buyers looking for MGO. Singapore, currently the world's largest bunkering port, will need to repurpose some storage tanks and other infrastructure to prepare for a shift from HFO to MGO bunkering.

Conclusion

The shipping industry is faced with several options ahead of 2020 with no silver bullet solution.

If refiners indeed move to significantly restrict the sale of HFO as they see higher margins from selling MGO, ships fitted with scrubbers and potential scrubber users would be left wondering if there will be enough supply of HFO to use. The surge in use of MGO will then lead to the question of what how will refiners deal with all the surplus of HFO which is a natural by-product of the cracking process. The double-edge sword is that refiners also

worry that any extra production of MGO would go unsold if more ships continue to equip themselves with scrubbers and seek to purchase the less costly HFO.

Refiners are certainly not taking the plunge first by making huge investment costs to change production configurations, while most shipowners are adopting a wait-and-see approach as they consider the options before them. It is a dilemma for the parties involved.

All the different options will be assessed by all the involved parties and they will have to choose one that they consider the most cost effective, suitable for their operations, and commercially sustainable for the long term.

Inséré 22/10/17 NIEUWS NOUVELLES NEWS Enlevé 22/11/17

Shipowners look to carbon as looming regulatory risk

With many in the shipping industry looking at ways to cut their sulfur emissions ahead of tighter limits being introduced in 2020, others are already looking at carbon as another problem that will face them in the coming years. Global marine fuel sulfur content limits will be cut from 3.5% to 0.5% at the start of 2020, and further restrictions on nitrogen and particulate matter emissions are likely to be announced over the next decade. But while the options for cutting these emissions are becoming increasingly familiar to the shipping industry, less thought has been put into how to reduce carbon emissions. The European Parliament voted last month to include shipping in the European emissions trading scheme (ETS) as of 2023 if the International Maritime Organization (IMO) does not have a comparable system operating by 2021. The vote was not binding, but indicated what the parliament will push for in negotiations with the EU's national governments on changes to the ETS. The IMO has criticized European moves to include shipping in the ETS, saying they could threaten its work on developing a global approach to cutting carbon emissions. "Shipowners that want to be prepared for the near future" are starting to investigate low-carbon options, Astrid Sonneveld, head of international marine business development at biofuels marketer GoodFuels, said in an interview earlier this month. "Most of them want to have a plug-and-play solution in mind, something off the shelf to turn to as soon as carbon regulations arise." Reducing carbon dioxide emissions from marine fuels will be a more difficult proposition than cutting pollution from sulfur and other unwanted chemicals. While sulfur can be removed from fuel oil either at the refinery or directly from a vessel's emissions with scrubbers, it is less obvious how to reduce carbon dioxide output. Methods like using vessels more efficiently will need to be considered as well as finding cleaner fuels. "Decarbonisation is a priority for now," according to Catrien Scheers, chairman of logistics company Fast Group. "We have to see that all terminals are efficient energy wise and all vessels are efficient." Container shipping company Maersk Line is targeting a 60% reduction from 2007 levels in carbon dioxide emissions per container carried by 2020, and had managed a 42% drop by the end of last year. Increasing average vessel sizes as well as vessel sharing agreements with other companies have helped the Danish firm in this. But Maersk now says low fuel prices are encouraging it to increase average vessel speed, cutting fuel efficiency and raising emissions per container again. Increased use of biofuels by the shipping industry may also help it to reduce its carbon footprint. This month the Port

of Amsterdam announced its fleet of five patrol vessels will use a blended product containing 30% biodiesel, with carbon dioxide emissions savings of 25% versus traditional marine diesel oil. In an interview with S&P Global Platts in December, GoodFuels forecast that marine biofuels could take up 5-10% of global bunker fuel demand by 2030. "We believe inclusion in the EU ETS to be an important first step towards low carbon shipping," Sonneveld said. "It will not help to bring the market for marine biofuel to a next level, but in our opinion any kind of progress sends a clear signal — it can be done — to the IMO." For now, it seems unlikely that the majority of shipowners will start to address carbon emissions until the regulatory environment for them and other pollution is clearer. There will be advantages for some early adopters in terms of their public relations and relationships with regulators, but for most the time to change practices will not come until both the law, and the best choice of fuel, are clear. "We all have a responsibility to lower carbon emissions," Scheers said. "Supply and availability of the fuel will be the problem."

Source : Platts

Inséré 24/10/17 DOSSIER Enlevé 24/11/17

New Houthi weapon emerges: a drone boat

By: Christopher P. Cavas, US admiral fears Yemen civil war widening into the Red Sea

The Houthi boat that attacked and hit a Saudi frigate Jan. 30 in the Red Sea, reported earlier as a suicide boat, was instead carried out by an unmanned, remote-controlled craft filled with explosives, the US Navy's top officer in the Mideast said. "Our assessment is that it was an unmanned, remote-controlled boat of some kind," Vice Adm. Kevin Donegan, commander of the Bahrain-based US frigate Al Madinah appears to be the first confirmed use of the weapon which, Donegan said, represents a wider threat than that posed by suicide boats and shows foreign interests are aiding the Houthis. Donegan is concerned "first that it is in the hands of someone like the Houthis. That's not an easy thing to develop. There have been many terrorist groups that have tried to develop that, it's not something that was just invented by the Houthis. There's clearly support there coming from others, so that's problematic.

"The second is the explosive boat piece — you don't need suicide attackers to do a suicide-like attack. There are certain terrorists that do things and they get martyrs to go and do it. But there are many others that don't want to martyr themselves in making attacks like that and that's pretty much where the Houthis are. So it makes that kind of weaponry, which would normally take someone suicidal to use, now able to be used by someone who's not going to martyr themselves." The unmanned boat was likely supplied by Iran, Donegan said.



"I don't know that it's Iranian-built, but I believe that it's production in some way was supported by Iran," Donegan said. "Here's how I connect those dots. About a year ago we

began and were successful in interdicting about four weapons shipments of things going to Yemen," he said, noting that three of the shipments were intercepted by coalition partners of the US, while one shipment was intercepted by a US ship. "We allowed the United Nations access to all the weapons we got from one of the interdictions, and they published quite an extensive report," Donegan said. "They said specifically that the weapons came from Iran and were destined for Yemen in violation of UN Security Council resolutions. That's not my assessment, that's the United Nations assessment. "Secondly, the other three weapon shipments that were interdicted were examined by another independent group, the [U.K.-based] Conflict Armament Research. They've also put out a report that almost said exactly the same thing. And they did this by analysis of the weapons and serial numbers and where they were manufactured and the instruction manuals, and the GPS waypoints of the systems. "So we know that weapons were shipped from Iran to Yemen. The question is at what level and how many, etc. We know what was in the weapon inventory of Yemen before the conflict started, and the Yemenis didn't have a weapon that could range Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. That's an 800-kilometer ballistic missile shot, whereas the Scud missile, about 200 kilometers is what it can do. They had a rudimentary coastal defense missile. But most of their systems had atrophied. So they're being supported by Iran. Maybe there's others supporting them, I don't know. But for certain these things aren't indigenous, there are parts and components that need to be coming from other places to make them effective like this." The Houthis in western Yemen along the Red Sea coast have been widening the Yemeni civil war to threaten the large amount of international commercial shipping that passes through the Bab el Mandeb strait at the southern end of the Red Sea. Virtually all maritime traffic in and out of the Suez Canal between the Mediterranean Sea and Indian Ocean passes through the strait. "This is a region that is always in conflict," Donegan said. "We're not here to maintain peace and stability. On the contrary, there are four, sometimes five active conflicts in the region going on. Most of our time is spent trying to get more peace and stability in the region. "But over the 15 years of fighting we've been doing on land, we haven't had the conflict spill into the maritime. What bothers me about Yemen is that you've seen this conflict spilled into the maritime in several places. The problem is the potential impact on the flow of commerce. And that's not just our interest, it's a global interest. "What we have now is that non-nation-states get access to nation-state-like weapon systems, and that impacts the flow of commerce. You saw that in the attack on the motor vessel Swift on the 1 st of October, and you saw that again with this explosive boat that was used against the Saudi frigate Al-Madinah. My fear is they move to use that [weapon] against any kind of commerce that flows through [the southern Red Sea]. And even if they don't intend to, my fear is that it becomes a collateral damage, because they're not so good at identifying targets and things like that. "With about 64 vessels a day travelling through there, the Bab al Mandeb, almost all with energy cargoes, any issue of misidentification or misapplication of one of these weapon systems could become an issue with commerce, and that's what we have to avoid. In the end what we'd like to see is that conflict back into the land mass and not out into where we have commercial traffic."

In January, Saudi Arabia, supporting the elected government of Yemen, began an offensive intended to drive the Houthis from the coastal regions along the Red Sea. The offensive has only been partially successful, and reports in the Arab media indicate the Houthis, as they evacuate an area, leave behind land and sea mines. There are fears that the sea mines, most of Soviet manufacture, are old and can break loose, drifting out into commercial shipping lanes. "That's exactly the part of my worry about this conflict spilling into the maritime," Donegan said. "It doesn't matter to us whether it's mines in the water or explosive boats in the water, that's a problem for me. "We've often talked in the past about the Strait of Hormuz being closed up. But the Bab al Mandeb and the Red Sea are so important for a couple of reasons. For one you have this flow of commerce that goes up to the Suez Canal. Anything going through the Suez Canal is feeding the Egyptian economy. We really can't afford to have a reduction to the Egyptian economy. It's fragile and we can't have that. "The other piece that happens is, diverting around the Red Sea and Bab al Mandeb is something potentially that the oil industry may be able to accommodate with some initial cost, but industries like liquid natural gas, there is no excess capacity in the transporting of it, nor is there excess storage capacity at the destinations. So any kind of slowdown in traffic through the Bab al Mandeb is going to have a pretty quick impact on both the region but also on the global supply of energy. Because of that just-in-time liquid natural gas piece, there'll be a delay before the oil will be able to move in a different direction, and then you'll have the impact on the local economies that are getting their money – especially Egypt.

" Asked if the US is stepping up interdiction actions, Donegan said, "No. But there are UN Security Council resolutions that compel all the nations that can to not allow weapons to go to Yemen. Very clear UN Security Council resolutions. So all the nations that can are compelled to not use their territory or waters for that use. "We haven't changed what we do. We've always had a focus on not allowing the maritime to be used for illicit purposes, especially those areas where we have UN Security Council resolutions that ask us to do that work." Asked if the United States was preparing military operations against the Houthis, Donegan demurred. "I don't think I'd be able to answer that for a whole bunch of reasons," he said. "But suffice to say we're certainly concerned about it and we're doing prudent planning, not just ourselves but with our allies and partners in the region. We're really concerned now more than before because of this spillage into the maritime. And it doesn't have to be a military solution that gets to an end-state here. "If we can get the factions in Yemen together to get back on the peace track then you can get in and clean out the weapons that are there, the higher-end weapons that have gotten in there. "My biggest concern now is you've got nation-state-like weapons in the hands of non-nation-states. It's not in the hands of the duly-elected government of Yemen. Some of them because they were able to pick up inventories of other weapons, and some because they've been augmented."

Donegan was also asked about the US commitment to the Gulf region, a perennial concern among the US partners here, particularly after the "America first" language in President Trump's inaugural address. "We're absolutely committed to stay here," Donegan declared. "There's been no change in that in any way, shape or form, in my mind. We're battling the readiness issues of our service, because we've used them pretty hard. But my headquarters is not going away. We'll have our ships out here in the region. We'll have the carrier strike group in and out. We still have permanently-homeported ships based here in the region. So we're not stepping in any way away from the region. And America first means we're here because it's in America's interests. It doesn't mean we're going to run back home and protect in a defensive way. It means we're going to be out and engaged so we can have influence in places, and where our interests are at stake we can be there when and where we're needed. That is not changing. I've gotten zero indications of that." And he added,

Defense Secretary Jim Mattis' current visit to the region is "to emphasize those exact same things."

Source: defensenews.

Inséré 24/10/17 BOEKEN LIVRES BOOKS Enlevé 24/11/17

Significant Ships of 2015 Significant Small Ships of 2015

Uitgever: RINA (Royal Institution of Naval Architects) 8-9 Northumberland Street London WC2N 5DA United Kingdom publications

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kostprijs: 64,90 (Significant Ships) - 32,00 (Significant Small Ships) of 65,00 voor de set van twee boeken of cd-roms Elk jaar verschijnen bij het vermaarde Britse RINA deze uiterst verzorgde jaarboeken.

Voor deze 26ste editie neemt samensteller Martin Conway de 'Small Ships' voor zijn rekening, terwijl Nick Savvides en Sandra Speares de 'Significant Ships' verzorgden.

Zoals elk jaar leveren zij een uitstekend overzicht van meest innoverende en commercieel interessante scheepsdesigns van het afgelopen jaar. Elk schip krijgt twee volledige pagina's met kleurenfoto's, dekplannen en alle mogelijke gegevens over afmetingen, voortstuwing, scheepswerf, eigenaar, land, vlag, tewaterlating, indienststelling, bemanning, enz... Kortom, alle denkbare informatie die zowel een professional als een scheepsliefhebber wenst.

'Significant Ships' belicht veertig eenheden alfabetisch: van Al Murabba, een containerschip van 15.000 TEU, tot en met de Viking Star, een milieuvriendelijk cruiseschip. 'Significant Small Ships' behandelt dertig kleinere maar ook zeer gesofisticeerde vaartuigen, zoals de Alusafe 100 FIC (Fast Interceptor Craft), een Noors prototype voor kustwacht of politie en de Yeniçay een Turkse sleper van 18,7 meter.



In beide publicaties vinden we tal van container- en passagiersschepen, tankers, sleepers, werkschepen, patrouilleboten en ferry's. Dit jaar komt echter geen Belgisch schip voor in de lijsten. Wél viel mijn aandacht op twee historische namen. Zo is er de LNG-tanker Ohio uit Philadelphia, USA. Zonder twijfel is dit schip genoemd naar de legendarische tanker s/s Ohio van de Texas Oil Company. En in boekdeel 2 vinden we de Neil

Armstrong, een zeer technische en wetenschappelijke Oceanic Survey Vessel, toevallig ook van Amerikaanse origine en vlag. Al bladerend door deze boeken, bezoeken we meteen ook enkele van de belangrijkste scheepswerven ter wereld, zoals Hyundai, Kawasaki, Samsung, Fincantieri, STX Corporation, Mitsubishi, Daewoo Shipbuilding, Hanjin en Damen.

Door de jaren heen heeft het RINA wereldwijd een reputatie uitgebouwd die vergelijkbaar is met die van Lloyds. De kwaliteit van deze uitgaven is dus gewaarborgd.
Louis Van Cant

Ship-to-shore Cranes Shipped via The Northern Sea Route



HANSA HEAVY LIFT has transported the first-ever ship-to-shore (STS) cranes via the Northern Sea Route (NSR), relocating them from the port of St Petersburg to the port of Vostochny, spanning both the European and Far East regions of Russia. **HHL VALPARAISO** is the first vessel to sail open hatch through the Northern Sea Route, which is covered by thick ice for

most of the year and has a limited window of about two months open to cargo voyages. This allowed the two cranes, each weighing 820 metric tonnes and measuring 61 meters in height and 92 metres in width, to be shipped partially above and below deck. "The Northern Sea Route was the only viable option to complete this voyage in the required timeframe," said Gleb Faldin, Commercial Manager, HANSA HEAVY LIFT. "In the Arctic there is no room for mistakes. During the passage, the vessel has limited connection and only a few points of shelter. "It is important to understand the legal framework to navigate the NSR, to plan carefully, to be prepared for the unexpected, and most importantly to have the right team on board the vessel and in the office." Faldin added that a two-month delay in the cargo being ready meant that **HHL VALPARAISO** had to be repositioned for the voyage, which was originally planned for **HHL TOKYO**. **HHL VALPARAISO** travelled from Qingdao, China to St Petersburg via the NSR to load the cranes, and then went back through the NSR a second time to complete the mission, which was accomplished in record time.



Crews had only a few weeks to complete the voyage, as the cargo was loaded in October and had to be delivered to its destination by late November before the route completely froze over. Other challenges included limited space aboard the **HHL VALPARAISO**, which holds Ice Class E3 equivalent to Russian Arc.4 (Finnish- Swedish Ice Class 1A). Additionally, the cranes were not designed to be lifted, requiring careful planning from all parties involved in the

move, as well as strong engineering expertise. "The Northern Sea Route is an important alternative that can save weeks from a voyage, but to be successful you need careful planning and engineering, the right equipment, capable vessels, and experienced crews," said Heinrich Nagrelli, Project & Transport Engineer, HANSA HEAVY LIFT. "Due to the STS's

very high center of gravity (CoG) at 30 meters above deck and 70 meters air draft, as well as draft restriction of 7.7 meters, a careful and detailed plan was needed from the start "This included a load spreading design and a structural analysis of the hatch covers and lower hold, a lifting stability assessment, a lifting simulation, fulfilment of Flag State requirements (open hatch, visibility, arctic weather conditions, COLREGs*), and the approval of the Russian Maritime Register of Shipping, as well as the arranging of ice breaker assistance." ZAO 'SMM', a leading manufacturer of heavy port handling equipment in Russia, was charterer of the HHL Valparaiso and in charge of overall project management as well as the transportation of the two STS cranes. "The high professionalism of ZAO 'SMM' and good mutual cooperation with HANSA HEAVY LIFT ensured the successful and timely implementation of this project," said Mikhail Skripchenko, Project Manager at ZAO 'SMM'. "Our company has proven expertise in the area of logistics for the transport of heavy cranes and other oversized equipment via Russian inland waterways, as well as the Northern Sea Route. All HANSA HEAVY LIFT vessels can travel along sea routes with an ice thickness of up to 0.8 meters.

source: maritimeprofessional

Inséré 28/10/17 HISTORIEK HISTORIQUE Enlevé 28/11/17

DE GRONDLEGGING VAN 'S LANDS ZEEMACHT - De vlootpolitiek anno 1574.(I)

door B. Vreede

Inleiding

De bemoeiingen van Prins Willem met het Zeewezen zijn vele geweest, begrijpelijk, wanneer men bedenkt hoe Holland en Zeeland de nomen maar al te zwakke — rug-gegraat van zijn politiek gevormd hebben en hoezeer de bestaansmogelijkheid van deze gewesten op de scheepvaart stoelde. Na het mislukken van de veldtochten van 1568 was het enige gewapende verzet dat nog gevoerd kon worden dat der Watergeuzen onder zijn testellingen als soeverein Prins van Oranje, een vloot wier reden van bestaan de kaapvaart op eigen landgenoten was en daarmee helpen moest de krijgskas van de Prins te stijven.

Bekend is het verhaal van de Admiraal Dolhain die in september 1569 een convoy van 60 schepen uit de Oostzee in het Vlie opving, enkele dagen later gevolgd door een tweede van 40 zeilen, dat eveneens werd onderschept. De schepen werden op rantsoen gesteld, soms voor forse bedragen, tot 2400 gulden toe, en van hun geschut ontdaan. Het deel van de Prins in deze rijke buit, dat zo nodig was om de afbetaling der troepen van de laatste veldtocht te kunnen doen, wist men niet van deze admiraal los te krijgen.



In ditzelfde jaar had Engeland de kaapvaart tegen de Bourgondische landen toegestaan en in April 1569 bevonden zich reeds 60 Nederlandse schepen in Engelse handen; deze situatie bleef bestaan tot de overeenkomst van Mei 1573 van de Hertog van Alva met Koningin Elisabeth de goede betrekkingen herstelde.

Vanwege de toenemende onveiligheid moesten de Hollandse steden in 1571 een vloot in zee brengen die, 11 zeilen sterk, gesteld onder het bevel van de schout van Texel, Franchoy van Bosschuysen, als admiraal, tegen de guerilla ter zee weinig definitiefs kon tot stand brengen doch aanzienlijke uitgaven vergde. Onder deze omstandigheden zette de uittocht van burgers uit de lage landen zich voort; Hooft vermeldt, dat er reeds in 1568

meer dan honderdduizend huizen leeg stonden en thans gingen er nog de nodigen weg, die veiligheid voor hun schepen en goederen ter zee zochten. Vele hiervan gingen naar Emden, dat in korte tijd de grootste rederijstad van Europa werd met in 1572 een vloot van 550 schepen boven de tien last 3). Hoe dit de scheepvaart van deze landen raakte blijkt hieruit, dat het aantal Nederlandse schepen dat de Sont in Westelijke richting passeerde verminderde van gemiddeld 1400 over de jaren 1565 t/m 1568 tot slechts 532 in 1569.

Over de jaren 1570 t/m 1573 zijn er geen gegevens over deze vaart bekend, doch wel aanwijzingen hoe de situatie dan is. In 1571 schreven enige Hollandse kooplieden aan de Spaanse Stadhouder Bossu, dat de scheepvaart op Oosten en Westen zo goed als geheel stil lag. Als de vaart naar Westen stilligt wordt er geen zout voor de grote visserij aangevoerd waardoor deze tak van bedrijf niet kan worden uitgeoefend, terwijl dan ook grote werkloosheid in de van die visserij afhankelijke bedrijven ontstaat. Daarnaast gaat één van de belangrijkste exportproducten naar de Oostzee, de gezouten haring, ontbreken waardoor de moedercommercie, de vaart naar Oosten, in gevaar komt. Dat deze ontwrichting van de zeehandel aan de gang is blijkt uit een brief van Bossu van 29 April 1571, waarin hij vermeldde, dat door het stilliggen van de visserij wel 5 à 6000 vissers brodeloos geworden waren. De Watergeuzen waren bezig de zeesteden te worgen en daarmee het gewone volk rijp te maken voor de opstand. Maar als deze uitgebroken is zijn daarmee de moeilijkheden niet in één slag overwonnen. Dit blijkt wel uit een placaat van 1573 waarbij een verbod werd ingesteld op het verkopen van Boten, Buizen, Koopvaarders, Schepen of Carveels naar het buitenland zonder expres consent, een maatregel die ook in latere moeilijke tijden herhaaldelijk door de Republiek is genomen. In datzelfde jaar beliepen de tolinkomsten te Emden het viervoudige van die van het voorafgegane jaar.

Om de nadelen, die aan de activiteiten van de Geuzenvloot verbonden waren, zoveel mogelijk te ondervangen, vaardigde de Prins reeds in Augustus 1570 de artuculen uit „voor alle Oversten, Capiteynen, Soldaeten ende Mateloots in de Vloote van zijnen dienst zynde". Dit zijn de bekende artikelen waarbij o.a. de opvarenden verplicht werden „de ordonnantie van der oorloghe" te bezweren terwijl ook werd bepaald, dat ieder schip een predikant aan boord moest hebben. Toch lukte het niet het optreden van de Geuzen in overeenstemming met 's Prinsen denkbeelden te brengen; dat bleek o.a. in Maart 1571 bij het nemen van een aantal koopvaarders onder Texel, bij welke gelegenheid ook 8 schepen met paspoort van Graaf Lodewijk van Nassau buit werden verklaard.

Toen na het slagen van de opstand in de Noordelijke gewesten de Geuzenvloot zich bases in het Vaderland verworven had, was één der eerste maatregelen die genomen werden het opdragen van het opperbewind over de zeezaken aan de Prins van Oranje. De Statenvergadering te Dordrecht verzocht Zijne Excellentie een admiraal aan te stellen die de kapiteins zou aannemen na, en dit is belangrijk, voorafgaande informatie en advies van de Watersteden; alle bestellingen ter zee zouden worden gecasseerd. Hiermede zou men een vloot hebben kunnen krijgen die aan het centrale gezag gehoorzaamde als niet de uitvoering was toegefallen aan de man die er belang bij had de oude bestellingen te handhaven, n.l. de Graaf van der Marck, Heer van Lumey, nu 's Prinsen gouverneur in Zuid Holland. Pas na zijn arrestatie op 6 Januari 1573, toen zijn lastbrief en alle bestellingen die hij had uitgegeven door de Prins herroepen werden, kon deze nuttige bepaling ingang vinden. Een andere maatregel die direct door deze Statenvergadering beraamd werd was de handel van het Spaans gebleven Amsterdam af te leiden naar Enkhuizen en Hoorn, waartoe brieven naar Denemarken en de Noord-Duitse steden geschreven werden, wel een bewijs hoezeer 's lands economie aandacht nodig had. Maar er is nog een zaak waaruit het grote belang van de zeehandel voor een gezonde economie van het land en het voortzetten van de krijg blijkt en dat is de heffing die er on gepleed werd in de vorm van licenten.

Licenten

In Oktober 1572 werd in Zeeland de eerste licent regeling ingesteld, waarbij de uitvoer van eetwaren en goederen op straffe van confiscatie, verboden werd tenzij tegen betaling van een zeker bedrag zodanig vastgesteld, als de waren zouden kunnen verdragen zonder de nering te verdrijven. Deze regeling werd door Holland in April 1573 overgenomen en daarna, met allerhande wijzigingen, gemaakt tot een uiterst belangrijk economisch wapen dezer gewesten en een grote bron van inkomsten voor 's Lands zeewezen, dat zelf voor de inning ervan moest zorgen. Het aantal placaten over de licenten is zeer groot, daar de regeling steeds werd aangepast aan de economische en krijgskundige situatie van het moment en van streek tot streek kon verschillen. Als gevolg ervan hebben 's Lands schepen wachtdiensten verricht op de binnenstromen en de Zuiderzee, in de zeegaten en langs kust, soms tot aan de Somme en de Elbe toe.

De term licenten, of verlofgelden zoals Hooft ze noemt, ontstaat ineens in 1572 en daardoor wordt de indruk gewekt alsof hier een nieuwe bron van inkomsten word gecreëerd; de Jonge noemt ze nadrukkelijk als een nieuw en onbekend recht. Toch kan dit eigenlijk niet worden gezegd en lijkt het eer de officiële voortzetting van een reeds in de Geuzentijd en daarvoor bestaand systeem. We hebben reeds gezien, hoe de Watergeuzen schepen en hun lading op rantsoen stelden in plaats van hen als goede buit te verkopen. De redenen hiertoe komen mij voor tweeledig te zijn. In die tijd was de organisatie van de samenleving reeds zo ver gevorderd, dat het te gelde maken van geroofd goed geen eenvoudige zaak was. Hagedorn vermeldt een belangwekkend voorbeeld van de moeilijkheden, waarmede dit gepaard kon gaan. Vier kooplieden uit Paderborn hadden in

1569 48 ton boter te Groningen gekocht, welke lading door een Hamburger schipper van Delfzijl naar Bremen zou worden gebracht. Deze werd echter op het wad aangehouden door Kapitein Jan Lodewycks die de lading — als Gronings goed — prijsverklaarde en verder doorleidde. De eigenaren wendden zich nu tot de Stad Groningen teneinde duplicaten van alle documenten op de lading betrekking hebbende te verkrijgen. Deze werden hen verstrekt en gewapend daarmee gingen zij op onderzoek uit en stuitten op een schipper van Workum, die in Zwolle gevangen gezet was en de boter bleek te hebben overgenomen om deze in Holland te verkopen. Zo kwam men 30 vaten op het spoor die in Gouda verkocht waren ; ver- der bleken er nog processen in Hasselt te lopen over 5 1/2 vaten en werden nog 2 halve vaten in Minnertsgra opgespoord. Dat onder dergelijke omstandigheden het handelen met grote partijen buitgoederen niet aantrekkelijk was laat zich begrijpen en daarom was een prijzenhof — dat de genomen goederen kon legaliseren — zo belangrijk. Daar lag het grote belang voor de Watergeuzen om in Engeland en la Rochelle te mogen havenen.

De tweede reden was, dat het aantal mensen dat grote partijen goederen van de Watergeuzen kon overnemen gering was en maar al te dikwijls tot de klasse behoorde die beroofd werd, waarvan dus weinig hulp viel te verwachten.

In deze omstandigheden is het systeem van op rantsoen stellen een eenvoudiger oplossing, daar de benadeelde zelf er allicht nog een zeker bedrag voor over heeft om zijn eigendom te mogen behouden en dan in geld betaalt, dat niet traceerbaar is en overal zijn waarde heeft. Van hier naar het betalen van een zeker bedrag vooruit, om alle moeilijkheden en gevaar aan de aanhouding verbonden te ontlopen, is slechts een kleine pas die ook werd gedaan. Zo vertrokken in April 1571 vijf Emdersche schippers met lading voor Deventer uit Bergen in Noorwegen, waarbij de eigenaren der lading hen voor vertrek paspoorten ter band stelden, die zij tegen betaling van de Watergeuzen verworven hadden, „soubz l'espoir et intention que leurs biens pourroient par ce moyen librement passer outre vers Deventer sans estre spoliez . .”.

In dit laatste school natuurlijk de moeilijkheid van het systeem; het vergde een discipline van de vloot die, zoals we reeds gezien hebben, de Geuzen kapiteins nog niet bezaten. Maar in feite heeft men hier de verlofgelden, die een bezettende macht ter zee heft om ladingen verschillende bestemmingen te laten bereiken, ingevoerd welk systeem zoals we later zullen zien wordt voortgezet met het placaat van 18 Mei 1574. Hierbij moet worden bedacht, dat de Nederlandse scheepvaart zeer goed op de hoogte was met een analoge praktijk. Immers, in de Sont was in 1565 de bestaande roertol omgezet in een heffing op de goederen geladen in de schepen, waardoor de afnemers van Baltische producten, evenals de Oostzeelanden voor hun importen uit het Westen, genoodzaakt werden extra te betalen voor de doorvaart der Deense wateren. In het licent systeem grijpen de opstandige gewesten naar één van de weinige troeven die zij bezitten, n.l. hun macht ter zee en plaatsen deze tussen de handel naar Oosten en Westen waardoor zij een controlerende invloed uit gaan oefenen in het ontmoetingspunt van deze twee grote handelsstromen, die als het ware schatplichtig aan de beide gewesten worden gemaakt .

Dat macht ter zee een noodzakelijke voorwaarde was blijkt uit de confrontatie met het licentsysteem van het machtige gilde der Merchant Adventurers. In 1573 toch keerde de Court, zoals de vestiging van het gilde genoemd werd, naar Antwerpen terug en moest toen een overeenkomst aangaan ter regeling van het inmiddels ingevoerde licent. Dit lichaam met koninklijk charter, dat zondig convoy voor zijn vloten kon verkrijgen zoals bij de verplaatsing naar Emden in 1564 was gebleken, diende nu, in plaats van licent te betalen, ervoor te zorgen, dat de Staten wapens en munitie uit Engeland konden betrekken, waartoe deze kooplieden zich tot de Kroon moesten wenden. Het kan Koningin Elisabeth, die doende was haar steun aan de Prins te verminderen, weinig welkom zijn geweest in de periode waarin zij toenadering tot Alva zocht op deze indirecte wijze

genoodzaakt te worden de rebellen toch weer te steunen en hen van krijgsbehoeften te voorzien. Daarmede verkreeg het gilde echter nog geen vrije doorvaart; het mocht slechts 4 schepen tegelijk opzenden naar Antwerpen die hun geschut op een vaartuig, dat te Vlissingen hun terugkeer bleef afwachten, moesten achterlaten 18). Deze overeenkomst kwam de 25e Mei 1573 bij verdrag tussen de Prins en de gedeputeerden van het gilde tot stand, een merkwaardig voorbeeld van de universele bruikbaarheid van macht ter zee 19) en werd 3 April 1574 door een nieuw verdrag vervangen.

Op 3 Mei 1573 was een nieuw placaat uitgevaardigd, houdende verbod van uitvoer van boter, kaas, zout, hop of anderen buiten Holland en Zeeland tenzij met paspoort van de Prins ; voor Holland werd nog speciaal de uitvoer van granen naar landen onder de Hertog van Alva verboden.

Toch bleek dit placaat mogelijkheden tot fraudes en abusen te bieden en er werd op 5 Mei 1574 een nieuw uitgevaardigd, wederom de uitvoer uit Holland en Zeeland o.a. van victuaille zonder betaling van licent verbiedend; cherchers moesten op de stromen en de passagiën de goede naleving controleren.

Reeds op 18 Mei 1574 verscheen het volgende placaat en alleen al op grond van deze snelle opeenvolging zou men mogen aannemen, dat er belangrijke bezwaren in het bestaande systeem gebleken waren. Jets hiervan blijkt misschien uit de titel van dit placaat, dat niet meer de uitvoer verbood doch deze juist permitteerde. Alvorens tot een bespreking van dit bijzonder belangwekkende placaat over te gaan is het echter zaak eerst een blik te werpen op de situatie waarin het uitgevaardigd werd.

Situatie te land.

In deze tijd was de opstand van de landen van herwaarts over geheel teruggedrongen en hielden alleen Holland en Zeeland de strijd in onderling gescheiden gebieden vol. Na de overgave van Middelburg in Februari 1574 was Walcheren wel geheel verenigd, doch met Beveland en Schouwen het enige gebied in Zeeland, dat de Prins was toegedaan ; Zuid Beveland en Tholen hielden nog de Spaanse zijde. De Vlaamse overwal was op een enkele plaats na Biervliet — in Spaanse handen. Ook de Brabantse overval was praktisch geheel Spaans met als uitzondering Geertruidenberg, 's Prinses eigen stad.

De Zuid Hollandse eilanden hielden de zijde van de Prins, doch de nabijheid van de vijand maakte de situatie daar gevaarlijk. Een illustratie daarvan was de vloot van 11 kromstevens, door Requesens te Nieuw Gestel bijeengebracht, waartegen de Prins op 20 Juli 1575 een aanval ondernam, o.a. met zijn zo gewaardeerde galeien, waarbij alle vijanden werden genomen).

Meer naar het Noorden was de Oostelijke oever van de Zuiderzee geheel in handen der Spanjaarden en door hun bezit van de Zuidoever — langs het Y tot aan de duinenrij toe was Holland in twee scherp gescheiden gebieden verdeeld. Daardoor konden de Spanjaarden tevens langs het strand omvattend optreden tegen Noord- en Zuid Holland. Verder verdeelde Leiden's beleg het Zuiden van Holland nogmaals in tweeën waarbij de steden zich als een soort egelstellingen in een onderwaterstaand en gebrandschat platteland handhaafden.

In Mei 1574 werden Leidsendam en Den Haag door de Spanjaarden bezet en na ampel beraad besloten de Staten op 30 Juli met veel moeite tot het doorsteken van de dijken. In het Zuiden van het gewest deed Vitelli een inval waarbij Woudrichem, Leerdam, Asperen en Heukelom genomen werden en de verdedigingslijn der grote rivieren in gevaar kwam. In het Noorden viel Chevreaulx Waterland binnen waar hij zijn hoofdkwartier in Assendelft vestigde en vandaar de Zaanstreek onder contrôle hield. De aanval op de West Friese zeesteden, die wel het doel van deze onderneming was, kwam echter tegen de wakkere Sonoy niet van de grond.

Hoe moeilijk in deze tijd de situatie in Holland geweest is blijkt tijdens de Pacificatie, toen men becijferde, dat het gewest voor 1/3 had blank gestaan en 2/3 deel der plattelandsbevolking verlopen was 24). Dat in die omstandigheden een gewest niet meer de lasten van de krijg zou kunnen opbrengen, had niet behoeven te verbazen; dat Holland en Zeeland dit konden blijven doen, is te danken aan de handel en scheepvaart, die zich buiten het land konden afwickelen en niet direct van de toestand ervan afhankelijk waren. De Prins had zijn broeders verzocht een leger op de been te brengen om de drietandige Spaanse aanval af te trekken en mogelijk ook de andere gewesten weer tot de opstand te bezielen. Graaf Lodewijk, op 12 November 1573 tot Chieff d'Armée en Capitaine Lieutenant Général benoemd, was in Februari 1574 met 6000 voetvolk en 3000 ruiters -doch zonder veldgeschut - de Ryn overgestoken en ondernam een - mislukte aanslag op Maastricht. Bij de tocht naar het Noorden om de vereniging met de troepen van de Prins tot stand te brengen leed hij in April de verpletterende nederlaag bij Mook, die Graaf Hendrik en hemzelf het leven kostte.

De Spaanse troepen hadden nu de vrije hand.

Situatie te water.



Hollandse Hulk „DIE SCIMMEL“ en een Kromsteven op de Zuiderzee (?) Anno 1565.
Rijksmuseum P. Breughel de Oude

Uit de beschrijving van de situatie te land bleek reeds, in welke mate de opstandige gewesten door water werden omringd. In feite werden zij voor het grootste deel van hun grens door breed water gescheiden van de vijand, die op een aantal plaatsen enige kracht op dat element ontplooid. De zeeprovincies moesten daarom een naar Oosten gerichte verdediging opstellen waarin schepen, geschikt voor de dienst binnenduins, een belangrijke rol hadden te vervullen. Hoeveel schepen dit vergde kan o.a. hieruit blijken, dat tijdens het beleg van Middelburg alleen al de afscherming van Walcheren tegen Z. Beveland 2 grote hulken en 11 heuden vergde benevens een menigte van schuiten, hier gebruikt in de betekenis van grote sloepen. Een andere illustratie vormden de 7 oorlogsschepen die aan de Klundert ingevroren lagen toen de Spanjaarden deze plaats in Februari 1574 innamen. De vijand had, vooral in het Zuiden, de

beschikking over vele uitvalsgaten, van welke altijd een tang beweging tegen doelen op de eilanden of tegen de zeesteden kon worden uitgevoerd.

Van Spaanse zijde gezien waren de posities van de opstandige gewesten bijzonder hinderlijk, daar ze met weinig en moeilijk bereikbaar terrein bijna alle toevoermogelijkheden van overzee naar de Tage Landen onder contrôle hadden. Slechts de vaart over de Eems, die een bevoorradingsweg bood voor Munsterland en het Kleefse

en daarmee voor de Spaanse Nederlanden als de vaart op de Ryn gesloten was — onttrok zich aan de contrôle van Holland. Dat het belangrijk was daarin te voorzien bleek, toen een groot deel van de bevoorrading van het Spaanse leger voor Haarlem via Emden geschiedde.

De Zeeuwen hadden in de slag bij Reimerswaal in Januari 1574 nogmaals hun meesterschap op Ooster- en Westerschelde bevestigd en handhaafden dit verder. De West Friese steden waren in een harde strijd met Amsterdam gewikkeld over de beheersing der Zuiderzee, die zij in October 1573 met het verslaan van Bossu verworven hadden. In de zomer van dat jaar was Duco Martena, admiraal van Friesland, met 4 schepen op de Eems verschenen om de vlootuitrusting van Caspar de Robles, Heer van Billy, ter ondersteuning van Bossu, te verhinderen. Het Zuiderkwartier behoefde weinig met een zeegaande vijand te rekenen en kon alle aandacht wijden aan de ondernemingen op de binnenstromen. De versperring van de vaart binnendoor tussen Noord- en Zuid. Holland moet grote moeilijkheden gegeven hebben. Een spoor hiervan komt mogelijk naar voren in de aanwijzing aan de Commissarissen op de aanhouding van de schepen in den Briel, dat zij de smalschepen met behoeften voor Noord Holland of Zeeland mochten laten passeren, mits zij ze bezichtigden en toezicht namen op het geschut. Deze aanwijzing werd uitgevaardigd in de tijd dat het beleg van Zierikzee begon, maar uit het feit, dat ook Noord Holland genoemd werd — waar toen geen belangrijke operaties plaatsvonden — mag men misschien afleiden, dat deze vaart over zee voor wat men toch binnenschepen noemen mag, reeds in 1574 ontstond en het volgend jaar werd gelegaliseerd.


Hoezeer de situatie te water geruststellend lijkt, zij was het in feite niet en wel omdat Philips II een deugdelijk advies gekregen had over de vraag hoe de oorlog in de Tage landen voort te zetten. Dit was afkomstig van de proviseur van de langdvoogd en kwam er op neer, „datter geen ander middel en was om de calamiteyten van herwaerts over te remedieren ; ten ware hij sich meester conde maken van der zee". Philips besloot tot een -uitrusting van een grote vloot met o.a. 9 geweldige Biscayers, de nodige victualie schepen en schepen en boten voor de landing. Requesens nam reeds 50 ervaren Nederlandse loodsen aan die hij per schip naar Boulogne zond om deze vloot op te wachten. Zelf deed hij te Antwerpen een vloot van ca 30 zeilen uitrusten om, in combinatie met deze Armada, een aanslag te ondernemen op het Brouwershavense Gat en daarmee Zeeland van Holland te scheiden. Wanneer er met dit plan iets mis mocht gaan moest de Spaanse vloot doorzeilen naar Emden om daar een basin te vestigen, zonder zich iets aan te trekken van de dan te verwachten protesten van het Duitse Rijk.

Ter voorbereiding van deze Armada, voor welke Requesens 200 schepen nodig achtte, werd in Spanje een embargo gelegd op Hollandse, Zeeuwse, Eemdbische en Oosterse schepen. Twee Nederlandse schippers, voerende „de Fortuyn" en „de Vliegende Geest", zagen kans zich hieraan te onttrekken en de tijding van de plannen van Philips in het vaderland te brengen. Ook de contribuanten tot de gemeene saecke te Ipswich kregen lucht van de onderneming en zonden hun waarschuwingen over. Na langdurig aarzelen stond Koningin Elisabeth de 22e Juli 1574 de Spaanse vloot toe zich in haar havens van levensmiddelen te voorzien.

Thans werden onder leiding van Louys de Boyssot zeer uitgebreide voorzieningen getroffen om deze aanval af te slaan; één ervan was de bouw van de sterkte op „de Haeck" die voortaan de Veerse rede zou beschermen gelijk Rammekens de Walcherse. Maatregelen werden getroffen om alle betonning en bebaking op zeer korte termijn te kunnen verwijderen.

De Armada werd gesteld onder Don Pedro de Maldovado en hield 8 September 1574 haar processie 32), waar behalve het bootsvolk, 15000 soldaten monsterden voor de expeditie. Door het uitbreken van de pest op de vloot, welke duizenden opvarenden waaronder de

admiraal deed sterven, moest de tocht worden afgelast waarmede een zeer ernstig gevaar voor deze gewesten was afgewend.



De Slag bij Lillo 30 Mei 1574 *Abdy te Middelburg.*
Tapijt naar een ontwerp van Hendrik Cornelisz Vroom (1566-1640), geweven door Hendrik de Maecht in 1598.

Reeds daarvoor echter was de bedreiging van de vloot te Antwerpen opgeheven, die te ernstiger was nu de Spanjaarden geen veldleger meer te vrezen hadden. Een samenwerken van de vloot met de troepen van Requesens — die Bommel belegerde — en Vitelli zou een ernstige bedreiging voor de Z.flank en voor de Prins in de Bommelerwaard hebben gevormd. Na de slag bij Mook kwam Valdez 26 Mei weer voor Leiden ; 30 Mei bracht Boyssot deze vloot, die in verband met een muiterij der Spaanse troepen te Antwerpen de rivier tot Lillo was afgezakt, een vernietigende nederlaag toe.

Meer dan de helft der schepen, waaronder dat van 20 metalen stukken van Adolf van Haemstede, de bevelhebber van het smaldeel, werden genomen of verbrand. Het was dank zij deze overwinning, dat Boyssot begin September met zijn ca 800 Zeeuwen, de bemanningen van naar schatting 20 schepen van oorlog voor dienst in de Zeeuwse wateren, voor het ontzet van Leiden naar het Noorden kon komen. Dat hij daarheen vertrok voor het bericht van de mislukking van de expeditie uit Spanje in het vaderland bekend kon zijn, geeft wel aan, dat het zeewezen toen aan de limiet van zijn mogelijkheden kwam. Dit blijkt ook uit een resolutie van Zeeland waarin besloten werd om, teneinde de tegen de Spaanse Armada uitgeruste en zeilklare vloot te kunnen victuallieren, een aparte belasting in te stellen van 15 stuivers voor elke vuurstede ; daartoe moest eerst een beschrijving van alle huizen worden gemaakt. Men kan zeggen, dat Leiden door deze zeeslag bij Lillo, waar de namen van de grote Zeeuwse aanvoerders dier dagen zoals Cornelis Claesz, Joos de Moor, Maerten Droghe, Evert Henricxsz aan verbonden zijn, werd ontzet op een ogenblik, dat het feitelijke beleg nog maar net begonnen was.

Onder deze omstandigheden moet men de noodzaak voor een goede organisatie van het zeewezen sterk hebben gevoeld en het is de moeite waard na te gaan wat daartoe is gedaan. Hoewel hiervan geen volledig beeld kan worden gegeven is er toch voldoende van bekend om de opzet duidelijk naar voren te laten komen.

Te volgen

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Simulated bridge team training - the evolving standard

"How well prepared are traditional maritime institutions at providing training for modern seafarers to operate on evolving new ships with vast and varied new equipment?

How relevant and appropriate are the varying BTM, BRM and CRM syllabi offered around the world?" we ask ourselves.*

Unfortunately, initial outlay for a new simulator is expensive. An average full mission bridge (FMB) of 360 deg costs over £300,000. This in conjunction with rapid changes in marine technology is putting pressure on colleges to adopt several of the 38 different manufacturers of ECDIS alone for their simulators.

This raises the questions; can these institutions reasonably keep pace with the current demands that are needed to train the industry as a whole? We have to approach the dangerous question of how effective is a bridge training course if it does not use any of the actual bridge equipment fitted to the student's vessel. Yes, we could argue that the courses can still teach the principles of navigation, but surely the closer we are to practising on our actual equipment the better.

There are currently 75,000 SOLAS registered vessels operating at sea that require bridge team and resource training. As a result of the sheer number of varying vessel types and bridge interfaces, and of course different navigation systems, there is huge demand for preparing our current and future seafarers with the most genuine realistic environment for true bridge training.

To provide a solution we first need to establish what the main problems are;

1. Ships now sail to and from many more coastal ports and marinas than ever before. Can all simulators replicate this?
2. Who is the modern seafarer and what are their training requirements? Does the modern seafarer require more training than perhaps seafarers of the past?
3. Does a classroom/simulator environment actually work?

There are obvious issues we seafarers face, in particular the emerging and swiftly changing world of technology that may be daunting for mariners. As a seafarer now ashore as an instructor, I have been able to look at some of these problems in greater detail and from a different perspective – and see both sides of the fence!



Maritime training facilities not only have to make international bridge equipment systems `talk` to each other, but also overcome the

issues of the multiple OS (operating systems) used at sea from Windows to Linux and Apple, so that their simulators reflect the real world. In addition, there are the varying range of ergonomic options needed when creating full mission bridge simulators, in order to create the most realistic experience for the seafarer in line with their actual vessels. This is very much the job of the training institutions to adapt and provide a solution. However, the industry must accept the implications of this investment, which is hard during difficult financial times for many.

Another significant evolution in the maritime industry is the variety of new emerging ports and the reality that modern vessels may be used to travel anywhere, at any time. This leads to the need for training centres to be able to help seafarers practice some of these new ports prior to their arrival.

There appears to now be technological leaps to help this.

Trevor Linn, the CEO of Turbulent, explained: "Port Creation technology has become so advanced and efficient that some companies like ours can create detailed ports tailored to the customer's needs and time frames using methods such as satellite imagery to provide as much detail to an environment as technology continues to advance."

Tanker involvement

A good example of this is a recent successful simulator project in Turkey where several sectors from tankers to tug operators coordinated together to construct a new simulator complex custom-built to their exact requirements that produced hundreds of miles of bespoke simulated areas to practice on. A video of this can be found at www.ecdis.org/ituSim

The third element of making modern and relevant simulator training courses is ensuring that the course and simulators reflect the needs and learning requirements of the modern seafarer. The recently published 94-page ECDIS Type Specific White Paper (free download at www.eMaritimeGroup.com) deals directly with the needs of a modern seafarer using a model established by an education consultant entitled Prensky titled 'Digital Natives, Digital Immigrants'.

An extract of the Type Specific White Paper reads: "What are the expectations of the seafarer we are procuring this equipment for, and what is their capacity to learn and use safely. If we follow Prensky's model, a digital native seafarer is one born after 1980, with technology in his hand. Essentially, here in 2016, a 36-year old seafarer is the first generation of mariners 'in command'. Perhaps this marks the current generation of seafarers as the 'transformation generation' and the last chance for traditional seafarers to pass on (or not) their methods, ethics, and ideology before they have gone forever."

The new bridge training syllabi is starting to reflect this notion of E-Navigation and modern seafarers' concerns. It has new modules, such as simulated cyber attacks during 'at sea' exercises on the bridge team management (BTM) course, and education of cyber security. Like it or not, the average age of seafarers is steadily falling and their needs are also changing from perhaps traditional ones to more current problems.

An indicator of this is that current younger seafarers consider an internet connection and Facebook availability almost as important as pay! Research and development trials have begun to assess the impact of bridge training on both younger and older seafarers. Admiral Nick Lambert a non-executive director at ECDIS Ltd has been a keen participant in the documentation and development of training syllabi to suit the transition



Research carried out at ECDIS Ltd's training centre in co-operation with Bournemouth University

to digital native seafarers. "Research through the eyes of current seafarers enables us to really understand their cognitive behaviour and as a result we can establish and provide the right training to really harness the potential of a bridge team."

Recent reports and papers have indicated that in most cases, almost 96% of maritime accidents are due to human error. The MAIB and other private investigative bodies are working together with companies and colleges to look into incidents, attempting to understand ways to eliminate or reduce the risk of these happening at sea.

Richard North, a marine Investigator from MADI (Marine Accident Digital Investigations Ltd) delivers the Investigation module of the new BTM course at ECDIS Ltd, he said: "We are all aware the marine industry is a reactive one, to attempt to curb this philosophy we must understand what is currently failing the system. By engaging shipping companies and using this information we can help provide specific training material and be proactive in raising awareness through courses, such as bridge team management."

An example of this would be the recent addition of Voyage Data Recording (VDR) modules as part of the BTM course. The evolution of adding new modules and elements to the traditional bridge courses is what helps seafarers deal with their new concerns at sea.

New ships, new ports, new skills, new officers and a next generation of simulators are without doubt making bridge training courses more effective. Change isn't coming; it's already here but perhaps not spread as evenly throughout the world as we would hope.


ECDIS Ltd's Mark Broster was recently made a Fellow of the Royal Institute of Navigation - 'In recognition of his significant and innovative contribution to the development of modern digital navigation and bridge team training in the global maritime industry'.

His passion is ensuring that seafarers receive the best and most comprehensive training without cutting corners to save money or time. He is not alone in this quest, and there is significant work taking place all over the world to adapt to the needs of modern ships and seafarers. It would appear that there is light at the end of the tunnel. If we do not all adapt we run the risk of being swept away with the digital tide. As we know, technology and tide waits for no one!

***This article was written by Robert Gale, Instructor at ECDIS Ltd**

Inséré 01/11/17 BOEKEN LIVRES BOOKS Enlevé 01/12/17

Hornblower's Historical shipmates



Heather Noel-Smith & Lorna M. Campbell have just released a new book, *Hornblower's Historical Shipmates: The Young Gentlemen of Pellew's Indefatigable*. It is available worldwide in Hardcover.

This book sets out the lives of seventeen 'young gentlemen' who were midshipmen under the famous Captain Sir Edward Pellew. Together, aboard the frigate HMS *Indefatigable*, they fought a celebrated action in 1797 against the French ship of the line *Les Droits de l'Homme*. C. S. Forester, the historical novelist, placed his famous hero, Horatio Hornblower, aboard Pellew's ship as a midshipman, so this book tells, as it were, the actual stories of Hornblower's real-life shipmates. And what stories they were! From diverse backgrounds, aristocratic and humble, they bonded closely with Pellew, learned their naval leadership skills from him, and benefited from his patronage and his friendship in their subsequent, very varied careers. The group provides a

fascinating snapshot of the later eighteenth-century sailing navy in microcosm. Besides tracing the men's naval lives, the book shows how they adapted to peace after 1815, presenting details of their civilian careers. The colourful lives recounted include those of the Honourable George Cadogan, son of an earl, who survived three courts martial and a duel to retire with honour as an admiral in 1813; Thomas Groube, of a Falmouth merchant family, who commanded a fleet of boats which destroyed the Dutch shipping at Batavia, capital of the Dutch East Indies, in 1806; and James Bray, of Irish Catholic descent, who was killed commanding a sloop during the American war of 1812

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Inséré 01/11/17 LMB NIEUWS NOUVELLES NEWS Enlevé

Reisverslag van Internationale uitwisseling "Sea Cadets" zomerkamp UK 2017

Deelnemers :

Afd Leuven: 21(D PECHERSKYY Martin; KAD SAIDI Mateo
Afd Geel: 2KD DRIESEN Dylan; 2KD PIECK Dylan; KAD VERHAVERT Viktor
Verantwoordelijke begeleider: BRACKX Katrien, Afd Oostende



Het Koninklijk Marine Kadettenkorps - België vzw heeft ook in 2017 de mogelijkheid gehad om een beperkt aantal jongeren te laten deelnemen aan deze Internationale uitwisseling, dat plaatsvond in het Verenigd Koninkrijk.

Gedurende het kamp waren op verscheidene locaties activiteiten georganiseerd zoals o.a. zeilen, kajak en diverse bezoeken aan musea en gekende plaatsen.
De periode was van 05 Aug t.e.m. 19 Aug 2017 en er hebben 5 jongeren van

verschillende afdelingen kunnen deelnemen, leeftijd tussen de 14 en 18 jaar.
Jose BUTAYE
Stafchef van het Koninklijk Marine Kadettenkorps

UK Exchange 2017

Dylan PIECK

Koninklijk Marine Kadettenkorps België vzw - Afdeling Geel

Dag 1 "zaterdag 5 augustus"

Nadat we in de UK aangekomen waren na een treinrit van 2 uur, werden we opgehaald door een busje en reden we naar een universiteit. Daar ontmoetten we de deelnemers van andere landen die vooral vermoeid waren na hun lange vlucht. Nadat alle landen aanwezig waren, kregen we een pakje met twee sleutels en informatie. De sleutels waren voor onze eigen kamer die heel mooi en groot was. Daarna mochten we rondwandelen om kennis te maken met de buitenlanders, waarna we dan allen gingen eten. Er was veel eten beschikbaar en we konden kiezen wat we aten.



Dag 2 "zondag 6 augustus"

Nadat ze ons hadden gewekt gingen we ontbijten. Het was een typisch Engels ontbijt. Daarna gingen we ons klaarmaken om te vertrekken naar een museum. In het museum kregen we te horen dat de tickets voor de dag voordien waren, dus konden we niet naar binnen. Dus maakten we maar een groepsfoto op een tank en aten we ons lunchpakket in openlucht. Na een lange rit stapte we uit en gingen we wandelen (ongeveer 20 min) naar het zwembad, waar we een test gingen doen die heel gemakkelijk was. Na de test mochten

we nog zwemmen en spelen, heel leuk was dat. Nadien zijn we naar het trainingscenter gegaan waar we gingen slapen. De luxe van de kamer was veel minder dan de kamer in de universiteit, maar het was gezelliger want we sliepen met alle jongens van de uitwisseling samen. Het avondeten bestond uit fish en chips oftewel vis met frieten. Dit vond ik minder, want je kon alleen maar vis bij de frieten nemen en dat eet ik niet graag. Als avondafsluiter gingen we nog naar het strand waar we spelletjes speelden. Na het strand gingen we terug naar de basis om iets later te gaan slapen.



Dag 3 "maandag 7 augustus"

Na het ontwaken moesten we met lege maag de basisbegrippen van de Engelse drill leren om daarna de vlaggenroet te doen, nadien volgde er een typisch Engels ontbijt. Na het ontbijt kwam een kleine bespreking van wie wat ging doen en nog wat uitleg over de veiligheid enz.. Daarna werden we in groepen opgesplitst. Mijn groep had zeilen dus deden we aangepaste kledij aan wat bestond uit een wetsuit (waterbestendige broek en waterbestendige T-shirt). We gingen te voet naar de zeilboten en kregen een kleine les van hoe we een boot moesten klaarmaken. Per twee moesten we onze eigen boot klaarmaken met een begeleider en gingen we zeilen richting het strand. Daar gingen we eten. Tijdens het zeilen naar het strand legde de begeleider ons uit wat we moesten doen en mochten we ook zelf varen. Op het strand gingen we eten. We konden onze zwemkledij ondertussen even uitdoen zodat deze kon drogen en zo konden we ook naar toilet. Toen onze pauze voorbij was gingen we weer zeilen. Het terugzeilen verliep sneller dus konden we nog wat rondvaren en oefenen op het kapseizen. Maar het water was vrij koud dus deden we dat niet te vaak. Toen de tijd om was gingen we terug naar de haven. De zeilen en het getuig werden van de zeilboot gehaald om ze daarna terug op te bergen. We gingen terug naar de basis om ons te douchen en om te kleden. Daarna gingen we frieten met hamburger eten en onze kamer opruimen voor inspectie. De inspectie was veel strenger dan in België, want in onze bedovertrek mocht geen enkel kreukje zitten of het was niet

goed. Er volgde zelfs nog een extra inspectie! Na de inspectie gingen we naar de stad om cricket te spelen. Het was een leuk spel. Tegen slaaptijd gingen we terug naar de basis om te slapen.



Dag 4 "dinsdag 8 augustus"

Na de drill, vlaggenroet en het ontbijt gingen we ons omkleden. Mijn activiteit was klimmen en mountainbiken. De grote groep werd opgesplitst. Mijn groepje ging eerst klimmen. We startten op een kleine muur waar we opdrachten moesten op uitvoeren en daarna gingen we een klein wedstrijdje spelen. Om ter langst op de muur blijven met opdrachten die het moeilijker maakten. Na de opwarming op de kleine muur gingen we klimmen op de gewone muren. Na een tijdje klimmen gingen we een andere wedstrijd spelen. Om ter snelst naar boven! Na de wedstrijd gingen we eten en nadien ons klaarmaken voor het mountainbiken. We kregen een kleine uitleg over wat en waar we alles gingen doen. Daarna gingen we met de auto naar het park waar we onze fietsen namen en een controle deden om te kijken of onze fiets en kledij helemaal in orde was. Het fietsen startte na de controle. Na een tijdje fietsen stopte we op een groot grasveld waar we een spel gingen spelen. De bedoeling van het spel was om in een cirkel te fietsen met z'n allen, zonder uit de cirkel te gaan of de grond te raken met je voet. De winnaar kreeg een snoepje na dat spel. We speelden het een aantal keer en toen gingen we nog een beetje fietsen langs het strand, door de bossen en door het park. Wat allemaal leuk was en met een mooi uitzicht. Na een tijd fietsen stopten we bij een ijskar, naast een stationnetje van een treintje, in het park. Nadat we onze ijsjes hadden opgegeten gingen we weer fietsen en op het einde mochten we proberen om over een heuveltje te springen.

Dat was leuk! Na het fietsen gingen we terug naar het busje waar we onze fietsen er terug inzetten en we vertrokken terug naar de basis om ons te douchen. Ons avondeten was spaghetti. 's Avonds mochten we doen wat we wilden zolang het in de basis was. De meesten gingen naar de kadetten gameroom waar we op de Xbox konden spelen met z'n allen. Dat was echt tof!



Dag 5 "woensdag 9 augustus"

Na de drill, het ontbijt en vlaggenroet gingen we ons weer klaarmaken voor de activiteit van de dag. In mijn geval was dat kajakken. Dus deden we weer ons wetsuit aan en gingen we naar het strand met een busje. Toen we op het strand aankwamen gingen we de kajaks en 1 kano in het water leggen daarna kregen we een uitleg wat we moesten doen en wat we niet mochten en daarna gingen we een opwarmingsspel spelen. Iedereen nam een peddel en probeerde die recht op te balanceren en als de instructeur zei naar links, ging iedereen naar de peddel links van hem. Als hij zij rechts dan gingen we naar rechts. Maar

dit moest gebeuren zonder de peddel te laten vallen wat niet altijd gemakkelijk was. Na een tijdje spelen gingen we kajakken. In de voormiddag gingen we kajakken naar een ander strand. Eens daar moesten we allemaal iets interessant vertellen over ons en ons land. Er waren veel leuke weetjes te horen van iedereen. We gingen terug naar het strand waar we van kwamen en gingen eten. Na het eten gingen sommige naar de toiletten die een beetje verder waren. We gingen er heen zonder de instructeur maar we konden het niet vinden dus moesten we aan mensen vragen waar we een toilet konden vinden. Iemand zei de weg naar een heel mooi restaurant waar we gelukkig naar het toilet mochten gaan. We keerden daarna snel terug naar het strand waar we dan weer een ander opwarmingsspel speelden. Zo moesten we veel springen en roepen tijdens het spel. Na afloop gingen we weer kajakken maar we konden nergens heen omdat de wind te hard was dus gingen we wat spelletjes spelen zoals tikkertje. Samen met de instructeur speelden we grappige spelletjes. Na de spelletjes gingen we kapseizen oefenen. Als je kapseist moet je drie keer onderaan op de kajak slaan met twee handen en daarna moet je voorwaarts uit de kajak gaan. Na het oefenen van het kapseizen gingen we de kajaks weer opbergen en gingen we terug naar de basis om ons te douchen en op te warmen en nadat dat gebeurd was gingen we eten. Daarna gingen we rondwandelen in de stad wat echt leuk was. We gingen naar allerlei winkels en zagen allerlei dingen. Na onze wandeling zijn we terug naar de basis gegaan waar we nog spelletjes speelden en daarna gingen we slapen.

Dag 6 "donderdag 10 augustus"

Na de drill en het ontbijt dat zoals elke andere dag alweer Engels ontbijt was gingen we ons klaarmaken voor onze activiteit. Mijn groep ging powerboaten. Na het omkleden gingen we samen met de mensen die de activiteit zeilen hadden naar onze boten. Toen we er aankwamen moesten we in een rib gaan om naar onze boot te gaan. Het was maar een klein traag bootje waardoor we na vertrek allemaal mochten varen. Na het rondvaren gingen we naar een haven verderop. Eens aangemeerd mochten we wandelen naar een grasveld waar we gingen eten. Op de weg naar daar konden we nog even naar de boten kijken die ook in de haven lagen. Toen we op het veld aankwamen gingen we eten en net als al de eerdere dagen mochten we kiezen wat we na het eten deden. We konden blijven waar we waren om even te zonnen of te wandelen en misschien iets te gaan kopen. Toen we terug gingen varen mochten we proberen om exact naast een boei te gaan liggen, wat niet makkelijk was door de wind en de golven. Na de activiteit gingen we terug om ons te douchen en gingen we hotdogs eten. Na het avondeten gingen we niet naar de stad maar in plaats daarvan gingen we een talentenshow doen. Ieder land moest minstens één ding doen. Zo was er dansen, zingen, ... De talentenshow wat grappig en een heel tof idee. Voor het slapen konden we nog wat praten met iedereen en we speelden nog tafelvoetbal. Daarna gingen we terug slapen.



Dag 7 "vrijdag 11 augustus"

Na ons dagelijks ochtendritueel en ontbijt moesten we onze bagage klaarmaken. Met de bus gingen we naar het fleet army museum. Toen we daar aankwamen kregen we een uitleg over hoe alles er vroeger was en hoe alles geëvolueerd was. Na het middageten mochten we vrij rondwandelen in een museum. Dit museum stond vol met oude en heel interessante dingen. Er was zelf een simulatie van hoe het er op een vliegdekschip uitziet en hoe het er aan toe gaat. Dit was echt wel tof om te zien. Na het museum gingen we terug met de bus op weg naar de "Bristol "het schip waar we de volgende dagen op gingen slapen. Toen we aankwamen moesten we onze bagage helemaal naar boven dragen en daarna weer helemaal naar beneden naar de plek waar we sliepen. Nadat we onze spullen hadden weggezet kregen we een video te zien over de veiligheid op het schip. De video was op een leuke manier gemaakt. Vervolgens mochten we nog verder onze spullen uitpakken en gaan slapen.



Dag 8 "zaterdag 12 augustus"

Nadat we opgestaan waren moesten we in 3de uniform naar de kantine om te gaan eten. Na het eten gingen we terug naar de boot om ons klaar te maken voor onze activiteit van de dag. Voor mijn groep en 1 andere groep stond drillrondleiding en touwwerk op het programma. Mijn groep startte met het touwwerk. We kregen uitleg over hoe we knopen moesten maken. Ik kende bepaalde knopen niet bij naam. Hierdoor kon ik geen antwoord geven op de namen van bepaalde knopen. Dit vond ik wel jammer. Na het oefenen gingen we naar buiten om een systeem te maken om een vat naar boven te hijsen. Daarna volgde een wedstrijd op tijd tegen al de andere groepen. Nadat dit allemaal gebeurd was gingen we eten. De groepen wisselden na het eten van activiteit. Dus mijn groep ging drill met geweer doen met daarna een rondleiding. We kregen een korte uitleg wat we niet mochten doen en wat we wel moesten doen met het geweer. Daarna gingen we allemaal een geweer halen dat iets zwaarder woog. We maakten een wandeling in drill met geweer naar een plein waar we uitleg kregen. We kregen te zien hoe de drill eruitzag het was echt leuk om dat eens te doen want in België is er geen drill met geweer. Het was dat ook leuk om te zien en om na te doen. Na de drill werden de geweren opgeborgen. We kregen een rondleiding op de legerbasis. Het begon bij het op 1 na oudste gebouw waar een kanon stond dat gebruikt werd in de oorlog. Dit kanon werd ook gebruikt wanneer een koning sterft. Er wordt dan een rit door de stad gemaakt. Daarna gingen we naar een gebouw dat verder verwijderd stond maar dit gebouw stond niet op de grond maar zat in een groten bak vol met kiezel steentjes ingeval er grondverzakkingen waren. Het gebouw blijft dan rechtstaan. Na de rondleiding gingen we weer terug om te eten waarna we vrij mochten

rondwandelen op het schip. Eerst gingen we naar de kadettenkamer waar een biljardtafel stond en een kikkertafel. Na een tijdje kwamen ze zeggen dat ze een film gingen kijken in de cinema aan boord van het schip. Na de film was het slaaptijd.



Dag 9 "zondag 13 augustus"

Na het opstaan gingen we weer in drill naar de eetzaal. Na het eten gingen we ons klaarmaken voor de activiteiten van de dag wat vandaag wateractiviteiten waren. Ik koos zeilen. Dit was niet echt tof omdat er bijna geen wind was dus was het meer dobberen en zonnen en ondertussen praten met de anderen. Na het zeilen gingen we eten en na het eten gingen we powerboaten wat veel leuker was want nu gingen we ten minste vooruit met een grote snelheid. Na een tijdje varen gingen we naar een haventje om iets te gaan eten en drinken en daarna gingen we terug naar de basis. Net voor we aankwamen riep de andere ribs op dat ze geen benzine meer hadden dus moesten we helemaal terug naar de haven gaan om een benzine tank te gaan brengen. Later dan normaal konden we ons omkleden en gingen we weer eten. Na het eten gingen we met iedereen naar een voetbalveld om te voetballen of om gewoon te gaan zitten en na een tijdje voetballen gingen we weer terug naar het schip om te gaan slapen.



Dag 10 "maandag 14 augustus"

Nadat we ontbeten hadden gingen we onze spullen inpakken om te vertrekken naar een haven van de marine. Hier waren vroeger allemaal museums over boten. We konden ook op de boten HMS Victory en HMS Warrior. Deze waren allemaal omgebouwd tot museums. Na een tijdje rondwandelen en kijken op de schepen gingen we weer terug naar de bus om verder te rijden naar de volgende locatie. Op Blackhead zouden we de laatste dagen doorbrengen. Na een lange rit kwamen we eindelijk aan in Blackhead waar we onze spullen konden uitladen in onze kamer. De kamer bestond uit 7 stapelbedden. Toen dit gebeurt was konden we nog wat rondwandelen op de nieuwe verblijfplaats waarna we gingen slapen.



Dag 11 "dinsdag 15 augustus"

Na het ontbijt gingen we met zijn allen ons klaarmaken om naar 2 museums te gaan. Eén was op de 0 graden lijn van Greenwich en de andere was met allemaal oude dingen zoals boten, geweren en schilderijen. Dus 2 groepen gingen naar Greenwich en de andere 2 gingen naar het andere museum. Ik ging eerst naar Greenwich wat echt tof was om te zien want er was een grote telescoop en er waren ook veel klokken en schilderijen. Op de lijn van 0 graden kon je ook zien op hoeveel graden andere grote steden lagen zoals New York, Amsterdam enz. Nadat we wat rondgekeken hadden en wat winkels bezocht hadden gingen we verder naar het andere museum waar we vrij konden rondwandelen. Het museum was heel groot maar er was te weinig tijd om alles te doen dus gingen we met zijn allen de souvenirwinkels maar doen waar we allerlei spullen kochten. Daarna gingen we terug naar het andere museum om met de andere groep terug naar de basis te gaan en te gaan eten en te gaan slapen.



Dag 12 "woensdag 16 augustus"

Na het ontbijt gingen we ons klaarmaken om te gaan wandelen in de stad. Bij de groepen waren een aantal landen bij elkaar gezet. Onze groep bestond uit België en Canada. We gingen te voet van de basis, door het park, naar de overzet boot (of Ferry) om naar het centrum van Londen te gaan. De overzetboten in Engeland zijn veel sneller, groter en mooier dan de overzetboten in België. Toen we aankwamen gingen we eerst nog naar Starbucks en daarna startte we onze wandeling door Londen samen met onze gids. We gingen naar de BigBen, Buckets en Buckingham Palace en nog veel andere plekken en souvenirwinkels. Na Buckingham Palace stopten we in het park om te eten samen met de


andere landen. Daarna gingen we nog een beetje verder wandelen en kijken naar de monumenten en andere mooie dingen in Londen. Daarna gingen we naar een basis van de Engelse Marine Kadetten waar ze de administratie deden voor alle kadetten van het United Kingdom. Daarna gingen we nog naar een museum over de 2de wereldoorlog en vervolgens gingen we samen met iedereen naar het Londen Eye om daar onze overzetboot te nemen. Na de boottocht konden we wandelen naar de basis. Op de terugweg zagen we ook het museum en het schip Cutty Shark. Daarna wandelden we terug naar de basis en om te eten. Na het avondeten speelden we een aantal spelletjes samen met een officier die speciaal gekomen was voor ons om ons bezig te houden tijdens de avondactiviteit. We speelden met waterballonnen wat superleuk was. Nadat alle ballonnen op waren gingen we terug naar binnen waar we ons nog een beetje zelf mochten bezighouden en daarna gingen we slapen.



Dag 13 "donderdag 17 augustus"

Na het ontbijt gingen we met de bus naar de Tower of Londen waar we vrij mochten rond wandelen en gaan kijken naar de Crown Jewels van de koningin. Deze juwelen waren echt mooi en werden zwaar beveiligd. Zo waren er dikke deuren van elk 1 ton. We gingen ook naar de White Tower, de Red Tower en de martelkamer. De Tower of Londen staat ook bekend voor de getrainde raven die elk een eigen naam en kooi hebben. Elke raaf had zijn eigen ring met een kleur die aangaf wat de naam was van de raaf. Plots hoorden we allemaal trommelgeroffel. We gingen kijken en het bleek een toneel te zijn met een opvoering van vroeger. Zo deden de acteurs een toneeltje na van het gewone volk dat in opstand kwam tegen de koning en de andere rijke mensen. Met de bus gingen we

vervolgens op weg naar het Westfield shopping center naast het Olympisch Stadion van het voetbalteam Westham United. Hier mochten we winkelen. We splitsten de groep op en gingen met onze groep op zoek naar een plek om te gaan eten. Eens we een plek hadden gevonden gingen we ons eten bestellen. Iedereen had wel iets anders. De ene had biefstuk, de andere een hamburger,... Na ons eten gingen we iets halen in de Starbucks en vervolgens verder winkelen. Er waren Game winkels, klerenwinkels, filmwinkels, enz.. Toen ons geld op was gingen we terug naar het verzamelpunt en vervolgens naar de bus. In de bus konden we al rustig onze spullen inpakken en vervolgens gaan slapen.



Dag 14 "vrijdag 18 augustus"

Na het ontbijt wat zoals al de andere dagen nog steeds hetzelfde was gingen we ons klaarmaken om naar het Dockyard te gaan. Toen we aankwamen moesten we een tijdje wachten voor we naar binnen konden. Binnen werden we in twee groepen gesplitst om later de duikboot te kunnen bezoeken. Als eerste gingen we op het Fregat. Het was echt tof om te zien hoe het was op een schip waar bijna niks aan veranderd was. Nadat we het Fregat gezien hadden moesten we wachten voor we op de duikboot mochten. Tijdens het wachten hadden we ook alvast gegeten en uiteindelijk mochten we op de duikboot gaan kijken. De duikboot was niet groot maar het was wel tof om door de deuren, die kleine

cirkels waren, heen te klimmen. Na alles in de duikboot gezien te hebben gingen we met z'n allen naar een touwshop waar we rond mochten kijken tot het weer tijd was om naar het volgende deel van het museum te gaan. Na een tijdje rondkijken mochten we naar het deel gaan waar ze het touw maakten. De vrouw van de rondleiding zei allerlei interessante dingen over de geschiedenis van de gebouwen. We zagen ook in een hal een handmatige machine om touw te maken. De vrouwelijke gids koos 2 mensen die elk aan 1 kant van de machine moesten staan en vervolgens aan een wiel moesten draaien. Er kwam een derde persoon met een staaf met een block hout in het midden en die moest dat tussen de gedraaide touwen houden. De 3 touwen werden 1 touw. De vrouw nam het touw van de machine en gaf het aan iemand van de leiding. Daarna gingen we naar een ander gebouw wat Y4 van een mijl groot was. Dat gebouw bevatte hetzelfde soort machine alleen veel groter en geautomatiseerd. Na deze demonstratie mochten we vrij rondwandelen in het gebouw. Voor vertrek kochten we nog snel om iets te eten waarna we met de bus terug naar de basis gingen. In de basis deden we ons 1ste uniform aan om onze presentatie te doen over ons land. In een zaal mochten we ons land voorstellen aan de anderen. Voor we begonnen moesten we wachten op een officier uit Engeland die speciaal naar de basis kwam om naar onze presentatie te komen kijken. Toen de officier aankwam begon Australië met de PowerPoint en daarna was België aan de beurt. Na een lange tijd waren alle PowerPoint aan de beurt geweest en mocht elk land nog een woordje zeggen. Ondertussen hadden we grote honger. We waren dan ook blij dat we konden gaan eten. Na de maaltijd mochten we onze cadeautjes geven aan de andere kadetten. De avond mochten we vrij opvullen. Wel moesten we voor 01 uur gaan slapen.



Dag 15 "zaterdag 19 augustus"

Nadat we om 1u30 eindelijk sliepen en terug wakker waren in de ochtend was Zweden al vertrokken naar huis. We aten het Engelse ontbijt voor een laatste keer, maakten onze rugzak en namen nog afscheid van al de andere die al wakker waren. In het station moesten we nog een hele tijd wachten voordat we onze trein konden nemen dus gingen we naar de winkeltjes om nog een beetje geld uit te geven. Na een poosje mochten we op onze trein stappen op weg naar België. Na twee uur in de namiddag kwamen we aan in het station waar onze ouders op ons stonden te wachten. We namen afscheid van elkaar en gingen elk naar ons eigen huisje. Het einde van een leuke reis.



END OF STORY

Inséré 01/11/17 NIEUWS NOUVELLES NEWS Enlevé 01/12/17

DEME wins multiple contracts in Africa



Building on recent successes in the region, DEME has been awarded several new contracts in Africa with a total value of approximately EUR 125 million. The contracts were awarded over the last few weeks for projects in Angola, Benin, Ghana, Ivory Coast, Liberia and Nigeria. In Angola, a 5-year maintenance dredging contract has been awarded by Angola LNG for its gas terminal in Soyo. Works will start by mid of June 2017. In Benin

DEME was awarded a contract for coastal protection works at the Cotonou shoreline. Works will include beach nourishment with a total volume of 1,5 million m³ as well as revetment works and groyne construction. In Ghana DEME participates in a contract for the Tema Port expansion project. Ghana's main seaport, operated by Meridian Port Services (MPS), is gearing up to accommodate some of the world's largest container ships and increase cargo handling services and capacity. The project includes dredging and land reclamation of 3 million m³. Works are set to start by the end of May 2017. In Ivory Coast, a contract has been awarded for the maintenance dredging of the port of Abidjan. Works will be executed in May 2017. It is the third consecutive time that DEME is contracted by the Port Autonome d'Abidjan to maintain the port.

DEME also returns to Liberia for maintenance dredging works in the Freeport of Liberia. The contract has been awarded by Liberia's National Ports Authority. In Nigeria, DEME acquired a contract for the Maiyegun Waterfront development in Lagos. DEME reclaims approximately 600,000 m³ to raise the level of an existing beach. Maiyegun Waterfront will include new housing units, a commercial hub, as well as leisure facilities. The contract in Nigeria follows the recently won project for the Lagos Deep Offshore Logistics Base (LADOL), where DEME is involved in the yard and quay wall construction, as well as the dredging of the berth pocket and access channel to the quay, on behalf of Samsung Heavy Industries. Over the years DEME developed significant expertise across Africa, where the company is currently executing several major dredging and land reclamation projects.

Source: DEME

Inséré 03/11/17 DOSSIER Enlevé 03/12/17

Problems with tugs and infrastructure hobble new Panama Canal locks, says Masters, Mates & Pilots

Only half of the projected number of ships per day are transiting through the new canal locks due to a lack of staff and infrastructure East Coast Ports Invested

Billions of Dollars in Improvements to Accommodate Panamax Ships—Will the Panama Canal Authority Correct the Problem Before it Gets Worse?

Larger ships, known as Neopanamax, were expected to visit ports on the Eastern Seaboard this year, bringing shipping containers from Asia through an expanded Panama Canal. But due to insufficient operational resources within the Panama Canal, far fewer ships than expected have made the passage. The \$9.4 billion investment by the Panama Canal Authority in a third set of locks was supposed to double the tonnage capacity of the Canal. However, according to the Authority's own transit records, the new locks are operating at about half their anticipated capacity. A shortage of tugs and trained crews has limited the Authority's ability to efficiently move the mega-ships through the locks. Instead of the anticipated 12 vessel transits per day through the expanded canal, only a maximum of six are being completed. "This is like building a massive office tower without sufficient elevators to carry workers quickly to their offices," said Captain Don Marcus, the President of the International Organization of Masters, Mates & Pilots. Marcus' union represents sea captains and deck officers on U.S.-flagged vessels, as well as many of the captains and crews on tugboats in U.S. ports and Panama. The locks, designed in the early 1900s, and in continuous operation for more than a century, rely on locomotives moving on the side of the canal to tow vessels.



In contrast, the new third set of locks serving mega-ships are moved by powerful tugboats in a very complicated and risky process that has been documented in a report by the insurance company Allianz. It was estimated that

the canal expansion would require 70 to 90 of these more powerful tugboats. In practice, however, only 33 of 46 tugboats owned by the Panama Canal Authority are operational – on a good day. Tug captains employed by the Authority report that many of the canal tugs are not suitable to handle large container ships. Eight tugs purchased from China are poor performers and not fully used, and at least 10 other tugs are not operational. The shortage of appropriate tugs is not entirely the Panama Canal Authority's fault. Harbor pilots worldwide report that Neopanamax vessels have limitations on their ability to maneuver which, when combined with their increased size, makes them extremely difficult to control. These factors have required a greater number of the more powerful tugs than was initially expected. The safety and transit problems in the "Third set of Locks" were evident from the beginning. The New York Times documents this in a July 2016 story entitled "Fender Bender on the Water (The Expanded Panama Canal)." "You would think the Authority would address the problem and acquire more tugboats and train additional crews," said Marcus. "They have a canal that's working at half of its capacity and is not generating the projected

revenues. As a stopgap, they have hired a Venezuelan company to provide additional tugboats." The waters around the Panama Canal can be very tricky because of difficult currents and tight maneuvering into locks. The Neopanamax vessels and LNG carriers generally require at least two tugboats to move through the new locks. There isn't much room for error. In February, the Associated Press documented that many vessels were scraping the walls of the locks and wearing out the newly constructed walls and doors. "The Authority is at a critical point," said Marcus. "Everyone acknowledges that there is a shortage of tugs and trained tugboat captains. In order for the new locks to be a success, the Authority must complete its investment in infrastructure and personnel. Bringing in a Venezuelan company to provide tugs and crews who lack sufficient training and English language skills, unlike crews employed by the canal authority, is not a solution. It will create greater problems. The Venezuelan company's employees do not go through the rigorous 2.5-year training and certification process that is required for captains employed by the canal authority. And, for the first time in the canal's history you will have these sensitive operations conducted by an outside Venezuelan company rather than direct employees of the Panama Canal authority, thus creating safety and security questions." Added Marcus, "Ports in the U.S. and as far away as the U.K. have made investments based on the canal expansion. The canal is of vital strategic importance and is critical to trade. The Panama Canal Authority must live up to its commitments, acquire additional tugs and train and hire Panamanian personnel to operate them.

The Canal administration needs to take these actions now." In the United States, ports on the Atlantic coast such as Savannah, Jacksonville and New York have spent billions of dollars dredging harbors and raising bridges to accommodate the Neopanamax container ships. The Bayonne Bridge alone required an appropriation of \$1.3 billion to raise that structure from 151 to 215 feet. "The Panama Canal Authority needs to finish the job," said Marcus. "There will be no payoff for Panama nor for East Coast ports until the canal is running at full capacity. A promise was made 15 years ago. The Panamanian people and U.S. East Coast ports relied on that promise and spent billions of taxpayers' dollars. A few more dollars must be invested in tugs and personnel by the Panama Canal authority. This will guarantee the desired return on investment and advance world trade. Failure to promptly address the problem will bring adverse economic consequences to the United States and Panama."

Source: American Journal of Transportation

Inséré 05/11/17 NIEUWS NOUVELLES NEWS Enlevé 05/12/17

Real Life Incident: Improper Communication Leads to Tanker And Container Ship Collision

A container vessel was leaving port in darkness under the con of a pilot. The third officer and the Master were also on the bridge and a helmsman was steering by hand. On leaving the container ship, the pilot was scheduled to embark on an inbound tanker near the entrance of the buoyed port channel. The tanker was approaching the entrance to the port channel and preparing to pick up the pilot. The Master, the OOW and a helmsman steering

in hand mode were on the bridge. The tanker was about one nautical mile (1nm) from No 1 buoy, making 126° COG at about 2kt. At about this time the port control authority was in an unrelated communication with a tug and had instructed the tug to 'cross 1nm astern of the tanker'. The tanker's Master heard part of this radio exchange and assumed that port control was talking to the outbound container ship in relation to his ship. The Master of the tanker assessed that to pass astern of his vessel, the container ship would alter course to port on clearing the channel.

As the outbound container vessel was approaching No 3 buoy, the pilot and the Master discussed the pilot's disembarkation. The tanker was visible from the container vessel's bridge in addition to showing on the radar displays, but it was not acquired as an ARPA target. Just before disembarking the container ship, the pilot advised the Master to reduce speed to 10kt and to maintain 314° COG. By eye, the container vessel's Master estimated that the tanker would pass down his ship's port side at a distance of 1.5 cables. As the container vessel passed between the No. 2 buoys, the pilot launch with the pilot on board cleared the container vessel and headed towards the tanker. The container vessel's Master then increased the engine speed. As the container vessel passed between the No. 1 buoys its speed was about 11kt. The tanker's Master saw the outbound container vessel pass between the No. 1 buoys and became concerned that the vessel had not altered to port as he had expected. He called VTS port control on the VHF radio to inquire. At this point, the pilot was still on the launch after having left the container ship. Shortly thereafter the two vessels, now both 4 cables from the entrance to the buoyed channel and near the centreline, collided bow to bow. The official investigation found, among other things: The tanker Master's reliance on scanty VHF information and the failure of the container vessel's Master to keep a proper lookout and monitor the tanker's movement were pivotal to this accident. A lack of an agreed plan and absence of effective communication, co-ordination and monitoring were significant factors, which contributed to the flaws in both Master's situational awareness. On this occasion, the precautions of pilotage and port control, which should have been able to manage and de-conflict the vessels' movements, were ineffective. The pilot's failure to co-ordinate and communicate the passing arrangements for the two vessels was a significant omission; he was the assigned pilot for both ships. Although both Masters were aware of the other vessel, the plan for the meeting of the vessels remained ambiguous.

Reference: nautinst.org

Deux bateaux se sont percutés mardi vers midi sur l'Escaut occidental. Le premier navire avait quitté le port d'Anvers, tandis que le second se dirigeait vers la Métropole. Les deux embarcations sont actuellement ancrées à proximité de Flessingue (Vlissingen) afin d'évaluer les dégâts, indique le média spécialisé dans la navigation Flows.

Le porte-conteneurs Maersk Genoe avait quitté Anvers pour Bremerhaven en Allemagne. Il a percuté le navire de charge Dan Fighter, plus léger, sur l'Escaut occidental alors que celui-ci se rendait vers le premier port belge.

Les deux bateaux ont été endommagés par l'accident, mais selon l'autorité nautique, aucun blessé n'est à déplorer. Aucun container n'est passé par dessus bord, ajoute-t-elle.

Une enquête a été lancée afin de déterminer les causes de l'accident

Reisverslag van Internationale uitwisseling "Sea Cadets" zomerkamp UK 2017

Deelnemers :

Afd Leuven: 21(D PECHERSKYY Martin; KAD SAIDI Mateo

Afd Geel: 2KD DRIESEN Dylan; 2KD PIECK Dylan; KAD VERHAVERT Viktor

Verantwoordelijke begeleider: BRACKX Katrien, Afd Oostende



Het Koninklijk Marine Kadettenkorps - België vzw heeft ook in 2017 de mogelijkheid gehad om een beperkt aantal jongeren te laten deelnemen aan deze Internationale uitwisseling, dat plaatsvond in het Verenigd Koninkrijk.

Gedurende het kamp waren op verscheidene locaties activiteiten georganiseerd zoals o.a. zeilen, kajak en diverse bezoeken aan musea en gekende plaatsen.

De periode was van 05 Aug t.e.m. 19 Aug 2017 en er hebben 5 jongeren van verschillende afdelingen kunnen deelnemen, leeftijd tussen de 14 en 18 jaar.

Jose BUTAYE

Stafchef van het Koninklijk Marine Kadettenkorps

UK Exchange 2017

International
Cadets
2KD
Afdeling LEUVEN

Summer
Martin

Exchange
camp

Sea
2017
PERCHERSKY

Dagindeling/activiteiten

5 augustus: aankomst St. Mary's
6 augustus: Introductions
7 augustus: Kayakken en Engelse drill
8 augustus: Powerboten
9 augustus: Zeilen
10 augustus: Mountainbiken en Klimmen
11 augustus: Talentenshow
12 augustus: HMS Bristol
13 augustus: Zeilen in een sloep
14 augustus: Histok'ic Dockyards
15 augustus: Prime Meridian
16 augustus: London Tour
17 augustus: Shopping
18 augustus: Tweede Dockyard
19 augustus: Afscheid

5 augustus:

De eerste dag begon met een vrolijk, alzijnde vermoeid humeur van de kadetten. Wij (Belgische kadetten) kwamen samen aan de ingang van de eurostar om 9u. Na een kleine briefing en wat bijpraten begonnen we met de check-in. Deze was relatief kort. Hierna was het gewoon een zaak van wachten op de trein en voor sommigen ontbijten. Toen we aankwamen in Engeland werden we opgehaald met een minibusje. Tijdens de reis hebben ik en Dylan de Britse chauffeurs goed laten horen hoe graag we meezingen met de radio. We kwamen aan in St. Mary's University waar we zouden samenkomen met de rest en overnachten. In het begin praatten we niet veel met de toen alleen nog Hong Kongse kadetten. Juist toen ik 1 van hun wou laten meespelen met kaarten omdat ik zag dat hij wou spelen moesten we naar de briefmg luisteren. We kregen wat informatie over wat de dagplanning was en gingen naar onze kamers. We kregen heel luxe kamers, 1 voor elk! Dit was wel alleen voor de onze tijd in St. Mary's maar ik was er al heel tevreden mee. We gingen eten en leerden daar Conan, een van de Australische kadetten, een beetje kennen. Hij zei in het begin dat zijn naam Conrad was en wij dachten dit voor bijna de hele twee weken haha. Na het eten gingen we "slapen", dit was feitelijk gewoon stil chilen tussen elkaar in om de anderen niet te storen.



6 Augustus



De volgende dag zou relatief kalm zijn: Ontbijt, museum bezoeken en later de About Me presentaties waar we ons moesten voorstellen per land. Zo leerde ik dat Erin, een van de beste vrienden die ik op dat kamp zou maken, ook karate deed en dat ze net als mij een bijna zwarte gordel had. Het bleek ook duidelijk dat alle kadetten een passie hadden voor de Sea Cadets of het KNIK. Dit bleek uit dat bijvoorbeeld zo'n 70% van de kadetten graag drill deed. Iets dat ze allemaal zeiden niet graag werd gedaan normaal in hun afdelingen. Dit zou nog duidelijker blijken op de laatste dag. `s Avonds vertrokken we naar onze volgende verblijfplaats in Weymouth. Hier zouden de meisjes en jongens apart slapen in grote kamers met half afgesloten compartimenten van 4 bedden. Later die avond speelden we "vo et-baseball" op het strand. Dit was rampzalig want het eindigde met iedereen die valspeelt haha. (Zij speelden eerst vals ;))



7 augustus:

De volgende ochtend zouden we onze eerste Engelse drill krijgen. Deze was in het begin nogal verwarrend voor de Belgen en Canadezen want wij tillen ons been op terwijl de Engelsen het gewoon bijzetten. Hierdoor zou het ons wat dagen duren eer we het perfect konden, wat opzich al snel was voor een nieuwe drill. Hun bevelen zijn ook lang en zonder duidelijk ritme. In plaats van 1. Plaats 2. Rust hebben zij gewoon 1. SquadAtEase en ik heb nog steeds geen idee wat de 5 woorden om te draaien zijn behalve dat het laatste woord "turn" is. Dit maakte het allemaal heel grappig om te leren. Diezelfde dag zouden we opsplitsen in "divisions". Deze zouden onze activiteitsgroepen zijn voor de rest van het kamp. Ik was in een heel leuke groep met Dylan, Britten, Canadezen, Hong Kongers en Koreanen. Alleen geen Australiërs want daar waren er maar 2 van. Onze division heette Dreadnought, en wij waren de beste groep in mijn mening. Simpelweg omdat we elk record verbroken (1 alzijnde ni officieel), en ongelooflijk veel plezier hadden. Die dag gingen we kajakken en Kyle niet meetellend waren we goed bezig. Kyle zou het rest van het kamp bekend staan als degene die alles laat kapseizen in onze groep en vooral bij de Amerikaanse officier. Dit kwam omdat Kyle ongeveer drie kajaks/canoes heeft laten zinken waarvan 2 met de Amerikaanse officier erin. Er waren geen slechte gevoelens bij, het was gewoon grappig. Later zou zijn zeilboot ook kapseizen maar dat komt deels door het feit dat mijn zeilboot over hun boot ging door een plan van mijn zeilploeg van 3 om Kyle in het water te trekken haha. We konden er allemaal heel goed om lachen. De Amerikaanse officier was de rest van het kamp Kyle nog wat aan het plagen omdat hij haar heeft laten zwemmen maar dat was weer al in goede humor. Die avond gingen we allemaal heel snel slapen.

8 Augustus:

De tweede dag in division Dreadnought was ongeveer identiek met als enige verschil dat we gingen powerboaten en niemand moest zwemmen. We hadden ook 1 van de trainingsschepen van een Engelse afdeling gezien genaamd de "Victory".




9 augustus:

Net als de vorige twee dagen gingen we uit op het water. Deze keer was het zeilen. Die dag besloot mijn zeilploeg en ik, bestaande uit Jonas, mij en een instructeur die gwn als roerganger en schipper diende omdat Jonas en ik konden zeilen, dat het grappig zou zijn om met Kyle zijn ploeg te racen en dan Kyle zijn hand te schudden en hem in het water te trekken. Dit mislukte echter op een veel betere manier: Toen we naast hun aan het varen waren en probeerden Kyle te overtuigen zijn hand uit te steken ging de neus van onze boot op die van hun, hierdoor ging hun boot half onder water aan 1 kant en met wat snelle manoeuvres ontsnapten we de kapseizende mast zodat we niet mee zouden omdraaien. We waren de volgende 5 minuten keihard aan het lachen. Ons plan was mislukt maar Kyle EN zijn ploeg waren aan het zwemmen en dat was nog beter als gepland. Vooral omdat Dylan ook in die boot zat haha.



10 Augustus:

Vandaag was de planning iets meer als normaal. We gingen mountainbiken en dan later in de dag zouden we rotsklimmen. Het mountainbiken was spijtig genoeg eerder fietsen omdat er geen mountainbike-paden dichtbij genoeg waren om in het tijdschema te passen. Het rotsklimmen was wel ongelooflijk extreem. Dit was mijn eerste keer en we waren allemaal zo competitief ingesteld dat twee groepsleden bijna de beste tijd van de andere ploegen versloegen. Ik ging van 50 s naar 30 en dan naar 18. Een ongelooflijke progressie voor een eerste keer. Toen het tijd was voor de tweede helft van onze groep om te klimmen versloeg Jonas niet alleen de tijd van de beste kadet met 6 seconden maar hij was een honderste van een seconde van de beste tijd van de instructeur af! De instructeur had 9.61 seconden terwijl Jonas 9.62 haalde! Met 1 extra poging kon hij zowiezo de instructeur verslaan. Wii waren allemaal zo blii die dag omdat onze ploeg de beste was.



11 Augustus:

11 Augustus was gekenmerkt door 1 activiteit: De talentenshow. Het begon allemaal bij het kajakken toen ik aan onze instructeur vermeldde dat Dylan kan beatboxen. Toen deze aan Dylan vroeg om het te laten zien heeft Dylan een serieuze indruk op iedereen gemaakt. Ik stelde toen lachend het idee voor voor een talentenshow. Een idee dat de instructeur later aan de officieren voorlegde en dat dus gebeurde. De avond was gekenmerkt door de 4 acts in de Uk sea cadet exchange 2017 video op youtube en facebook. Dylan de beatboxer, Daniela de gitaarzanger, Zuid-Koreaanse HipHop die niemand zag aankomen van het bescheiden meisje en het belangrijkste van al: De officieren die de macarena dansen! Ook bezochten we het Royal Navy Fleet Air museum waar Blinky, onze kampmascotte, veel nieuwe vriendjes ontmoette.



12 Augustus:

12 Augustus vertrokken we naar de HMS Bristol. Een buiten gebruik marine schip dat gebruikt werd om kadetten op te leiden in de basis die HMS Excellent noemt. Hier hebben we veel gemarcheerd en werden er weeral activiteiten gedaan op basis van onze divisions. De eerste dag heeft mijn groep nog gezeild.



13 augustus:

Op 13 augustus hebben we weeral gezeild in Porstmouth. Deze keer heb ik mogen zeilen in een sloep zoals degene in Nederland omdat ik had gepraat met een officier die graag zeilt en hij vond ook dat ze veel aangenamer waren om in te zeilen. In de ochtend moest ik wel eerst in 1 van de meer moderne bootjes zeilen. Deze zijn onstabiel en het is dan ook geen toeval dat toen de kampcommandant besloot te racen de andere kadet eruit viel. Zij was perfect ok want het water was warm dus de kampcommandant en ik waren gewoon aan het lachen voor de volgende 5 minuten. Toen ik eindelijk mocht zeilen in de sloep met Jonas vond ik het eindelijk veel rustiger. Er was meer ruimte en de sloep was veel stabiel.



14 Augustus:

Vandaag bezochten we de Historic Dockyards waar we een toer kregen van Whale Island en de Dockyards. We bezochten ook twee oude oorlogschepen van de Engelse Navy, namelijk de Victory en nog een ander. De HMS Victory is het schip waarop Nelson stierf en dus bezochten we de plaats waar hij werd neergeschoten en de plaats waar hij stierf. Ook deden we vandaag Armed Drill en Seamanship. Deze waren beide vooral interessant voor twee redenen: Dit was onze (Belgen) eerste keer drill met geweren, iets wat ik absoluut wil doen in het KMK, en twee omdat we het nationale Britse team dat twee weken trainde in HMS Excellent in 1 oefen poging, drie officiële pogingen en nog 1 niet officiële poging versloegen. In de eerste drie officiële pogingen versloegen we bijna de beste tijd van de kadetten, dus we wouden een 4de keer gaan ook al zou het ni tellen en toen versloegen we niet alleen de kadetten maar ook het nationale team. Wij hadden 2 minuten 15 terwijl zij 2 minuten 50 hadden. Ik neem wel aan dat het nationale team ondertussen een veel kleinere tijd heeft maar hun Excellent tijd hadden we verslagen. Wat betreft Armed Drill, aangezien de geweren natuurlijk geblokkeerd zijn vind ik dat het echt iets is dat de status van het KMK nog kan verhogen en onze bekendheid zou vergroten omdat we de enige jeugdbeweging zouden zijn die iets gelijkaardig doet, dus ik ga het absoluut voorstellen aan mijn officieren.



15 augustus:

Vandaag bezochten we de Prime Meridian in Greenwich en het Britse War Museum. In het algemeen vond ik het ok maar aangezien veel van de exposities niet werkten of niet beschikbaar waren vond ik het ook wat weinig om te zien. Toen het tijd werd voor het war museum kregen we een half uur wat spijtig was want dat was wel een interessant museum. Ik heb wel eindelijk een Spitfire motor kunnen zien waar ik heel blij om was.



16 Augustus:

We kregen een tour van Londen van de Britse kadetten vandaag. We bezochten daarin ongeveer elk groot monument in Londen en zelfs de Sea Cadet HQ! We kregen een tour en ik was een beetje verbaasd om te zien hoe klein de staff van het HQ was. Niet meer als 30 mensen besturen een wereldwijde organisatie. Later die avond deden we wat kleine fysieke trainingsoefeningen. Push-ups werden niet gedaan wegens tijdgebrek, maar Erin en ik besloten dat we het toch wouden doen dus na het waterballonengevecht hebben we

de hele avond zitten work-outs doen. Daniela deed uiteindelijk mee en voor een korte tijd 1 van de Britse kadetten.



17 Augustus:

Vandaag kregen we wat tijd in een shoppingcenter en bezochten we de Tower Of London. Ik heb lekker veel snoep gekocht en voor de eerste keer avocadosushi gegeten met Erin. Ook probeerde ik voor de eerste keer KFC en kocht ik een pizza van PizzaHut. Een in het algemeen lekkere dag dus.



18 augustus:

Vandaag bezochten we nog een andere Historic Dockyard in Chatham. Hier bezochten we de HMS Ocelot de laatste onderzeeër die in de dockyard gebouwd was en de HMS Cavalier. Ook bezochten we Buckingham Palace. Iets wat ik echt wou doen omdat de vorige keer dat ik in Londen was met de school ik daar geen kans voor had.



19

Augustus:

De laatste echte kampdag. Vandaag maakten we ons eigen touw in de Rope factory. Deze fabriek is de laatste in de wereld om nog touw te maken met gebruik van Victoriaanse technologie en technieken. Later in de avond gingen we bezoek krijgen van de hoofd van

de Sea Cadets. Na de presentaties en een aangenaam buffet besloten Erin, ik, Dylan, Daniela en nog wat anderen in echte Kadetten spirit onze laatste avond wat te doen? Drill natuurlijk! Marcheren onder marcheerliedjes om precies te zijn. We vonden het zo spijtig dat dit niet mocht in Portsmouth dat we het gewoon zelf deden in Londen. In de gymzaal maakten we een peloton en degene die het liedje kent leid het peloton. Omdat de zaal zo klein was hebben we de draai bevelen achterwege gelaten omdat dit de liedjes zou storen, maar we hadden die avond ongelooflijk veel plezier aan iets te doen dat sommige kadetten thuis niet leuk zouden gevonden had hebben. Toen voelde ik pas echte teamspirit. Samen marcheren terwijl het niet moest in onze verschillende eerste uniformen uit verschillende landen, gebonden door 1 ding: We waren allemaal kadetten. Sommige waren dan misschien chef in hun land maar hier waren we allemaal kadetten. En we zongen. Lied na lied, land na land.

Dat is wat het betekent om kadet te zijn. Niet bevelen volgen of een uniform dragen maar trots zijn en onszelf kadet noemen niet omdat het moet, maar uit respect, trots, passie en eer om kadet te mogen zijn.

Ik kan haast niet wachten op volgend jaar.

2KD Pecherskyy Martin



Inséré 07/11/17 HISTORIEK HISTORIQUE Enlevé 07/12/17

DE GRONDLEGGING VAN 'S LANDS ZEEMACHT - De vlootpolitiek anno 1574. (II)

Organisatie Admiraliteit.

Kort na de inname van Middelburg vaardigde de Prins op 2 Maart 1574 een nieuw Regeringsreglement voor Zeeland uit, waarin tegelijkertijd de zaken der Admiraliteit werden geregeld.

Voor het bestuur werd een College van Gouverneurs en Raden ingesteld waarin de Admiraal bij de behandeling van zaken de defensie ter zee rakende ook zitting kreeg. Dit College zou rechter zijn over alle buitgoederen en zaken, de Admiraliteit rakende, boven de 1000 Carolus guldens eens; de aangelegenheden van en beneden dit bedrag zouden worden overgelaten aan de raad der Admiraliteit, die goed register moest houden van alle prinsen en buitgoederen. Tevens moest deze raad ook de processen boven de 1000 guldens behandelen „toner sententie diffinitieve excluz .". Dat deze raad uiteindelijk de rol van prijzenhof volledig ging vervullen laat zich hieruit wel begrijpen.

Eén van de leden van het College zal Commissaris-Generaal „van der equippage van den schepen ten oorloghe" wezen en zijn instructie werd in art. 17 omschreven. Eén of meer Commissarissen tot de monstering konden worden aangesteld.

De criminele judicature bleef bij de Admiraal en Capiteynen (art. 12). De Admiraal alléén kon brieven van zekerheid of passage voor gevangenen van oorlog afgeven en de steden moesten deze gevangenen onderbrengen mits hij de kosten betaalde. Hij mocht geen saufconducten beroerende „de frequentatie oft hanteeringhe van de coopmanschap" afgeven en moest een procureur, een fiscaal, een secretaris en een bode voor de Raad benoemen, wier tractementen werden vastgesteld. De sterkte van de vloot, van het aantal schepen op de goede avonture en de sterkte der garnizoenen werden bepaald ; de capiteinen te water hebben het College te gehoorzamen „als Onze eigene persoon".

Holland of Zeeland met schepen of goederen, of tot het elders woonplaats nemen, zonder consent van de Prins. Voorts mochten de uitgewekenen niet meer zonder consent varen naar of handel drijven op andere landen dan Holland en Zeeland en daar alleen met de plaatsen die Zijne Excellentie zijn toegedaan. Tenslotte werden alle, die sedert 1566 uit de voorgeschreven landen vertrokken waren, verplicht de redenen van hun vertrek spoedig te verklaren.

Hoewel dit nogal onschuldig klinkt, betekende het in feite het gebod tot terugkeer uit den vreemde voor de uitgeweken Nederlandse schippers en kooplieden, in het bijzonder die uit Emden, daar zij anders hun bedrijf op den duur niet meer zouden kunnen uitoefenen. De magistraat van Emden kreeg dan ook een exemplaar van het placaat toegezonden waarop duizenden uitgewekenen, onder het wakend oog van een smaldeel oorlogsschepen, naar het vaderland terugkeerden. Als gevolg van dit placaat verminderde de Oost Friese rederij in één jaar tijds tot bijna de helft.

Licent placaten.

De volgende maatregel was het reeds genoemde placaat betreffende de licenten van 5 Mei 1574 waarbij de heffing beter georganiseerd werd en met name het heffen van eigen rechten op transporten binnenslands, als strekkende „tot verminderinge van onse hoogheydt ende autoriteyt ." streng verboden werd. Aangezien de Hanze van Keulen reeds toen ernstig klaagde over de zware rechten die de schepen moesten betalen wanneer ze van een Hollandse of Zeeuwse haven „nach Engeland, Frankrich, Hispaniën, Flandern oder die Wasserstreume nach Teutschland hinauf" wilden varen is het duidelijk, dat het licent toen geheven werd van alle uitvoer en doorvoer door deze landen. Dit maakt het waarschijnlijk, dat deze kooplieden een weg voor hun handel zullen hebben gezocht buiten Holland en Zeeland om.

Op 18 Mei 1574 werd daarop het placaat uitgegeven „permitterende den uitvoer van allerhande waren ende koopmanschappen, uitgesondert ammunitie van oorlog etc.", gegeven binnen Dordrecht. Het behoort nog tot de placaten die in naam van Philips II

worden uitgegeven hetgeen hier een eigenaardige moeilijkheid oplevert zoals we zullen zien.

De vorige placaten verboden de uitvoer uit Holland en Zeeland tenzij tegen betaling van licent en het is duidelijk, dat dit op den duur ten nadele van de handel van deze Landen moest werken, daar de uitvoer uit andere landen naar dezelfde markten er niet door werd beroerd. Wilde men dus de handel van deze landen niet in een ongunstige positie brengen, dan moest ook de rechtstreekse aanvoer uit andere landen naar die markten onder de regeling worden gebracht. Dit is nu juist wat dit plaacaat, dat nadere voorzieningen geeft voor de handel op vijanden land, doet en men moet wel aannemen, dat een diverteren van de handel, dit schrikbeeld der Staten, zichtbaar geworden was.

Het plaacaat begon met vast te stellen, dat alle kooplieden, van welke natie ook, die op Holland en Zeeland handelden, hun waren en koopmanschappen (behalve munitie en vivres) uit deze landen mochten uitvoeren naar alle havens van Onze Nederlanden en omliggende landen en Koninkrijken, mits aangifte werd gedaan en paspoort verkregen volgens de ordonnantie daarvan zijnde en tot nog toe gebruikt. Deze laatste uitdrukking wijst er reeds op, dat hier waarschijnlijk niet veel mee veranderd werd; bedacht moet worden, dat in de omschrijving van de landen waarheen de uitvoer mogelijk is Brabant, Vlaanderen en Friesland begrepen zijn.

Daarna werd er bepaald, dat geen der genoemde kooplieden noch schippers, inlandige noch buitenlandige, met hun schepen en goederen op Brabant, Vlaanderen, Friesland en andere, die zich vijandelijk tegen Holland en Zeeland gedragen, mochten varen noch deze aandoen of hun koers daarop nemen zonder paspoort of voldoening als bovenbedoeld, op verbeurte van schip en goed. In deze paragraaf wordt dus wederom de vaart naar „Onze Nederlanden“, althans de zeeprovinciën ervan, geregeld, wederom met een bepaling omtrent licentbetaling doch met 2 nieuwe clausules. De eerste is, dat de schippers zelfs niet hun koers op deze Nederlanden mogen stellen zonder paspoort; deze bepaling heeft alleen zin voor schepen die niet uit Holland of Zeeland komen, daar deze laatsten die koers gerust mogen nemen daar zij het licent reeds voor vertrek naar zee hebben betaald. De tweede is, dat de eigenaren hier met de zware straf van verbeurte van schip en goed worden bedreigd. Dit wijst erop, dat men de heffing van deze schepen niet zo goed beheerst als voor die uit Hollandse en Zeeuwse havens, voor welke men dergelijke zware bedreigingen begrijpelijk niet nodig acht. Beide bepalingen duiden erop, dat zij gericht zijn tegen schepen die zich niet in het machtsgebied der Staten bevinden en hun combinatie wijst er op, dat hier de neutrale scheepvaart van elders naar „Onze Nederlanden“ de plicht tot licent betalen wordt opgelegd (42). Hier wordt dus de directe vaart op de Spaanse Nederlanden aan neutrale schippers, zo Duitse, Franse, Engelse of Schotten en alle andere uitheemse, verboden, tenzij ander betaling van licent en onder bedreiging met een zware straf bij overtreding.

De redenen hiertoe werden in het plaacaat zeer duidelijk genoemd en luiden: „ . . . en-de omme noodshalven, soo omme deselve Onse Landen in de onkosten der Oorloge te subvenieren, als omme de Vijanden derselver af te snyden ende te beneemen alle weegen ende middelen der toevoeringe van eenige Waaren, Provisie ofte Behoeften, daar meede syluiden hun teegens den voornoemden Lande van Holland ende Zeeland souden moogen dienen ende opmaaken tot agterdeel ende verderf derselver Landen, daar aan, als aan Onse principaale Havenen, Stroomen ende Sterkten onser Nederlanden, het welvaaren van dien voor het meestendeel is dependeerende, “. Hierbij is dan tevens de mogelijkheid geschapen dezelfde goederen, waarvan men de uitvoer uit Holland en Zeeland niet vrij wilde geven, ook niet op andere wijze in vijandenland te laten komen. Met dit plaacaat breidt de Prins zijn machtsgebied ter zee uit tot de Vlaamse en Friese kusten. Hiermede is het belang van dit plaacaat nog niet volledig belicht, daar het nog een bepaling

bevat die evenmin in vorige placaten voorkomt. De kooplieden van alle natiën die de vrijheid van handelen op Holland en Zeeland toegezegd werd kregen daar n.l. de verzekering bij, dat zij op de bescherming van de schepen onder bestelling van de Prins zullen kunnen rekenen. De capiteinen werden daartoe gelast, „dat sy alle Koopluiden en Schipperen op de voorsz Pasporten vry en onbelet sullen laten passeeren, en haare voorgenomen Reise te volbrengen; ook alle hulpe en bystant doen, bevryen ende beschermen teegens alle beroovinge ofte geweld, te Waater ende te Lande, soo van de Zeeroovers als van andere Vijanden van de gemeene ruste ende van de voorschreevene Onsen Landen van Holland ende Zeeland, tot dien einde ook deselve Koopluiden en Schipperen convoyeerende ende geleidende, daar en wanneer omme eenig pericul syluiden van des te doen sullen weesen versogt, sonder hunluiden by eenige weegen te verhinderen, aan Schip of Goed te beschaadigen, ofte iet met dreigementen nogte geweld af te neemen, op poene van de Galge;”

Hier komt uit de warboel, die het zeewezen in de eerste jaren van de opstand toch steeds schijnt te zijn, ineens een taak voor de vloot naar voren, die ons bekend in de oren klinkt. Het verbod van de rechtstreekse vaart van overzee op de Spaanse landen vereist schepen, die de naleving ervan kunnen afdwingen tegenover de onderdanen — en zonodig dus ook de macht der omringende Koninkrijken. Daarnaast zullen deze schepen controle op het verbod van uitvoer van ammunitie en vivres hebben moeten uitoefenen. Koningin Elisabeth had 5 Maart 1574 haar schepen gelast alle Zeeuwse vaartuigen die ze machtig konden worden op te brengen, terwijl Requesens zijn verbod tot handel drijven met Holland en Zeeland ook wel met schepen kracht zal hebben bijgezet, zodat de veiligheid voor de koopvaarders maar zeer betrekkelijk zal zijn geweest. Daarom krijgt men een duidelijke opdracht voor de capiteins van de Prins, waarbij zij er in de eerste plaats voor hebben te zorgen het effect van de maatregelen niet illusoir te laten worden door indisciplinair gedrag. In feite is het afkondigen van een dergelijk placaat alleen mogelijk met een zeemacht die aan een centrale leiding gehoorzaamt. Daarnaast wordt de koopvaardij van alle neutralen niet alleen bescherming voor de vrije vaart op deze gewesten toegezegd, dock kunnen deze schippers voor hun wettige handel zonodig de bescherming van 's Prinsen schepen inroepen. Dit placaat formuleert de taak van een vloot die de belangen van een gemeene best dient. De erbij afgekondigde economische oorlogvoering wordt ingesteld om het de opstandige gewesten mogelijk te maken de oorlog voort te zetten, waarbij de zeemacht zelf middels een kostbaar systeem voor de inning der verlofgelden moet zorgdragen. Het betreft hier een hoogst belangrijke politieke beslissing, genomen in een militair zeer zwakke positie, waarvan men zich kan voorstellen, dat de nood hoog gestegen moest zijn om de Staten een dergelijke toch riskante stap te laten doen.

Sterkte der Vloot

Voor het effectueren van deze maatregel was een vereiste, dat de beide gewesten over voldoende macht te water beschikten om de naleving ervan te kunnen afdwingen. Het moet de Prins duidelijk zijn geweest, dat zonder een dergelijke macht de maatregel geen effect kon sorteren en hem alleen maar kon schaden door de dan te verwachten politieke moeilijkheden. Hij zal dus hebben willen weten over welke macht hij kon beschikken en een brief, waaruit blijkt dat hij zich hieromtrent op de hoogte heeft gesteld, is bewaard.

Schematisch weergegeven was de samenstelling dus:					
	grote	vlieboots	cromstevens e.d.	galeien	Totaal
Maze	—	6	20	—	26
N.Qr.	8	5	10	6	29
Zeeland	11	6	30	—	47
	19	17	60	6	102

Dit is de brief die de Prins op 7 Mei 1574 te Dordrecht aan Graaf Jan van Nassau schreef waarin hij nog onkundig blijkt

over het lot van zijn broers na de slag bij Mook op 14 April. Daarin komt Z. Excellentie ook over de vloot te spreken, die hij als volgt beschrijft : „quant aux batteaux, nous avons en Hollande six fliesboots vingt aultres navires, tant drummelaer, cromstevens que hues ; en Zéelande unze grandes navires, six fliesbootz et trente cromstevens et hues; en Watterland huict grandes navires, six galères, 45) cinq fliesboots, dix boyers, et aultres appeléz waterschepen qui font en tout, y compris les galères, cent et deux batteaux de guerre ...".



Zeegaande boyers ca 1650.

Ned. Hist. Scheepvaart Museum W. Hollar.

van Dordrecht. Ter handhaving van haar belangrijke privilegiën had deze stad dikwijls uitleggers op de rivier. Nog in 1573 had de uitlegger bij de Lek, ter handhaving van Dordt's stapelrecht, een schip met koren en kruit bestemd voor Schoonhoven met het oog op het aanstaande beleg -- aangehouden en opgebracht naar Dordrecht. Dergelijke schepen konden zonodig ook tot krenking van de vijand optreden.

Het lijkt waarschijnlijk, dat ook in Holland en W. Friesland nog schepen op de goede avonture en ter bescherming der visserij werden uitgerust, zodat het niet een te boude veronderstelling is de vloot, waarmede de beide gewesten in dit jaar de oorlog te water voerden, op tegen de 150 zeilen te stellen, waarvan ca 100 geschikt voor de dienst ter zee.

Uitvoer uit de Spaanse Nederlanden belast.

Het plaacaat van 18 Mei had de import van overzee der Spaanse Nederlanden onder controle gebracht doch er was niets voorzien over de uitvoer van deze landen. Het lijkt mogelijk, dat de Staten snel tot het besef gekomen zijn, dat de kostbare vloot die men in dienst

moest houden ook de uitvoer dier landen kon belasten. In een Resolutie van de Staten van Holland van 25 Augustus 1574 werd vastgelegd, dat „alle schepen, goederen ende koopmanschappen, toekomende eenige kooplieden ofte schippers uyt Brabant, Vlaenderen ende andere deser Nederlanden, ende die Naere handelinghe ende koopmanschappen daerme de op Hollandt niet en souden begeren te doen, noch deselve aldaer vertie ren noch te voeren, aengehouden sullen worden en tegens deselve geprocedeert achter volgende den placate" van 7 Maart 1574 (het terugkeer plaacaat). De vrije handel naar overige landen werd de kooplieden en schippers uit de Zuidelijke Nederlanden dus ontzegd en na de afkondiging van deze maatregel had de vloot de controle uit te oefenen op de volgende handelsbewegingen die aan licent onderworpen waren:

1. de uitvoer uit Holland en Zeeland naar neutraal en vijanden land,
2. de doorvoer door Holland en Zeeland naar neutralen en vijand,
3. de toevoer naar vijandenland van neutraal gebied,
4. de uitvoer uit de Spaanse Nederlanden.

De vloot in zee maakte het mogelijk deze retributies over de handel die deze landen passeerde te heffen.

Orders voor de wacht.

Het instellen en instand houden van een bezetting van de vijandelijke kust die deze taak kon volvoeren was in zekere zin een nieuw soort dienst voor de capiteinen, die hen duidelijk beperkingen oplegde en daarom niet makkelijk gevallen moet zijn. Gehoorzaamheid en discipline waren eerste vereisten, eigenschappen die door de omstandigheden der laatste jaren niet bepaald aangekweekt waren. Wel kende men de wachtdiensten, doch die hadden veelal een directe krijgsaanleiding, wat bij deze afsluiting veel minder het geval zou zijn. Goede orders voor de capiteins lijken dan ook nodig en hier is er één van bewaard n.l. die voor de Vlaamse Kust, de eerste taak van Zeeland.

Deze „Instructie voor de capiteyns en de officiers, houdende de wacht op de coste van Vlaenderen" werd door het College van Gouverneurs en Raden van Zeeland vastgesteld en gaf regels voor het optreden tegen degenen die geen paspoort hadden. Het verbod voor alle kooplieden en schippers van Oosten en Westen overzee komende tot handel drijven zoals vervat in het plaacaat van 18 Mei 1574 werd herhaald maar begrijpelijker omschreven. Gestipuleerd werd, dat het gold voor Vlaenderen, Brabant, Spanje, Portugal en andere zich vijandelijk gedragende landen. Den bevelhebbers werd gelast „te clampen ende voor goede prinse inne te brenghen" alle Oosterse, Deense, Zweedse, Schotse, Engelse, Franse en andere schepen, op Vlaenderen, Brabant, Spanje, Portugal en Italië bevracht zijnde die niet in Holland of Zeeland verlicent zijn. Alle schepen uit vijandsland komende, die geen bescheid bij zich hadden om in Holland of Zeeland te gaan verlicenten of „alreet hen cours gestelt hebben om ter naester gelegender havene van Hollandt ofte Zeelandt te gaan verlicenten" zullen insgelijks voor goede prinse worden ingebracht. Een schip dat de wacht slipte zonder te verlicenten kon bij een volgende reis verbeurd worden verklaard.

Voor de schepen van het Noorderkwartier, die de naleving van de placaten op de Friese kust moesten verzorgen, zal ook een dergelijke instructie gemaakt zijn waarvan die van 1575 bewaard is. Het is een „Instructie voor den Admiraal, met eenige Oorlogscheepen op de Eems gaande, tot bescherminge van de Trafique", waarbij hem werd opgedragen de zeegaten van Terschelling tot de Oostereems te bezetten teneinde in- en uitvoer zonder licentbetaling te beletten en goede correspondentie te houden om toch bij dreigend gevaar snel te kunnen concentreren. Aangehouden schepen moesten zo snel mogelijk met goede verzekering naar het Vlie en vandaar naar de Admiraliteit in Noord Holland worden gezonden. Een aparte behandeling werd voorzien voor de steden „onder het Rijk geseeten"


en voor de oude burgers van Emden, d.w.z. zij die langer dan 7 jaar daar burger geweest waren. Voorts diende de Admiraal op te treden tegen zeerovers tot het Rif en het Heylige Land toe en goede zorg te besteden aan de bescherming van de schepen en goederen van die van Holland, Zeeland en andere vrienden. Voor deze taak kreeg Admiraal Pieter Frericsz de beschikking over een smaldeel 58) van 6 schepen met als admiraalschap een dubbelboot van 50 last en 60 man. De vice-admiraal had een groot schip met 80 man bemanning; verder behoorden er nog toe een boot met 40 man, 2 carveels van 30 man, ieder met een roeyjacht en nog een vaartuig.

Wordt vervolgd

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Conway's Warship 2016

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Zoals elk jaar ontieedt en bespreekt ook deze 38ste uitgave van 'Warship' een aantal zeer uiteenlopende maritieme onderwerpen en marineschepen tot in de kleinste details. Dit gebeurt met de nodige historische achtergrond, foto's, tekeningen, dekplannen, technische en algemene gegevens.

Zo maken we kennis met de Franse 'colonial sloops' van het type 'Bougainville' waarvan er tussen 1931 en 1934 zeven in dienst kwamen. Dramatisch is dat het schip onder de vlag van Vichy op 9 november 1940 door zusterschip Savorgnan de Brazza, onder de vlag van de Vrije Fransen, tot zinken werd gebracht. Er is ook het verhaal van de Italiaanse tegenhanger: de 'colonial sloop' Eritrea. Ook dit schip kende een ongewoon einde, maar op een

latere datum. Het werd op 28 juni 1937 in dienst gesteld, in 1943 door de Italianen aan de geallieerden overgedragen en in 1948 aan Frankrijk toegewezen. Het schip maakte als 'Francis Garnier' vele jaren deel uit van de koloniale dienst van de Marine Nationale. Het werd in 1965 buiten dienst gesteld en als 'target schip, na een carrière van meer dan dertig jaar, door Franse marineschepen en vliegtuigen tot zinken gebracht. Het wrak rust op 1.300 meter diepte.

Zoals in de vorige editie aangekondigd, zijn er ook het tweede en laatste deel van 'The Naval War In The Adriatic' en het verhaal over de tien Japanse destroyers van de 'Asashio-klasse'. Die zijn tussen 1935 en 1939 in Japan gebouwd, maar gesneuveld tussen 1942 en 1945.

Tot slot zijn er de klassieke rubrieken. In Warship Notes' legt de auteur de klemtoon op minder bekende onderwerpen en achtergrondinfo over oorlogsschepen in het algemeen. 'Naval Books OfTheYear' herbergt maar liefst 29 uitgebreide besprekingen van recente boeken (o.a. van Pen & Sword, US Naval Institute, I.B. Tauris, Bloomsbury en het Franse Lela Presse). Warship Gallery' is deze keer gewijd aan het Britse slagschip HMS Colossus dat in 1909 is gebouwd en in 1916 deelnam aan de Slag bij Jutland. Het is in 1928 ais schroot verkocht. U vindt hier enkele scherpe foto's, dekplannen en veel informatie terug. Met 'Conway's Warship 2016' hebben samensteller John Jordan, zijn assistent Stephen Dent en al hun medewerkers opnieuw puik werk geleverd.

Louis Van Cant

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Troublesome paper certificates and why the maritime industry must embrace e-Certificates

As a result of ongoing commercial challenges and regulatory changes in the maritime industry, maritime organisations are undergoing many radical strategic and business model changes, including the drive to modernise outdated business processes. One of the prominent approaches for driving efficiencies, reducing costs and gaining competitive advantages has been through technological innovation. An existing example is the adoption of Electronic Chart Display and Information System (ECDIS), whilst the industry is also on the brink of numerous other developments, ranging from the paperless ship, to 24/7 ship internet connectivity and possibly even the contentious 'driverless ship'. As a software development company engaged in the maritime industry, some of the more intriguing aspects of the maritime technology landscape are the interlinked possibilities around electronic certification, online verification and the facilitation of the 'paperless ship'. Electronic certification and online verification of certificates increasingly is a topic of conversation with our contacts and clients (no longer something confined to the watercooler), which are also being accelerated by regulatory changes. However, despite the obvious benefits of electronic certification we are discovering that true digitisation is not necessarily being embraced as quickly as one might expect.

So, why not stick with paper, after all it has worked for hundreds of years?

Typically, the process for issuing paper certificates, or similar documents, involves a number of inherent inefficiencies in the modern world, as outlined below:

1. Manual processes: reliance on printing, stamping and posting in this modern technology age is inefficient, lengthy and costly.
2. Risk of Certificate loss: due to the nature of manual delivery, certificates can be lost and damaged during postage, leading to Port State Control (PSC) incidents, with the International Maritime Organization (IMO) having documented such cases.
3. Administrative burden: paper certificates contribute to the administrative burden placed upon ships' masters, PSC as well as ship registries. In fact, they place a burden on anybody who has to engage with them in the overall process.

4. Security issues: identification of an 'original' gets more challenging and onerous, leading to exposure to forgery, particularly where validity and anti-forgery processes are not kept up-to-date. With respect to security, the simple fact is that paper certificates are inherently insecure. In fact, certificate fraud is a well-documented issue, to the extent that the IMO itself has previously stated that this issue risks undermining the STCW convention.

A major study into Certificate of Competence (CoC) fraud by the UK Maritime & Coastguard Agency (MCA) also highlighted the vulnerability of paper certificates, with fraud occurring through:

- Counterfeit documents or their alteration (60%)
- Falsification of records (30%)
- Cloning or impersonation (10%) Part of the issue with certificate fraud is that there appears to be no consistent certificate format or approach to verifiable features, making it extremely difficult, for example, for PSC inspectors to verify a document's authenticity.

Meanwhile, new 2017 IMO regulations really focus the need to deal with the absence of online verification capabilities across the industry. Many regulatory flags, managers and crewing agents still struggle to check certificate validity before issuing an endorsement or providing employment, carrying an ongoing administrative burden as a result. New electronic certification verification processes should deal with the latter issue too.

Does regulation support the use of electronic certificates/documents?

The IMO's Guidelines for the use of Electronic Certificates, issued in April 2016, does not appear to have focused stakeholder's attention on widespread adoption, despite many in the industry already recognising the value of electronic certificates. However, the industry regulators and advisory bodies including IMO and FAL, who strive to ensure that all relevant maritime industry stakeholders use the highest practicable degree of uniformity in their formalities and other procedures, are very much providing and driving regulatory changes to allow this to happen.

The latest Facilitation Committee (40th session April 2016 – FAL 40) recommended changing the IMO Procedures for Port State Control so that electronic certificates are considered equivalent to paper certificates, including providing guidance for accepting certificates delivered via a website through the ship's computer. This is a real step change and means that if the stakeholders (e.g. ship owners; flag states; Recognised Organisations) use electronic certificates, PSC officials could be viewing them either on the ship computer or possibly through their own devices, without needing to request a printed copy. As a result, the industry needs to be in a position to ensure that the ship has both the procedures and capability to verify certificates on-board if, for example, a PSC official questions a document's authenticity.

Safeguards put in place at FAL40 are intended to encourage the acceptance of electronic versions and to help deal with the real-world issue that in some regions the electronic version is still routinely questioned. The IMO guidelines stipulate that 'e-certificates' must include a unique tracking number or reference and also be protected from modifications, which are both capabilities that the IT world is already very familiar with.

That the top industry bodies are putting in place the necessary provisions to ensure that industry can accept electronic certificates and documentation has been qualified by Roger Butturini, Chair of the 'Working Group on Electronic Means for the Clearance of Ships of the FAL Committee'. Roger explained to us that: "FAL's main goal in developing the FAL40 Circular was to remove barriers to the use of electronic certificates. We fairly quickly determined that the challenge to using electronic certificates was not a technological one, but a policy decision predicated on acceptance by Port State Control Officials. Otherwise,

the advantages of electronic certificates are unquestionably preferred to paper certificates.”

The significant point here is, that from a pure technology perspective, enabling the solutions for true electronic certification and online verification are all very achievable, however the challenges of engagement, acceptance and business change represent the greater hurdles.

How technology can address these issues

The challenge here is not dissimilar to electronic documentation, digitisation and online service changes that have been faced in other industries, where such technology already exists. However, people need to know how to use it, what to use and be able to trust it.

Within PDMS Maritime’s MARIS ship registries platform, we are launching new functionality which includes generating electronic signatures and unique tracking numbers for every new version of a certificate, to protect against counterfeiting of documents. The use of cryptography aligned with the inbuilt security within the platform will further protect documents from being modified, altered or falsified.

The issue of ensuring a document comes from a trusted source and hasn’t been modified since being issued are both neatly dealt with by digitally signing the document with what is termed a security-certificate. In an unfortunate clash of terminology, this has nothing to do with a pen and paper signature, nor a vessel or seafarer certificate. These security-certificates are issued by global authorities that certify the validity of the certificate and any documents signed using it. The ‘security-certificate’ in this case is electronic data issued and held by an accredited certificate authority.

This can be thought of as a set of keys used to encrypt and decrypt an electronic document. In each case, there are two keys. The first, a private key, is held securely with the authority and is used by the platform to create and encrypt the digital signature of a document. The second is a public key which is freely available to anyone requiring it and is used by an eDocument reader to decrypt the digital signature which consequently validates the contents and origin of the document. Details of the signature are then displayed to anyone viewing the document to indicate that it is authentic and has not been tampered with. Once a signature is created it can only be read by using the public key. The origin of the public key can be verified with the certificate authority ensuring the signature was generated by the private key that was issued to the ship registry, or creator. So, once digitally signed, documents are truly ‘read only’ and cannot be modified.

Benefits of e-Certification and online verification

There are considerable benefits of e-Certification and e-Verification for stakeholders throughout the industry. It can significantly reduce the administrative burden placed upon ship’s masters and all stakeholders, as well as eliminating the need to courier certificates, or e-mail unsecured attachments all around the world, reducing unnecessary costs and service lead times.

Furthermore, online verification (including for printed hard copies) will also enable key stakeholders, e.g. PSC and ship registries, to type in the unique document tracking code and receive an instant digital authentication. This significantly reduces the amount of time spent manually requesting verifications of a certificate or document. In parallel, the ability to access an electronically stored certificate 24/7 from anywhere in the world and from any device is hugely beneficial for industry stakeholders including: owners; crewing agents; management companies and ship managers, to name a few.

Barriers to uptake and trusting technology

Despite the clear benefits of e-Certification and e-Verification, there are a number of barriers which can still lead to a reluctance to embrace them – with similar resistances experienced when aiming to move away from paper through both the Maritime Single Window project and ECDIS. One of the primary issues has been acceptance, with legitimate concerns that PSC can be reluctant in many cases to accept e-Certificates. However, the recent IMO/ FAL guidance means the drive for acceptance should be further empowered and so this should no longer be seen as a barrier. In our experience, another key issue which has led to slow engagement has been general concern from the maritime industry with respect to cyber-security implications.

However, as this paper has set out to articulate, the technology is not the real problem and has been proven in other industries. So, resolving these issues is already in the domain of technology experts which should leave maritime businesses, including PSC and ship registries, for example, to focus on their core business activities with the confidence that they shouldn't need to worry about the technology. The real challenge in the maritime industry is one of full engagement, acceptance and business process change. These represent the greater hurdles, even with the FAL and IMO recommendations. In the broader maritime technology landscape, it is also important to consider e-Certification and online verification, along with the complete stakeholder engagement, in the wider context of the 'paperless ship'. Electronic certificates are certain to become the norm, aided significantly by provision of viable 24/7 connectivity on board ships, which to many is no longer viewed as a luxury but a necessity.

Conclusion

Full engagement with e-Certification and electronic documentation will not only improve service provision, efficiencies and quality across the industry but will also provide modern tools to address increasing service expectations whilst still under the ever-present commercial challenges. It must surely be embraced.

Source: PDMS Maritime

Inséré 11/11/17 NIEUWS NOUVELLES NEWS Enlevé 11/12/17

Laagconjunctuur slaat, dividend zalft

Sinds 2015 garandeerde de oliering tankerredery Euronav de uitkerin van een dividend van 80 procent van het nettoresultaat op jaarbasis, exclusief eenmalige meerwaarden leverde over de boekjaren 2015 en 2016 fantastische brutojaardividenden van 1,44 dollar en 0,77 dollar per aandeel op. Maar de olietankersector is heel cyclisch. Vandaar dat vanaf nu een minimaal jaardividend van 0,12 dollar per aandeel bruto wordt gegarandeerd, met in september een eerste interim-dividendbetaling van 0,06 dollar per aandeel bruto. Is de nettowinst hoger, dan wordt een afweging gemaakt tussen een hoger dividend, de inkoop van eigen aandelen of overnames die bijdragen aan de winst.

De recente uitbreiding van langetermijnverhuurovereenkomsten, die uitzicht bieden op stabiele kasstromen, gaf daarvoor de nodige financiële armslag. Enerzijds sloot Euronav een nieuw vijfjarig contract voor de verhuur van twee drijvende opslagplatformen — de

FSO Africa en de FSO Asia, die voor 50 procent eigendom van Euronav is — dat jaarlijks 36 miljoen dollar bedrijfskasstroom (ebitda) zal opbrengen. Daarnaast ondertekende Euronav twee zevenjarige contracten voor telkens twee Suezmax-schepen (olietankers met een capaciteit van 150.000 à 165.000 ton). Euronav laat daarvoor vier nieuwe schepen bouwen, ter vervanging van oudere Suezmax-schepen van de eigen negentienkoppige vloot, met een verwachte oplevering in 2018. Bovendien is de balans stevig, met eind juni een beschikbare liquiditeit tot 793 miljoen dollar. Dat is een verdubbeling over de voorbije achttien maanden.

In het tweede kwartaal leed Euronav een nettoverlies van 24,2 miljoen dollar. Dat cijfer omvat wel een eenmalig boekhoudkundig verlies van 21 miljoen dollar op de verkoop van de TI Topaz, een van de oudste schepen van de dertig-koppige VLCC-vloot (very large crude carriers, met een maximale capaciteit van 320.000 ton). Onderliggend was er een nettoverlies van 3,2 miljoen dollar, tegenover 15,9 miljoen dollar recurrente nettowinst in het tweede kwartaal vorig jaar en 34,3 miljoen in het eerste kwartaal. Het gemiddelde dagverhuurtarief op de spotmarkt daalde voor de VLCC's van 47.864 naar 28.351 dollar dit jaar en voor de Suezmax-schepen van 33.119 naar 17.341 dollar, en na zes maanden respectievelijk van 54.156 naar 34.843 dollar en van 35.729 naar 20.508 dollar.

De nettowinst verschrompelde in het eerste halfjaar van 153,7 miljoen naar 10,1 miljoen dollar. De tarieven noteren op het laagste niveau sinds 2013 door de combinatie van de seizoensgebonden lagere vraag en de oplevering van heel wat nieuwe schepen (dit jaar nog 51 schepen, op een wereldvloot van 1200). De vooruitzichten voor het derde kwartaal zijn zwak, aangezien 61 procent van de beschikbare VLCCcapaciteit is verhuurd tegen 20.000 dollar (break-evenprijs van 27.300 dollar) en 60 procent van de Suezmax-capaciteit tegen 14.700 dollar (24.000 dollar).

Conclusie

De slechte vooruitzichten op korte termijn hebben het aandeel van Euronav weer teruggeduwd tot het laagste niveau sinds 2013. Het bijgestelde dividendbeleid zal Euronav op termijn meer flexibiliteit geven. Door de vele opleveringen van schepen laat het herstel in de sector op zich wachten tot eind 2018 of begin 2019.

TRENDS

Inséré 13/11/17 DOSSIER Enlevé 13/12/17

Fibre optic condition monitoring systems offer better results

Developer of fibre optic condition monitoring systems, Light Structures, has fitted several systems to large tankers, as well as to other vessel types, since its launch in 2001.

The systems are based upon the Fiber Bragg Grating technology (FBG) and the company

claimed that fibre optic systems offer excellent reliability and unique data quality, compared to conventional technology.

Its patented SENSFIB product range includes hull stress monitoring (HSM), ice load monitoring (ILM), sloshing monitoring (mainly for gas carriers) and FPSO monitoring with the customised HullInfo software. In addition to operational data, the systems provide data for active fatigue management (AFM) reports.


The core SENSFIB system gives crew and vessels' owners/operators/managers real time information about the hull/ containment system/structure.

By monitoring the stress responses in the hull during voyages, HSM helps to prevent design stresses being exceeded. The development of hull fatigue is measured using long-life optic sensors located in various areas in the hull. This is achieved by measuring the hull's relative deformation, strain (stress), due to loading (still water strain) and due to waves (dynamic strain).

The measured stress is analysed in a distributed way inside the sensors. The analysis used identifies the static, dynamic and slow changing temperature components from the signal and calculates different signal characteristics. The results are transmitted to the central unit, normally located on the bridge, to be further analysed, data logged and displayed to the bridge personnel to assist in navigation. The various components of a typical HSM system are strain sensors, accelerometer units, bow pressure transducers, plus the bridge display units.

As mentioned, SENSFIB HSM systems are based on the FBG system, which is an internal stripe pattern in the core of the optical fibre that strongly reflects one wave length (or colour) of light and the user interface can be configured to show current stress, fatigue accumulation, accelerations and slamming trends, as well as sailing conditions, such as sea state, wind, speed and position if the equipment is integrated.

HSM requirements



The sensors were developed specifically for HSM requirements and come in both short and long-base fibre optic strain sensors, fibre optic accelerometers and fibre optic sloshing pressure sensors.

FBG optical sensing technology is claimed to give SENSFIB a competitive advantage, compared to conventional strain gauge based sensors. The key advantages being:

- Sensors are intrinsically safe requiring no ZB and no limitation to their positioning.
- Reliable as they are immune to EMI. The software is based on a Linux OS platform.
- Accurate as the stress measurements are based on measurement of the wavelength of light.
- Reduced ownerships costs (recalibration, maintenance, repairs and service).
- Flexibility due to ease of installation (no hot work required for sensor installation).
- The basic HSM system can be easily expanded to include fatigue monitoring on the water line, bow sensors for ice load monitoring, etc, as required.

SENSFIB HSM helps the navigators to monitor the current hull stress status with online information regarding the load margins and provide assistance in making faster decisions for a safe voyage. The same data can be processed later to give inputs for maintenance planning and fleet utilisation.

A vessel's safe and cost-effective operation requires an exact knowledge of the ship's design and awareness of the operational risks and their consequences. Tankers and other types of vessels are particularly at risk of hull fatigue damage, induced by the stresses that can occur in the hull, as a result of ballast, cargo loading and sea state.

Fatigue build-up in vessels leads to local cracks in the hull, which if left unrepaired, eventually endanger the vessel's structural integrity. Hull stress is one of the major factors, which cause irretraceable damage to vessels. One of the challenges involved in hull fatigue has been the lack of information transmitted the bridge about the actual load on the hull/structure.

To reduce failure incidents, the IMO and leading class societies have recommended the use of HSM systems.

Important system features include -

- Structural integrity vs safety (HSE).
- Fatigue management.
- Preparation ahead of lifetime extension application.
- Preparation and documentation ahead of risk-based inspections.
- Automated monitoring has become a preferred solution compared to traditional visual inspections, due to development of new technology and cost/time saving for owners.

Light Structures offers data management services onshore to help maintenance planners and other onshore personnel manage the assets. Reports, which summarise the hull condition, are available based on data from the HSM system. Data can be transferred for onshore analysis on backup media. Regular condition reports come as a supplement to inspections and provide hull status documentation that can be used towards maintenance planning, customers, authorities, environmental groups and potential vessel buyers.

The company recommended that for analysis of actual fatigue life in hotspots, a fibre optic strain sensor is placed in a location near the hotspot(s) of interest, where the stress is well defined (no gradients), and calculate the hotspot stress and consequent fatigue damage using stress concentration factors (SCF) found from the design calculations (hotspot locations and SCFs are supplied by the shipyard).

One strain sensor can be used to calculate stress and fatigue in several nearby hotspots, based on individual SCFs for the hotspots. Individual SN-curves may also be defined.

The comparison of actual fatigue life with design fatigue life is a standard function in the SENSFIB system. The result is normally presented based on the latest half hour of data (single point in time) with a bar graph, and the time history of the comparison implemented

as an onshore function. An online graphical representation of the timeline can also be shown on board as a custom function in the human/machine interface.

In case there is a significant difference between the actual fatigue life and the design life, the system can provide the user with advice on the cause. The standard function will present the overall fatigue life calculation together with the contribution, due to wave loading (included in design life) and contributions due to vibrations (not included in design life).

Design parameters

With access to a full set of design parameters and environmental data, including wave data, it is possible to extend the advisory function to include a comparison of the actual loading conditions with the loading conditions used for design life calculations, as well as a comparison of the actual wave scatter with the design wave scatter.

In addition, the company markets the patented SENSFIB Integrated Marine Monitoring System (IMMS), which combines a number of different monitoring solutions in a single package:

- SENSFIB Hull for basic data acquisition from fibre optic sensor systems and interfaced systems.
- SENSFIB Fatigue Monitoring based on rain flow counting from actual stress histories. Extensions for low-cycle fatigue are available, as well as a data management and reporting service - SENSFIB Active Fatigue Management (AFM). Motion sensors (6DOF) and radar-based sea state monitoring can also be included in this package. A mooring monitoring front end is available for monitoring offsets and mooring related motions.
- SENSFIB Design Evaluation is an advisory function for tracking the actual fatigue damage accumulation, compared to the fatigue design and hull response model using a spectral fatigue calculation approach.

AFM can improve maintenance planning with both the tool, as the report is accepted by leading class societies. This will lead to an improved lifecycle, reduced survey costs, delivering an attractive return on investment (ROI), Light Structures claimed.

Founded in 2001 by scientists from the Norwegian Defense Research Establishment, the company has now supplied nearly 200 systems to the commercial shipping, naval and offshore sectors.

Headquartered in Oslo, the company has a subsidiary -GME - based in Busan, South Korea and a network of agents in South Korea, China, Japan, India, Canada, Greece, Singapore, Australia and the UAE.

Today, the company offers fibre optic HSM, sloshing monitoring, ILM, while GME offers torque meters, performance monitoring and electrical/mechanical.

Among the leading tanker companies to have invested in a Light Structures systems are Adnatco, Bahri, Frontline, Gener8, Neda Maritime and Teekay, as well as several FPSO and FSO operators.

TankerOperator

Inséré 15/11/17 NIEUWS NOUVELLES NEWS Enlevé 15/12/17

Euronav Remains in the Red



Due to the challenging freight market, Antwerp-based tanker owner and operator Euronav recorded a net loss of USD 28.1 million in the third quarter of 2017, compared to a net profit of USD 0.1 million in the same period a year earlier.

The company remained in the loss as it also posted a net loss of USD 24.2 million in the second quarter of 2017. "Freight rates remained under sustained pressure in both the VLCC and Suezmax sectors during Q3 – particularly in August as seasonally low levels of cargo

and new tonnage entering the market combined to drive rates to lowest levels since 2013," Paddy Rodgers, CEO of Euronav, explained.

"Whilst there has been an encouraging recent uptick in scrapping activity and crude demand growth continued to see upgrades during the quarter, the delivery schedule of new vessels remains elevated into late 2018. Euronav retains substantial balance sheet capacity and fixed income visibility to navigate through such a period of lower freight rates and/or to take advantage of expansion opportunities," Rodgers added.

During the third quarter, the company repaid all outstanding debt and associated liabilities on the FSO joint ventures at the conclusion of the original contract. The FSOs are now debt-free.

Also, there were stage payments associated with the construction of four Suezmax vessels at the Hyundai Heavy Industries (HHI) shipyards in South Korea and due for delivery during 2018. These vessel orders were accompanied by four seven-year time charter contracts.

The company said it retained around USD 735 million of liquidity as at the end of September 2017.

The USD 150 million unsecured bond launched earlier this year in May was listed on the Oslo Stock Exchange on October 23, 2017. This initial entry into debt capital markets is Euronav's intention to diversify its funding structure.

"The outlook remains mixed. In August we stated that the sector is now entering a new phase of the cycle with stabilized prices for modern assets but uncertainty over, and pressure upon, freight rates. This remains the case. The duration of a challenging freight rate environment will remain dependent on the number of additional new build orders that are not needed by the market. Scrapping/fleet removal trends need to be extrapolated further before an inflection point can be reached," the company said.

"Euronav has taken progressive action in recent quarters via sale & leaseback, corporate bond and bank financing activity to ensure it is well positioned to navigate the next stage of the tanker cycle – to be strategically opportunistic whilst remaining exposed to any potential upside from an improved freight rate environment," Euronav concluded.

As of October 31, Euronav's fleet comprises a total of 56 tankers, the company's data shows.

DE GRONDLEGGING VAN 'S LANDS ZEEMACHT - De vlootpolitiek anno 1574. (III)

Order over de aanhouding

Nu de bezetting van de kusten afgekondigd is lijkt een instructie aan de capiteinen ten aanzien van de aanhouding van de koopvaarders nodig. Waarschijnlijk heeft het enige tijd geduurd vóór de noodzaak voelbaar werd, doch in 1574 werd een dergelijke order gemaakt, waarvan die voor de Zeeuwse vloot bewaard is gebleven. Het is een „Acte waer by de schepen, gheen vyanden synde maer hen vyantlick dragende ende ter were stellende, sonder te willen strycken, worden verclaert voor verbeurt". Vermoedelijk was de praktijk van de aanhouding zelf voldoende gevestigd en was het alleen nodig een voorschrift t.a.v. de onwilligen te geven, dat als volgt luidde : „Also op den 21e dach van November 1574 voor Gouverneurs ende Gedeputeerde Raeden des Lants van Hollant metgaders myn heer d'Admiraal ende diversche scheepsapiteynen ende andere & varende persoonen by de voorsz van Rade theure versterkinghe geroepen, geprooneert ende in deliberatie gheleyt wiert, of de scheren gheene vyanden nochtans zynde gherencontreert in zee by de schepen van oorloghe van Zyne Ex1e, ende by deselve om behoerlicke kennisse daer van thebbend, ghemaent synde omme te strycken, ofte aan boort te comen, des niet alleene refuserende, nemaer hem te weer stellende & vyantlicke draghende, by de selve schepen van Zyne Ex1e eyndelinghe overweldicht wesende, ter cause van dien confiscabel ende van goede prinse.... wesen geresolveert, dat alsulcke schepen..... vervallen in verbeurte ende confiscatie

Actum tot Middelburg ten dage en jare als boven".
Ondertekend Taymon.

Het is blijkbaar geen eenvoudige aangelegenheid geweest, afgaande op het feit, dat de Raeden zich hebben laten bijstaan door enkele capiteinen, een ongewone werkwijze doch wel verklaarbaar door het grote belang van de materie. Het maakt de indruk, dat de capiteinen content zijn geweest met deze klare regeling en iets van de trots waarmede zij 's Prinsen gezag op zee handhaafden klinkt als het ware nog door in de stukken.


Prijzenhof.

De geschiedenis van het Zeeuws Prijzenhof te Vlissingen is het verslag van de werking van het placaat van 18 Mei en de verschillende uitvoeringsbepalingen, jammer genoeg pas bekend van April 1575 af. Dat het hierbij om een handelsoorlog ging komt duidelijk naar voren; alleen goederen werden in beslag genomen en wanneer dit gebeurde ontving de schipper nog dikwijls de verschuldigde vrachtpenningen. Wanneer hij zich bij de aanhouding verzet had werd hij gewoonlijk nog zeer clement behandeld, al was de kans dat zodanig verweer hem zijn geschut kostte groot, een zware boete in die onveilige tijd.

Van April 1575 tot en met December 1576 werden ruim 250 schepen aangehouden, waaronder vele Franse en Engelse; toen was het met het licentsysteem afgelopen daar het door de Pacificatie van Gent tot een politieke onmogelijkheid geworden was en tot divertering van de handel leidde. Dan is ook de vloot van Sancho d'Avila, die zo lang de tegenstander der Zeeuwen geweest was, overgegaan in de dienst der Staten Generaal, die

reeds op 1 October 1576 besloten, „que nulz capitains, soldatz et aultres ne luy aient doresavenant à obeir veu que ledict Sancho d'Avila s'est porté chieff des rebelles" (i.e. de muitende Spanjaarden) en overigens de grootste moeite hebben om de opvarenden te betalen. Hetzelfde verschijnsel doet zich trouwens aan de Zeeuwse zijde voor. Gouverneurs en Raden besloten reeds op 5 November 1576 om 1 craveel, 3 cromstevens en 8 heuden af te danken en te verkopen voor gereed geld om de afgedankte manschappen te kunnen betalen ; het eerst zullen verkocht worden, volgens Resolutie van 14 November 't Ingelsmanneken en 't Victaille schip. Ook Noord Holland leed aan hetzelfde euvel en daar deed zich wederom een kleine mutenatie voor onder het scheepsvolk wegens achterstand in de betalingen.

Eenheid van Bevel over Zeemacht.



Bij de eerste Statenvergadering te Dordrecht in 1572 was de eenheid van bevel over de zeemacht direct ingesteld en deze werd nog eens bevestigd door de aanstelling van Boyssoet en diens werk tegen de Armada van 1574. Dat hier iets groeiende is blijkt het volgende jaar in Hoorn door de uitrusting van schepen en het aannemen van mensen om daarmee Zeeland te hulp te komen ; ook de hulp van de Zeeuwen bij het ontzet van Leiden wees in die richting. Hulp tussen de gewesten was één der moeilijkste dingen om te bereiken en misschien hebben juist deze twee zware bedreigingen de Prins duidelijk

gemaakt, dat zijn gezag over het zeezezen nog steviger gevestigd moest worden. In ieder geval brengt hij dit weer naar voren in de propositie t.a.v. het gouvernement van den Lande, die hij op 20 October 1574 indiende. In hun antwoord zeggen de Staten, dat aangezien het principale geweld en het voordeel van den Lande tegen haar vijanden gelegen is in de schepen van oorlog en misverstand of twist tussen de steden of Staten, die de schepen nu verscheidenlijk in handen hebben, voorkomen moeten worden, alle schepen „voortaen sullen wesen, ende gesamentlyck gesteldt worden in handen van Z.E. sonder enige reserve; ende omme die sonder yemandts wederseggen gebruyckt te worden tot bescherminge der landen, tot krenckinge der vyanden, alomme daar Z.E. bevinden sal de vorderinge der gemeene saecke sulcks te vereysschen ".

Tot onderhoud der schepen zal Z.E. ontvangen en beheeren alle licenten in Holland en Zeeland en alle Prinsen en Buyten, die met de schepen zullen worden gemaakt. Hier werd dus nogmaals en zeer nadrukkelijk de vloot in haar geheel onder de Prins geplaatst, geruime tijd vóór de Unie tussen Holland en Zeeland van 4 Juni 1575, waarbij het een der belangrijke punten der overeenkomst vormde.

De bezetting der Zeegaten.

Met de afkondiging van de genoemde uitvoeringsmaatregelen was alles gedaan wat voor een behoorlijke naleving van het plaacaat van 18 Mei nodig was en rest nog slechts iets te vermelden over de wijze waarop de bewaking der zeegaten uitgevoerd werd. Ten aanzien

van de afsluiting van Amsterdam en de IJssel was er, zodra West Friesland de heerschappij over de Zuiderzee bevochten had, geen wezenlijke moeilijkheid aangezien Enkhuizen een zeer goede basis was van welke uit de scheepvaart naar het Zuiden en naar de zeegaten kon worden beheerst. Hetzelfde kon worden gezegd van de Maas met betrekking tot de scheepvaart op de grote rivieren en de Z. Hollandse stromen. Hoe effectief dit was bleek direct uit een brief aan Alva, op 16 Juni 1572 door de Raad van Amsterdam geschreven, waarin deze zich beklaagde, dat het graan dagelij ks duurder werd „sprutende uytsaecke, dat de rebellen mit enigen scepen hen houen voor ende in den gaten van dezen lande, als voir 't Marsdiep ende 't Vlie ". De schepen uit de Oostzee schuwen de gaten dezer landen en „dusdoende es geschapen, datter noch van Oosten noch van Westen eenich graen in dezen lande van Hollant sal mogen gebracht werden, overmits de binnenlantsche wateren mede by den rebellen, in den Briel ende tot Vlissinghe legghende, ontveylicht syn ". De veiliging van de gaten en stromen dezer landen werd de Hertog dan ook als eerste taak voorgehouden.

Bij de Schelde werd de zaak reeds moeilijker, doch Vlissingen had van het eerste begin van de opstand af getoond het zeeverkeer naar Antwerpen, Gent en Brugge daadwerkelijk te kunnen beheersen. Dat deze afsluiting zeer effectief was blijkt uit een besluit van Bossu van 30 April 1572 waarbij hij geschut voor Geertruidenberg over land van Antwerpen liet opzenden toen capitein Vinck van Vlissingen met 2 schepen op de Schelde verscheen. Wel had deze afsluiting tot gevolg, dat het verkeer zich ging verplaatsen naar de Vlaamse kust, waar het veel moeilijker onder controle te houden was. Immers, hier moest nu een smaldeel permanent de havens, alle aan open zee gelegen, zodanig bezetten, dat alle schepen die probeerden in of uit te lopen konden worden aangehouden. Deze taak, waar dus het insluiten van Duinkerken de stad waar Karel V reeds in 1535 de Admiraliteit van Vlaanderen had gevestigd bij inbegrepen was, werd een permanente opdracht zolang de oorlog duurde en deze „vloot op de custe" werd de school waarin 's Lands zeemacht is gevormd.

Teneinde de permanente bezetting mogelijk te maken, werd direct een systeem van aflossing ingevoerd. Dit blijkt uit een besluit van Zeeland van 20 Maart 1574 waarbij de sterkte van de uit te rusten vloot werd gesteld op 50 schepen waarvan er 32 direct dienst moesten doen op de wacht terwijl de 18 overigen zeilree, doch zonder bemanning, aan land werden gehouden. Vlissingen en Zierikzee moesten ieder 20 schepen equiperen en Veere 10; het totaal is in overeenstemming met het getal in de brief van de Prins. Uit verschillende prenten van later tijd blijkt, dat de bezettende vloot veelal dicht onder de kust ten anker lag en zo nodig met klein vaartuig of sloepen de afzetting nog nauwer maakte.

In het Noorden was de Zoute Eems de zeeweg naar de Ommelanden en via het in 1573 gegraven Kolonelsdiep naar Friesland, gewesten die nog onder het gebied des Konings stonden en dus onder de werking van het placaat vielen. De Verse Eems was een handelsweg tot diep in Duitsland en gaf daar aansluitmogelijkheid naar de Spaanse Nederlanden. De afsluiting moest zich dus tot beiden uitstrekken als men niet een achterdeur wijd open wilde laten. Daar Holland hier geen enkele basis had werd er een vrij sterk smaldeel onderhouden, dat gewoonlijk bij het nauwste stuk van de Eems ten anker lag.

Begin 1574 werd Willem Jansz van Hoorn als vice-admiraal er met 9 schepen heengezonden teneinde de naleving van het terugkeer placaat en licent placaat te verzekeren. Het bedrijf van dit smaldeel was de Oost Friezen niet duidelijk en door het opbrengen van de aangehouden schepen naar Noord Holland vermoedden zij de opzet de handel daarheen te diverteren. Abel Eppens, in zijn Kroniek, zag dit als een gevolg van de grote toevoer die het vorige jaar over de Eems naar Haarlem gegaan was en vermeldt, dat Emdenaren en Ommelanders alles deden om het smaldeel kwijt te raken, doch zonder

resultaat. De uitwerking die de aanwezigheid van deze schepen had bleek uit de achteruitgang van de roertol voor vreemde schepen te Emden van 530 schepen in Maart tot 160 schepen in Augustus 1574. Als gevolg daarvan ontstond er een grote duurte.

In Augustus berichtten de Staten de vice admiraal, dat er een grote vloot, meest met koren geladen en vijandelijke kooplieden toebehorende, uit het Oosten in aantocht was. De admiraal kreeg de mondelinge last „de voorschreve vloot in de Maaze te doen komen ende havenen ". Als een mondelinge last niet genoeg mocht zijn zou een schriftelijke instructie gegeven worden. Deze order met hooguit 9 schepen een kleine 200 onwillige koopvaarders naar de Maaze op te brengen moet de admiraal ernstige zorgen hebben gebaard en zal niet vreemd zijn aan het feit, dat de schepen per slot vergunning kregen naar Emden op te varen.

De schepen van dit smaldeel konden door het gevaar van invriezen niet de winter over op de Eems blijven en de laatsten keerden in December naar hun thuishavens terug, niet zonder dat er ernstige klachten over hun gedrag werden ingediend door de Graven van Oost Friesland.

De Staten deden behoorlijke excuse maar stelden, dat de afsluiting wegens het beletten van de toevoer naar de vijand noodzakelijk was terwijl de vice admiraal en zijn capiteinen een geschrift hadden overgeleverd waaruit hun onschuld bleek. Dit vrij koel terzijde schuiven van het protest werd mede veroorzaakt door het gevoelen, dat men eigenlijk de oorlog ook voor deze beide Graven voerde.

Na het vertrek van het smaldeel ontwikkelde zich direct een bijzonder levendige handel van Emden met de Spaanse Gewesten.

Voor 1575 rustte het Noorderkwartier drie smaldelen uit, n.l. voor Amsterdam, de Zeegaten en de Eems. Voor het eerste werd de „Inquisitie" , het oude vlaggeschip van Bossu als admiraalschip aangewezen, terwijl het verder nog één schip en een aantal boeiers en waterschepen telde. Het tweede bestond uit het admiraalschip, een schip, een boot, een galei niet 90 opvarenden en 10 caverschepen.

Requesens was in deze gewesten met grote uitrustingen te water bezig teneinde hulp aan Zeeland i.v.m. Zierikzee te voorkomen. Alleen al Amsterdam moest een vloot uitrusten die haast even sterk zou zijn als beide bovengenoemde smaldelen samen, terwijl ook in Harlingen een sterke macht gevormd moest worden.



Het derde smaldeel was het reeds genoemde van 6 schepen onder admiraal Pieter Frericsz, wiens orders we gezien hebben. Deze admiraal moet de eer te beurt zijn gevallen Charlotte de Bourbon te

geleiden toen zij op weg naar den Briel door Emden kwam en door een paar oorlogsschepen werd afgehaald.


Ook in 1576 ging er nog een smaldeel naar de Eems, doch de situatie wijzigde daar volkomen toen de troepen van Caspar de Robles, Heer van Billy later in het jaar de eed aan de Staten deden, waardoor de afsluiting van de Eems opgeheven kon worden. Deze toestand veranderde pas weer toen, na het verraad van Rennenberg, in Juli 1580 Delfzijl als laatste steunpunt op de Eems verloren ging. Daarop werd de bezetting weer hervat en ononderbroken voortgezet tot de val van Groningen in 1594, waarna de heffing der licenten alleen nog op de Verse Eems nodig was en zonder een zeegaande vloot kon geschieden. Deze Eemseskaders zijn een weinig bekend deel van de geschiedenis van ons zeewezen, dat door Backer Dirks haast in de rubriek kaapvaart werd ondergebracht. Het is de school waarin o.a. de vice admiraal Johan Gerbrandtsz gevormd is.

De bezetting der Binnenstromen.

Dit moet het moeilijkste deel van de licentregeling geweest zijn die een kunstmatige grens door de lage landen trok met een aanzienlijk verschil in prijzen ter weerszijden ervan. Hierdoor ontstond de mogelijkheid van allerhande smokkel, lorredraaijerij geheten, die tegengegaan moest worden. Bovendien was deze grens lang en aan beide zijden ruim van vaartuigen en schippers die wat wilden verdienen voorzien, terwijl de nood soms hoog was. Zo ging in Februari 1575 niet minder dan 3000 Last graan, oorspronkelijk in Emden binnengebracht, van Kuinre naar Amsterdam, zonder dat er licent op betaald was. Dit was dan ook een ernstige aansporing voor het Noorderkwartier zo spoedig mogelijk zijn Zuiderzee flotilje van 8 schepen in zee te brengen teneinde verdere licent ontduiking tegen te gaan.

De bezetting der binnenstromen werd tussen de drie thans bestaande Admiraliteiten verdeeld. Hierbij zorgt: Nqr voor Zuiderzee en IJssel; Z. Holland voor de grote rivieren en Z. Hollandse stromen ; Zeeland voor de Honte, Schelde en tussenwateren tot Ooltgensplaat.

Het heffen van licenten betekende, dat men kantoren moest hebben waar deze betaald konden worden, ambtenaren die de juiste naleving controleerden, schepen die tegen smokkel te water waakten of langs zij waarvan verbodemd kon worden, voorgeschreven routes welke de karren naar vijanden land moesten gebruiken enz. ; zelfs heeft de Rotterdamse Admiraliteit wel een „Rydende commies in de Heide omtrent Maestricht" gehad, teneinde toezicht op het grensoverschrijdend vervoer te houden. Speciaal het gebied van Zuid Holland was groot en daarbij de hoofdverdedigingslinie; men had er een groot aantal welgewapende en bemande schepen nodig, die meestal op niet groter afstand dan het kanon kon dekken ten anker lagen en 's nachts met hun schuyten of roeyjachten tussen de schepen of langs de wal op en neer deden roeien. Daar waar steden of sterkten aan de rivier lagen konden die een gedeelte van deze dienst vervullen, doch zij hadden feitelijk een schildwacht te water nodig welke rol de schepen of schuyten dan weer vervulden. Dat deze schepen op de binnenstromen ook een zuivere oorlogstaak hebben blijkt uit het feit, dat zij zonodig een schans konden vervangen, zoals bij Hardincxvelt. Toen het opnieuw uitrusten van deze schans te kostbaar ging worden besloot men deze te slechten, mits daar voortaan enige schepen zouden gehouden worden tot bevrijding van de dijk en de stromen. Ook deze schepen konden echter slechts met veel moeite worden bekostigd zoals blijkt uit een resolutie der Staten van Holland van 14 Februari 1575. Hierbij werd de omslag van 3 stuivers op elke morgge land tot onderhoud van de schepen van oorlog weer voor 4 maanden gecontinueerd. De eerste heffing, echter van maar 2 stuivers, was op 1 October geëindigd, zodat deze belasting, geheven van de eilanden van Zuid Holland tot bevrijding en bescherming dezer eilanden en binnenstromen, om de oorlogsschepen in dienst te houden op 1 Juni 1574 moet zijn ingegaan.



De situatie was toen blijkbaar niet zo, dat de in de Maze geheven licenten de vloot konden betalen en dit morgengeld werd zeker tot 1576 geheven. Zelfs werden bij resolutie van 21 Juni 1576 die van de Admiraliteit in Holland, i.e.

de Maze, de convoygelden, morgengelden, licenten en de impost op de granen toegestaan tot onderhoud der schepen van oorlog; het zo bekende geldgebrek van de oudste admiraliteit heeft haar blijkbaar van de vroegste tijden af geplaagd, terwijl zij het minste aantal zeegaande schepen had uit te rusten.

Blokkade.

In het voorgaande is bewust de uitdrukking afsluiting of bezetting de oude term gebruikt voor de taak die 's Prinsen vloot op grond van het plaacaat van 18 Mei 1574 vervulde, om niet in het gebruik van het woord blokkade te vervallen. Dit toch is een volkenrechtelijk duidelijk omschreven begrip geworden en de eerste echte blokkade wordt geacht te zijn afgekondigd bij het plaacaat der Staten Generaal van 26 Juni 1630 . Aan de andere kant zou een zeeman de rol die de vloot in 1574 speelde noemen het blokkeren van de kust, welke term ook verschillende schrijvers voor die operatie gebruiken. De vraag of deze actie ook volgens het volkenrechtelijk gebruik een blokkade genoemd mag worden lijkt gerechtigd.

De blokkade wordt beschreven als een operatie die tot doel heeft de vijandelijke kuststrook of haven van alle verkeer over zee af te snijden; teneinde dit te bereiken moet een scheepsmacht ter plaatse aanwezig zijn van een zodanige sterkte, dat deze het aanlopen van die kust of haven practisch zeker kan verhinderen en dit blijkens een aankondiging ook zal doen. Niet opvolgen van deze aankondiging wordt gemeenlijk gestraft met de verbeurte van schip en goed. Het is een grote ingreep in de rechten der neutralen, die slechts gerechtvaardigd is door grote belangen voor de belligerent, doch hen niet alle rechten ontnemt; dit laatste gebeurt bij het handelsverbod.

François noemt als eerste placaten in de 80-jarige oorlog die het handelsverbod invoeren die van 27 Juli 1584 en 4 April 1586 en meent in het eerste een aarzeling te ontdekken t.a.v. de rechtmatigheid ervan. De Staten spreken n.1. daarin de hoop uit, dat de omringende landen zullen toelaten, dat zij de toevoer met alle mogelijke middelen beletten zullen. Het plaacaat van 18 Mei 1574 geeft geen blijk van enige aarzeling op dit punt, maar beroept zich juist op het rechtmatige van de maatregel als vallende binnen „het gemeene regt van den oorlog sulks als dat van oude tyden by alle andere Koningrijken, Landen ende

Provinciën, in oorlog ende waapenen wesende, gepretendeert, gepleegt ende gebruikt is geweest".

De kloeke taal van deze ordonnantie en gebod laat er geen twijfel over bestaan, dat de Prins het wapen van het handelsverbod in 1574 welbewust toepast. Het feit, dat het placaat de mogelijkheid van de ontheffing tegen een zekere som gelds het licent kent maakt het niet minder tot een verbod.

Zijn de overige elementen aanwezig om tot de blokkade te mogen besluiten? Het placaat van 1574 verbiedt de vaart, ja zelfs het koersstellen, op de Spaanse Landen en heeft dit gemeen met het placaat van 1630, dat zegt „dat neutrale met haere schepen bevonden wordende uyt vyandelycke Havenen van Vlaenderen gekomen of dezelve invarende, of so na dezelve zynde, dat het ongetwyffelt is, dat sy daer in willen loopen, dat soodanighe scheepen ende goederen by sententie van voorsz Collegiën Respectieve gheconfisqueert sullen worden ". Het placaat van 27 Juli 1584 echter bevat een verbod tot uitvoer van welke waren ook naar de Zuidelijke Nederlanden (hetwelk door overeenkomstige verboden van Frankrijk en Engeland gevolgd werd) hetgeen een bepaling van een gans ander karakter is, ook al verschilt het resultaat op zee uiteindelijk weinig.

Uit de sterkte der smaldelen die door Zeeland en het Noorderquartier werden uitgerust ter handhaving van het placaat blijkt, dat een voldoende macht werd ingezet en men bepaald niet van een fictieve blokkade zou kunnen spreken. Merkwaardig is, dat het in deze tijd gewoon is deze wachtdienst ten anker te verrichten, daarmede ongewild voldoende aan een pas eeuwen later geformuleerde eis, dat een blokkade door „Navires Arrêtés" moest worden uitgevoerd, iets waar Engeland zich altijd sterk tegen heeft verzet.



*De bezetting van Duinkerken ca 1610.
Gravure in Guicciardini,
Beschryvinghe van alle de Nederlanden.*

Ned. Hist. Scheepvaart Museum.

Ook hebben we kunnen lezen, dat zekere rechten van neutralen werden ontzien. In de eerste plaats is het feit, dat de toevoer niet kortweg verboden wordt, maar verboden wordt „indien geen ontheffing

betaald wordt" reeds het instandhouden van een recht van de neutralen. Daarnaast werden nog speciale voorzieningen getroffen zoals voor de oorspronkelijke burgers van Emden en die der steden onder het Duitse Rijk. Immers, art. X van de instructie voor de admiraal op de Eems zegt:

„Wolverstaande, dat hier onder niet begrepen zyn de Steeden onder het Ryk geseeten, de oude Burgeren van Emden, dewelke met haare vrye eigen goederen sullen moogen onverhindert de Eems opvaaren, ende voorts haare goederen en koopmanschappen in de Steeden brengen onder den Ryke geseeten, mits dat deselve niet en sullen passeeren door Steeden en Plaatsen, syne Excellencie en de gemeene saake niet toegedaan zynde".

Interessant is nog daarbij, dat aangehouden neutralen niet altijd behoeften te worden opgebracht, doch „onder belofte van nieuwers elders te zeilen" zelf naar de hen opgegeven haven mochten varen. (art. XI instructie).


Het oogmerk van het placaat van 1574 heeft dit gemeen met een blokkade, dat om aan het doel te beantwoorden men het verkeer geheel onder controle moet hebben en dus in feite het verkeer evengoed zou kunnen afsnijden als er verlogelden van te heffen. De scheepsmacht die men ter plaatse nodig heeft kan niet minder sterk zijn omdat men alleen maar licent wil laten betalen en niet het verkeer geheel afsnijden. Wanneer men geen adequate scheepsmacht ter plaatse heeft kan men het verkeer niet afsnijden noch licent ervan heffen; ook voor dit laatste is nodig, dat elk schip practisch zeker aangehouden zal worden. In deze zin is het verschil tussen het placaat van 1574 en de blokkade gering en niet principieel doch gradueel; beide zijn slechts mogelijk door de hantering van de heerschappij ter zee, zichtbaar en voelbaar gemaakt door een scheepsmacht ter plaatse.

Ik meen dan ook, dat men het placaat van 18 Mei 1574 de afkondiging van de blokkade der Spaanse Nederlanden moet noemen. De overige maatregelen die daarbij behoren zoals orders omtrent de aanhouding, de opbrenging, instellen van een prijzenhof e.d. waren, zoals we zagen getroffen.

Wanneer de Staten Generaal dan ook in het placaat van 26 Juni 1630 verklaren, dat de daarin genoemde „Havenen en plaatsen ghehouden werden voor belegert, 't welck van outs in langdurigh gebruyck is geweest...", een verklaring waarvan François meent, dat zij op grond van de voorgeschiedenis niet verantwoord is, dan lijkt het zeer wel mogelijk, dat H Ho Mo hierbij denken aan de blokkadepractijk zoals deze in 1574 is ingesteld die gemakkelijk zie het placaat van 1584 vervangen kon worden door een handelsverbod, gehandhaafd door dezelfde smaldelen ter plaatse. Voorts is het merkwaardig, dat reeds bij dit eerste placaat direct de blokkade door een neutraal land heen, n.l. Oost Friesland, wordt toegepast. Daarmee werd van het eerste moment af de leer der voortgezette reis ingevoerd, dit later zozeer door het Volkenrecht, óók door Nederland, bestreden leerstuk, dat de basis werd voor de Engelse blokkade van Duitsland in de eerste Wereldoorlog.

Besluit.

Uit het voorgaande blijkt, hoeveel aandacht er in dit moeilijke jaar aan de organisatie van het Zeewezen is gewijd, waarbij de Prins niet teruggeschrokken is voor zeer verstrekkende maatregelen. Op grond daarvan kan men 1574 het geboortjaar van 's Lands zeemacht noemen. Wel is waar moest kort daarop tijdens de Pacificatie van Gent, toen door het afschaffen der licenten de middelen niet meer beschikbaar kwamen, de vloot worden verminderd tot nog maar een fractie van haar sterkte, doch Holland en Zeeland behielden deze als hun eigen macht, gescheiden van de krijgsmacht der Staten Generaal. Op de basis die was gelegd kon men echter voortbouwen en alle uit de zeedienst vrijkomende schepen en mensen zullen zonder moeite weer emplooi in de koopvaart hebben kunnen vinden door de opleving van de handel die volgde op de vereniging der Nederlanden.



*Een van 's Prinsen Smakzeilen in 1574.
Vermoedelijk het Admiraalschip.
Detail uit Slag bij Lillo.*

Abdy te Middelburg

Dat de maatregelen van 1574 succes hebben gehad wat het herstel van handel en scheepvaart betreft, valt af te leiden uit het feit, dat in dit jaar weer 989 Hollandse schepen

Westwaarts door de Sont voeren waarbij er, het zij tussen haakjes gezegd, slechts 2 van Amsterdam waren; vele Amsterdamse schepen waren nog uitgeweken in Emden.

Men bespeurt bij de schrijvers een zekere neiging 's Lands vloot uit deze jaren als nog niet helemaal echt te beschouwen vanwege de geringe afmetingen der schepen, hetgeen dan toegeschreven wordt aan de aard der door deze schepen te verrichten diensten. Toch is dit maar gedeeltelijk juist, er is een andere belangrijke factor en wel deze, dat in die tijd de koopvaarders waaruit de oorlogsvloot bijna geheel bestond klein waren. Dit blijkt o.a. uit de samenstelling van de Emden vloot in 1572.

boven	100
Last	21
schepen	
van 50	99
Last	142
schepen	
van 30	49
Last	84
schepen	
van 10	29
Last	303
schepen	

Deze kleinste categorie bevatte niet alleen schepen voor lokaal verkeer, maar vele zeegaande vaartuigen die de algemene vrachtvaart op de Noordzee en door de Sont uitoefenen. Meer dan 60% van de Nederlandse schepen die in 1574 Koningsbergen aandeden waren kleiner dan 40 Last, terwijl de Sonttol een tarief had voor geladen schepen beneden de 30 Last. Onder deze omstandigheden is het zeer begrijpelijk, als ten oorlog toegeruste schepen van 30 tot 70 Last groot zijn; deze kunnen reeds een behoorlijke bewapening voeren waarmede zij bijna overal kunnen optreden. Daarnaast komt dan het grote voordeel, dat zij zowel buiten- als binnenduins kunnen dienen en door het langscheepse tuig dat velen hebben goed bezeild zijn.

De grote schepen bleven zodoende vrij om de commercie te dienen en Nederlands vroegere praeponderante positie in de vrachtvaart naar Oosten en Westen te behouden die een voorwaarde voor het voortzetten van de krijg was.

Voorlopig waren alle, in het moeilijke begin zo beperkte, middelen nodig om zich de vijand van het lijf te houden en kon men zich geen kostbare uitrustingen in verder weg gelegen zeeën waarvan het directe rendement te onzeker was veroorloven. Dit toch zouden ondernemingen zijn geweest waar men de grote schepen voor had moeten in dienst nemen en hoewel reeds in 1577 een dergelijke tocht werd ontworpen, zou het nog jaren duren voordat soortgelijke plannen werkelijkheid werden. Het is goed hierbij te bedenken, dat ook Koningin Elisabeth niet voor dergelijke risico's voelde en zulke tochten, getuige Drake's beroemde reis met de Golden Hind, door handelondernemingen op speculatie liet uitvoeren. Voor de strijd bij huis had men zich de meest geschikte wapenen verschaft, waarvan één der belangrijkste het kleine vaartuig voor alle diensten was, dat voor de hoofdtaken van de vloot zolang Spanje geen vloot in zee bracht n.l. de verdediging naar het Oosten en de blokkade op de Noordzee bijzonder geschikt was.

Het zijn deze schepen, die het de Prins van Oranje mogelijk hebben gemaakt zijn devies voorkomende onder het Rijkswapen, dat op grond van een Koninklijk

<i>Van een Vlieboot van veertig Perfoonen.</i>							
<i>Soldye.</i>	gul.	fl.	p.	<i>Kostgeld.</i>	gul.	fl.	p.
Een Capitein	24	0	0		10	0	0
Schipper	20	0	0		10	0	0
Stuurman	18	0	0		10	0	0
Koopman	10	0	0		6	0	0
Hoog-Bootsman	8	0	0		6	0	0
Hoog-Bootsmans-Maat	7	0	0		6	0	0
Schieman	8	0	0		6	0	0
Drie Quartiermeesters, elk	8	0	0	elk	6	0	0
Constapel	8	0	0		6	0	0
Constapels-Maat	7	0	0		6	0	0
Ses Buschieters, elk	6	0	0	elk	6	0	0
Drie Marsklimmers, elk	6	0	0	elk	6	0	0
Een Timmerman	8	0	0		6	0	0
Bottelier	8	0	0		6	0	0
Botteliers-Maat	6	0	0		6	0	0
Kock	8	0	0		6	0	0
Tromslaager	6	0	0		6	0	0
Provoost	8	0	0		6	0	0
Stok-knecht	6	0	0		6	0	0
Agt Bootsgefallen, elk	4	0	0	elk	6	0	0
Vier Jongens, elk	3	12	0	elk	3	12	0
Somma ter maand	282	12	0	Somma	240	12	0
Totalis	522	12	0				

<i>Kromsteeven voor veertig Perfoonen.</i>							
<i>Soldye.</i>	gul.	fl.	p.	<i>Kostgeld.</i>	gul.	fl.	p.
Een Capitein	24	0	0		10	0	0
Schipper	20	0	0		10	0	0
Stuurman	18	0	0		10	0	0
Schieman	10	0	0		6	0	0
Hoog-Bootsman	8	0	0		6	0	0
Drie Quartiermeesters, elk	8	0	0	elk	6	0	0
Constapel	8	0	0		6	0	0
Constapels-Maat	7	0	0		6	0	0
Ses Buschieters, elk	6	0	0	elk	6	0	0
Een Timmerman	8	0	0		6	0	0
Bottelier	8	0	0		6	0	0
Botteliers-Maat	7	0	0		6	0	0
Kock	8	0	0		6	0	0
Tromslaager	6	0	0		6	0	0
Sestien Bootsgezellen, elk	4	0	0	elk	6	0	0
Vier Jongens, elk	3	0	0	elk	3	0	0
Somma ter maand	267	0	0	Somma	246	0	0
Totalis	613	0	0				

Huur

Besluit van 24 Augustus 1815 het achterschip van alle Nederlandse oorlogsschepen placht te sieren welke traditie thans in onbruik dreigt te geraken na te komen, het fiere

JE MAINTIENDRAI

<i>Huur voor seiven en twintig Perfoonen.</i>							
<i>Soldye.</i>	gul.	fl.	p.	<i>Kostgeld.</i>	gul.	fl.	p.
Een Capitein	24	0	0		10	0	0
Schipper	20	0	0		10	0	0
Stuurman	18	0	0		10	0	0
Schieman	10	0	0		6	0	0
Hoog-Bootsman	8	0	0		6	0	0
Twee Quartiermeesters, elk	8	0	0	elk	6	0	0
Constapel	8	0	0		6	0	0
Vyf Buschieters, elk	6	0	0	elk	6	0	0
Een Timmerman	8	0	0		6	0	0
Bottelier	8	0	0		6	0	0
Kock	8	0	0		6	0	0
Tromslaager	6	0	0		6	0	0
Provoost	8	0	0		6	0	0
Ses Bootsgezellen, elk	4	0	0	elk	6	0	0
Drie Jongens, elk	3	0	0	elk	3	0	0
Somma ter maand	205	0	0	Somma	165	0	0
Totalis	370	0	0				

Inséré 17/11/17 BOEKEN LIVRES BOOKS Enlevé 17/12/17

Le Greffier de Neptune, Abécédaire des drames de la mer.

Ce curieux abécédaire raconte plusieurs drames de la mer, choisis parmi beaucoup d'autres, survenus de l'Antiquité à nos jours.

Une approche originale du récit maritime, des mots et des noms qui n'ont rien à voir avec le vocabulaire classique des naufrages ou des grandes catastrophes. Vous lirez des anecdotes piquantes et historiques sur les événements et les hommes.

Dans ce livre, on trouvera bien sûr l'évocation des plus grandes catastrophes (de l'échouement de la frégate *La méduse* au naufrage du paquebot *Afrique*, en passant par la disparition du *Titanic*), des plus grandes tragédies humaines (du séisme de Lisbonne en 1755, des réfugiés climatiques du Vanuatu, ou des migrants de Méditerranée), des combats navals (de la célèbre bataille des Cardinaux en 1759 aux raids meurtriers de la Kriegsmarine), mais aussi et surtout des disparitions qui n'ont fait l'objet d'aucun écho, hors de la sphère locale, mais qui font partie de la triste litanie des accidents de la mer

Le Greffier de Neptune

Abécédaire des drames de la mer.

Éditions l'Ancre de marine, juillet 2016

Jacques LABORDE, ancien de l'École des mousses de Brest, quartier maître sur la *Jeanne d'Arc* de 1962 à 1964, moniteur de voile au Club Méd, plaisancier et cadre commercial à Paris pendant trente ans, est un passionné d'histoire maritime et de long-courriers à voiles. Il a notamment écrit deux ouvrages : *Quand la mer baisse, les rochers montent*, et *À l'école des grands voiliers*, une sorte de manuel d'embarquement destiné aux jeunes de 16 à 25 ans.

Inséré 19/11/17 DOSSIER Enlevé 19/12/17

Grounding – caused by routine job in the engine room

It was winter and the vessel was drifting out- side Newfoundland waiting for an ice advisor to board and then proceed to Montreal. After a couple of hours the weather deteriorated. To stay clear of the heavy weather it was decided to sail to more sheltered waters and pick up the ice advisor. For navigation the master used 20 black and white photocopies from the British Admiralty for the area. In preparation for entering ice-covered waters, the chief engineer prepared an ice checklist, gave night orders to the crew, checked all of the valves for the cooling system and opened the steam valve to the low sea chest. Some hours later the third engineer standing watch noticed a rise in temperature in the freshwater cooling system. He called the chief engineer, who attributed the rise in temperature to a blockage in the low sea chest suction. The chief engineer closed the low sea chest valve and opened

the high sea chest valve to lower the fresh water temperature; however, the flow of seawater through this line was obstructed. The master agreed with the chief engineer to draw water from the forepeak ballast tank. The chief engineer arranged all the appropriate valves in the engine room. The master then went to the ballast control room, where he opened the necessary valves to allow water to begin circulating within the seawater cooling system, which in turn lowered the fresh water temperature. Suspecting a build-up of ice, the chief engineer unbolted the cover of the housing containing the low seawater strainer. As the crew were clearing the ice and slush, they noticed water beginning to overflow from the seawater strainer housing. The second engineer went to the low sea chest valve, where he attempted to tighten the valve by hand, but he could not close the valve. This was probably because ice was blocking the valve disk. The crew were not aware that the valve disc had not fully closed, nor did they have the visual means to verify that the valve disc had reached its closed position, as the indicator was not working. The second engineer, not being able to move the hand wheel, then attempted to tighten the valve by using an F-key, when the valve operating mechanism failed. The hydrostatic pressure on the valve disc pushed the unsecured valve operating mechanism upwards, allowing seawater to enter the uncovered seawater strainer housing uncontrollably, and overflowed into the engine room. The chief engineer, along with the engine room crew, made multiple attempts to secure the cover on the seawater strainer housing but failed, which allowed more water to flow into the engine room and flood it. Within approximately 10 minutes, the water in the engine room was about 4 meters deep and had reached the level of the grating deck, from which the crew were still attempting to secure the cover on the seawater strainer housing. Upon seeing electrical sparks, the master ordered that the vessel be blacked out and the engine room evacuated.

The vessel drifted aground the following day as no salvage tug reached it in time. Issues to be considered after the discussion :

-The charts had for the area were not sufficient for navigation. It is mandatory to have updated and correct charts onboard for the intended voyage.

- The seawater inlet should be kept at 20°C.

-The warmed seawater leaving the various main engine heat exchangers was not being recirculated to the low sea chest to melt ice.

- The steam valve to the low sea chest had been opened to prevent the build-up of ice and slush. This is ineffective and should not be done.

- The main seawater overboard discharge valve should be only kept open at 5% to 10%.

- Steam and/or compressed air to the sea chest is not a defence against ice and slush build-up, given that steam and compressed air will not be able to keep the sea chest ice-free during normal operations.

-It was found that the valve that permitted seawater to recirculate to the low sea chest was closed.

- The low and high sea chests within the seawater cooling system each have a valve that controls suction.

These valves were each fitted with an extended drive shaft. The extended drive shaft was fitted with a valve position indicator to indicate whether the valve was open, closed, or somewhere in between. If the sea chest valve discs were not fully closed to create a watertight seal, seawater could enter the cooling system by seeping in around the valve disc. The vertical plate of the valve position indicator was bent upwards and therefore no longer fitted within the slot in the fixed vertical plate.

-Follow Transport Canada's Mandatory Winter Navigation Information when sailing in Canadian waters.

Furthermore these suggestions will apply to navigation in any icy waters.

Source: The Swedish Club

Inséré 21/11/17 NIEUWS NOUVELLES NEWS Enlevé 21/12/17

Euronav says ballast water convention delay to have little impact on tanker market

Tanker owner Euronav says the delay in implementation of the IMO's Ballast Water Management (BWM) Convention for all large tankers by two years will have little impact on the market.

The BWM Convention was originally due to come into force on 8 September 2017, but this date has been deferred until 8 September 2019. The requirement of existing vessels to fit a BWM system at their next special survey after the convention came into force had been seen a potential driver for the scrapping of older tonnage given the costs of fitting a ballast water system.



"We believe that the recent deferral of the required implementation of installing new ballast water treatment systems on all large crude tankers from September 2017 until 2019 will have a negligible impact," Euronav said in its Q2 results.

"Many operators had already de-harmonised their surveying cycle arrangements in anticipation of this legislation so that the

original implementation date of 8 September 2017 would, in our view, not have been a specific catalyst for scrapping."

However the tanker owner also noted that a "significant portion" of the VLCC and suezmax fleet would pass the 20 years of age mark between end 2017 and end 2020 when both the BWM convention and global low sulphur fuel regulations come into force. It said this "regulatory window" between 2018 and 2020 would drive charterers away from vessels aged 15 years and older.

Euronav reported a second quarter loss of \$24.2m compared to a \$34.3m profit in the first quarter of 2017. While the company was still able to generate a positive result for the first half of 2017 of \$10.1m this sharply down \$153.8m in the same period in 2016.

Looking ahead Euronav warned of the likelihood of interim losses. "In the near future the tanker freight market may indeed be more challenging than in the last ten quarters and as a result the company may not generate semi-annual positive results," it stated.

Inséré 23/11/17 DOSSIER Enlevé 23/12/17

BIMCO/ICS Manpower report:Officer shortfall continues

Latest reading from BIMCO and the International Chamber of Shipping (ICS) on the state of global seafarer supply makes worrying reading with demand continuing to outstrip supply and the situation estimated to deteriorate over the next decade.

The results of the five yearly BIMCO/ ICS Manpower Report is eagerly awaited by the industry and this year is no exception with mounting concerns in industry circles over crew competence to the job in hand as well as the changing attitudes towards a career at sea. Will seafarers choose to stay at sea for longer periods of time and how attractive is a life at sea to women? And indeed what complaints do seafarers have about a life at sea?

According to the report's findings, the global supply of seafarers in 2015 is estimated at 1,647,500 seafarers, of which 774,000 are officers and 873,500 are ratings but global demand for seafarers in 2015 is estimated at 1,545,000 seafarers, with the industry requiring approximately 790,500 officers and 754,500 ratings. While this represents a surplus of ratings of 119,000, it also means that the industry is facing an officer shortfall of 2.1 %, or 16,500, likely to rise to 147,500 by 2025 (against an estimated supply of 805,000 and an increased demand in 10 years' time of 952,500).

ESTIMATED SUPPLY-DEMAND BALANCE FOR OFFICERS			
	2015	2020	2025
Supply	774,000	789,500	805,000
Demand	790,500	881,500	952,500
Shortage/Surplus	-16,500	-92,000	-147,500
%	2.1%	11.7%	18.3%

It is true that the global supply of seafarers has increased over the past five years, with both numbers of qualified officers and ratings available to the internationally trading world merchant fleet continuing to rise. The number of officers was reported to have increased by 34% between 2005 and 2010, and is now estimated to have increased by 24% in the past five years. However, the estimated demand for officers has increased by around 24.1 % since 2010, while the demand for ratings has increased by around 1%. Whereas the estimated demand for officers and ratings increased between 2005 and 2010 by 33.8% and 27.5% respectively, the trend in demand for officers has continued whilst only a small increase in demand for ratings has appeared since 2010.

According to the report, a proportion of the increase may be the result of improved techniques of calculating the estimates (i.e. using STCW certification), however, information obtained as part of the other questionnaires and surveys suggest the increases

are also likely the result of increased levels of recruitment and training to keep pace with demand.

The results indicate that the global supply of ratings appears to have increased substantially by 17% between 2010 and 2015. There could be several reasons for this, but perhaps one of the most persuasive is that certificates of ratings do not require revalidation, unlike the certificates held by officers. As the data collection was based on STCW certificates, some of the ratings may have ceased to be available for employment at sea but may still remain recorded in national databases for some time.

As the report clarifies, a basic forecast for the future supply-demand balance is calculated based on the information and data obtained for the 2015 report. The report also presents nine other possible future scenarios (some demand-side and some supply-side) that may affect the future maritime manpower situation, specifically the global supply and demand for officers. The basic forecast is that the global supply of officers will increase steadily, but be outpaced by increasing demand for officers.

The 2015 report indicates that the forecast growth in the world merchant fleet over the next 10 years, and its anticipated demand for seafarers, will likely continue the trend of an overall shortage in the supply of officers.

This is despite improved recruitment and training levels and reductions in officer wastage rates over the past five years.

ESTIMATED FIVE LARGEST SEAFARER SUPPLY COUNTRIES			
	FOR ALL SEAFARERS	FOR OFFICERS	FOR RATINGS
1	China	China	Philippines
2	Philippines	Philippines	China
3	Indonesia	India	Indonesia
4	Russian Federation	Indonesia	Russian Federation
5	Ukraine	Russian Federation	Ukraine

The current maritime manpower situation and future outlook indicate that the industry and relevant stakeholders should not expect there to be an abundant supply of qualified and competent seafarers in the future without concerted efforts and measures to address key manpower issues.

It is crucial to promote careers at sea, enhance maritime education and training worldwide, address the retention of seafarers, and to continue monitoring the global supply and demand for seafarers on a regular basis, the report says.

The estimate of the current global supply of internationally qualified and competent seafarers available for service on ships trading internationally was calculated by compiling figures of national seafarers for as many countries as possible. Data on the supply of seafarers was principally collected through two questionnaires.

A Country Questionnaire was targeted at national administrations to obtain information from their records of the numbers of seafarers, specifically those holding valid STCW certificates. To obtain information on national seafarers and to avoid double counting, information was not requested about endorsements attesting to the recognition of a certificate (i.e. flag State endorsements).

According to the authors, considerable efforts were made during data collection to ensure information was obtained about as many nationalities of seafarers as possible, using other sources where necessary.

A Company Questionnaire was sent to a selected sample of companies to ensure coverage of the different sectors and trades, and to ensure the respondents were responsible for

employing a sufficient proportion of the world’s seafarers. The questionnaire sought to obtain information on wastage and turnover rates, age profiles and other details pertinent to assessing the current maritime manpower situation. Other companies that expressed an interest in completing the questionnaire were provided the opportunity to complete the questionnaire. Additional surveys targeting company experts, seafarers, MET institutions, manning agents and maritime unions were used to obtain insight and views of the current maritime manpower situation. These views were taken into account when it was necessary to interpret data obtained on the supply of seafarers (e.g. to determine whether the seafarers were qualified and available to the world merchant fleet).

The estimate of the current global demand for seafarers was calculated by multiplying world merchant fleet figures for each relevant ship type and tonnage range by the estimated average operational manning levels and average MBRs estimated for each ship type and tonnage range.

World merchant fleet data used in the report was based on information from IHS Fairplay. The ship types and tonnage ranges were determined based on an assessment of the main shipping sectors and advice from the Steering Committee. Sizes of ships were considered because of the implication for operational crew complements on board. Some ship types were divided by tonnage ranges, whilst others were not. Data used to estimate average operational manning levels was provided by the Maritime and Port Authority (MPA) of Singapore based on crew lists from ships calling at Singapore over a one-month period. The crew list data was then differentiated by ship type and tonnage to allow average operational manning levels to be calculated. Information on average MBRs for each ship type and tonnage range was assembled based on inputs from the Steering Committee and other experts. The average estimated operational manning levels and MBRs were reviewed by the Steering Committee to ensure they were realistic averages. The additional surveys provided further information on the global demand for seafarers.

RANK/ROLE PERCENTAGE TURNOVER PER ANNUM	
RANK/ROLE	PERCENTAGE TURNOVER PER ANNUM
Deck officers - Management level	8%
Deck officers - Operational Level	10%
Engineer officers - Management Level	11.6%
Engineer officers - Operational Level	8.2%
Other officers - Operational level	5.3%
Ratings - Support level	10.6%

When it comes to estimated crew turnover and wastage rates, some seafarers who leave their current employers may simply transfer to another company, take extended leave or attend training courses but remain available for further work at sea – referred to as “turnover” within

the report.

Other seafarers will decide to leave their current employers because they have chosen to retire, obtain shore-based employment, become medically unfit for work at sea or, for some other reason, cease to be available for employment at sea – referred to as “wastage” within the report.

According to the report, the primary role of a company crewing department is to ensure that the ships it is responsible for are sufficiently manned with suitably qualified personnel. As a consequence, it is often secondary to document reasons for why some seafarers may no longer be part of their crew availability lists. A seafarer is either available to a company

or is not, and thus it is not always recorded whether the seafarer is part of “turnover” (joined another employer), or is “wastage” (left the sea for whatever reason). Where exit interviews for seafarers are completed or detailed records kept of departing seafarers, it may be possible to gain a better indication of turnover and wastage rates. Varying degrees of detail in company records can make it difficult to provide the information used to estimate the number of seafarers who leave the sea each year. In the Company Questionnaire, companies were asked to estimate turnover and wastage rates for seafarers from each of their five most important seafarer supply countries, and for each rank and role.

The results varied considerably between companies and for the seafarer supply countries identified. For example, some companies reported very low turnover and wastage rates for certain officer ranks and roles regarding seafarers from a particular country, while other companies reported very high rates for the same officer ranks and roles from that same country. However, the results suggested some broad trends.

WOMEN SEAFARERS

There have been few attempts to estimate the global number of women seafarers, despite increasing attention on attracting women to careers in shipping. The 2015 report is the first to have endeavoured to collect information on women seafarers, with questions about the gender of seafarers included in the Company Questionnaire, Seafarer Survey and MET Institution Survey. It is anticipated that future reports will be able to expand on the data collection regarding women seafarers.

The Company Questionnaire obtained substantial quantitative data about over 164,550 seafarers, including on their rank/role, age, nationality and gender. The sample does not include any seafarers serving in non-marine operational roles, such as hotel and catering personnel. It is considered a fairly representative sample of the global supply of seafarers employed on the internationally trading world merchant fleet due to the fact that the respondent companies operate a diverse range of ship types and employ a significant number of the world’s seafarers. Some basic estimates regarding women seafarers are possible from the data.

Of the 164,550 seafarer sample, 1,587 of the seafarers were women qualified and holding certificates issued in accordance with the STCW Convention.

The fact that 6.9% of officer trainees in the sample were women indicates a positive and likely increasing trend of women seafarers for the future. It is equally positive that the largest percentage of women seafarers in the sample were in the process of training to be officers. Based on there being an estimated 1,647,500 seafarers, and the sample data indicating that approximately 1% were female, it could be estimated that there may be around 16,500 women seafarers currently forming part of the global supply of seafarers.

Inséré 25/11/17 NIEUWS NOUVELLES NEWS Enlevé 25/12/17

Une chère prolongation de dette soulage temporairement Exmar

Les détenteurs d'obligations du transporteur maritime de gaz naturel liquéfié ont donné leur accord mardi au cours d'une assemblée à la prolongation de deux ans d'un emprunt d'un milliard de couronnes norvégiennes.

JENNIFER MILLE


L'action Exmar a bien réagi après le vote des détenteurs d'obligations de la société en faveur du prolongement de deux ans de l'emprunt émis en couronnes norvégiennes (NOK) pour un montant d'un milliard de NOK, soit 105 millions d'euros.

Cependant, cette prolongation pourrait coûter cher au transporteur maritime de gaz liquéfié, car le rendement de cette obligation passe de 5,4% à 9%. «Exmar prévoit de rembourser les 105% du capital de cette obligation, explique Youri Huygen, analyste chez L'investisseur. Mais 9% de rendement, c'est énorme pour prolonger un emprunt. Dans les obligations à haut rendement, ce rendement se limite à 5%.»

Mais selon l'analyste, ce prolongement pourrait s'avérer positif pour le titre car «Exmar obtient une option pour rembourser son obligation anticipativement». En effet, la société peut exercer un «call» sur son obligation avant l'échéance de celle-ci.

Mais elle doit remplir certaines conditions. L'obligation peut être remboursée anticipativement à 112,5% si Exmar augmente son capital de 50 millions de dollars, ou si le groupe parvient à louer le Caribbean FLNG, actuellement en inactivité. «Exmar pourrait exercer son call d'ici quatre mois au lieu de payer pendant deux ans 9%», souligne Youri Huygen. Le titre Exmar, qui avait progressé après l'annonce, a terminé sur un repli de 0,17%

Défis à court terme



Le transporteur maritime n'est pas complètement sorti d'affaire avec le prolongement de l'échéance de son obligation en couronnes norvégienne. Chez KBC Securities, l'analyste David Vagman relève dans une note datant du 14 juin que le groupe doit «trouver un financement et une utilisation pour le Caribbean FLNG, de l'ordre de 200 millions de dollars, et pour leFRSU, de l'ordre de 84 millions de dollars, ce qui reste un challenge majeur à court terme».

Chez l'investisseur, Youri Huygen temporise. «La direction d'Exmar a laissé entendre qu'elle se trouve en négociation avec pas mal de parties. Elle a beaucoup promis ces derniers mois. Dans le cas du Caribbean FLNG, une vente pourrait d'ici quelques semaines alors pour le FRSU, la fin de l'année paraît une échéance probable.»

L'endettement d'Exmar reste aussi un défi majeur pour la société. Fin 2016, la dette de la compagnie maritime atteignait 559 millions d'euros, soit cinq fois l'Ebitda (résultat d'exploitation brut) de 1116,5 millions.

Certains analystes estiment que cette dette pourrait doubler à court terme en raison des 300 millions de dollars d'investissement prévus et de l'argent que la compagnie doit encore mettre sur la table pour la livraison du projet Caribbean.

Chez KBC Securities, David Vagman indique s'attendre à une dette nette supérieure à 500 millions de dollars pour cette année, pour un Ebitda de 77 millions d'euros.

Une faillite évitée



Les détenteurs d'obligations Exmar, en disant oui à la prolongation de l'échéance de la dette en couronnes norvégiennes, ont évité à la société de faire faillite. Car le groupe devait rembourser celle-ci en juillet. Mais il ne dispose actuellement pas de cet argent en caisse. Via ses activités, Exmar ne dégage pas de cash non plus: le cash-flow d'exploitation était négatif à hauteur de 5 millions d'euros ces deux dernières années.

Le groupe a bien essayé de boucler un nouvel emprunt mais, malgré un taux de plus de 10% et un rond show avec quatre banques scandinaves, les investisseurs n'ont pas répondu présents.

Les actuels détenteurs d'obligations n'avaient que très peu de marge de manœuvre en comparaison avec les nouveaux venus. Si les anciens ne s'étaient pas jetés à l'eau, Exmar menaçait de procéder à une restructuration de sa dette.

Les détenteurs d'obligations y auraient alors perdu une grande partie de leurs dépôts.

Inséré 25/11/17 BOEKEN LIVRES BOOKS Enlevé 25/12/17

Zeehelden - Nederlands trots overzee in de Gouden Eeuw

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Wie zeehelden zegt, denkt aan de Grote Drie: Piet Heyn, Maarten Tromp en Michiel de Ruyter. In de Gouden Eeuw konden echter tientallen anderen minstens zoveel aanspraak maken op die titel. Velen waren gewone zeelui, over wie bitter weinig informatie bewaard is gebleven. Over admiraals en andere vlagofficiëren weten we daarentegen veel meer. Hun levens waren vaak net zo boeiend als die van de Grote Drie. Soms omdat ze onverbeterlijke querulanten waren, zoals Witte de With en Cornelis Tromp, soms omdat ze van adel waren en enkel om die reden vlootvoogd werden gemaakt, terwijl ze niets van varen wisten, laat staan van het leiden van een zeeslag.

'Zeehelden' laat u kennismaken met die zeehelden uit de roemruchte Gouden Eeuw. Auteur Gerben Hellinga beschrijft de levens en daden van

drieëntwintig officieren die een rol speelden in de ontstaansgeschiedenis van de jonge Republiek der Verenigde Nederlanden. Het gaat over de ruzies die ze maakten, de zeeslagen waarin ze vochten en hun frustraties wanneer politici zich - vaak met rampzalige gevolgen - met hun werk bemoeiden. Uiteraard ontbreken in dit rijk gellustreerde boek de werken van de grote zeeschilders niet: Willem van de Velde de Oude en de Jonge, Ludolf Backhuysen en vele anderen. Ze geven de lezer een indruk van de strijd, die zo vaak ordeloos en chaotisch verliep, en van de schepen waarop de zeehelden vochten en in veel gevallen sneuvelde...

Frank Neyts

Inséré 27/11/17 HISTORIEK HISTORIQUE Enlevé 27/12/17

LES TENTATIVES DE COLONISATION

Les dernières expéditions menées par nos anciens au temps de la marine à voile le furent durant le règne de Léopold 1er, peu de temps après l'indépendance de la Belgique. Notre roi fut, en effet, le grand animateur de notre expansion maritime à cette époque. Il avait bien vite compris combien l'activité de la Belgique avait besoin d'un exutoire dans les pays d'outre-mer.

Notre brève union à la Hollande après 1815 nous avait valu la jouissance du vaste empire colonial néerlandais. La révolution de 1830 nous ferma ces débouchés. Le protectionnisme commercial pratiqué par la plupart des États européens compliquait encore les choses pour nous. L'industrie belge était beaucoup trop développée pour le seul marché national. Le paupérisme sévissant en Flandre - un tiers de la population au moins vivait de charité dans cette région essentiellement agricole souffrant d'une surabondance de main d'œuvre atteignait les proportions catastrophiques.

De sa longue et intime fréquentation des cercles dirigeants britanniques, le nouveau souverain avait conservé a conviction profondément ancrée des avantages qui résulteraient pour le jeune royaume d'une politique commerciale libérale. Dès son événement au trône, il chercha dans la colonisation un remède à la misère et au chômage régnant dans le pays. Seule la création d'établissements outre-mer permettrait, estimait-il, de combattre la gangrène en organisant l'émigration et en dotant notre industrie de débouchés diversifiés. «La Belgique repliée sur elle-même, affirmait-il, est une chaudière sans soupape.

Pour rompre le carcan qui étouffait la Belgique et mener à bien son programme d'expansion, il lui fallait deux moyens. Une marine militaire qui devait, non seulement assurer la défense des eaux territoriales, mais aussi fournir un appui logistique à ses projets de colonisation et une marine de commerce pour relier les nouveaux marchés à la mère patrie.

Il se heurta à beaucoup d'incompréhension et d'opposition dans les milieux dirigeants mais réussit, néanmoins, à atteindre ces deux objectifs. Si l'esprit d'entreprise et l'intelligence des affaires étaient encore peu développés dans le pays, il se trouvait heureusement comme aux siècles passés des Belges audacieux qui comprenaient tout le prestige et le profit que la Belgique pourrait tirer d'une expansion dans les pays lointains.

La Marine Royale fut créée en 1832 et, deux ans plus tard déjà, une partie de ses cadres fut mise à la disposition des quelques armateurs anversoises, demeurés dans la Métropole qui possédaient des navires pour a navigation au long cours mais se trouvaient dans l'impossibilité de recruter sur place des équipages compétents. Cela permit à ceux-ci d'effectuer bientôt des expéditions commerciales à Alger, Malte, Tunis au Brésil et en

Extrême-Orient. En 1840, une marine marchande belge avait été reconstituée ; 160 navires battaient pavillon national. Ces premières tentatives d'expansion eurent des résultats fructueux; l'industrie reprit son essor, le pays commença à sortir du marasme.

Pourtant, aux yeux de Léopold 1er, ces résultats demeuraient insuffisants. Développer des relations commerciales avec l'étranger, c'était bien ; créer des établissements permanents outre-mer lui semblait mieux encore. Le malheur voulut que toutes les tentatives de colonisation faites durant son règne se soldassent par des échecs. Manque de cohérence, de vision globale des choses, de moyens financiers, de personnel compétent ? Sans doute, mais surtout : pusillanimité et manque de conviction des hommes politiques.

On ne peut pas dire que le Roi n'ait pas tout essayé. On estime à une cinquantaine le nombre de projets et essais de colonisation envisagés à l'époque. Des occasions se présentèrent d'acquérir des possessions aux Antilles, en Nouvelle Zélande, sur la Côte d'Or, aux Philippines, en Australie, dans le golfe du Bengale, etc. Elles ne furent pas saisies.

Santo Thomas

La première entreprise sérieuse de colonisation fut tentée en Guatemala. Au mois d'Octobre 1841 fut constituée à Bruxelles la «Compagnie Belge de Colonisation », ayant pour but de «créer des établissements agricoles, industriels et de commerce dans les différents États de l'Amérique Centrale et autres lieux.

Le Conseil d'Administration de cette compagnie avait racheté à une compagnie anglaise à charte ses droits sur une concession non exploitée de 500.000 hectares (le 6e du territoire de la Belgique) située dans le district de Santo-Thomas (Guatemala). Le Roi subordonna son patronage à l'obligation d'envoyer sur place une commission d'Exploration chargée de vérifier l'exactitude des rapports et documents fournis par la compagnie anglaise et d'évaluer de manière précise les avantages et inconvénients que présentait la région et les chances de réussite de l'exploitation de la concession.

La Commission d'Exploration, dirigée par le colonel du génie De Puydt, quitta Anvers le 9 Novembre 1841 à bord de la goélette ' Louise Marie » de la Marine Royale, un bâtiment de 200 tonneaux armé de dix caronades construit par les chantiers brugeois Van Ghelwe et commandé par le Lieutenant de Vaisseau Petit. Elle se composait d'agents de la Compagnie Belge de Colonisation (dont De Puydt) et de représentants du gouvernement. Après 59 jours de voyage, elle arriva dans la baie de Santo-Thomas au fond du golfe du Honduras.

Tandis que le colonel De Puydt se rendait à Guatemala City pour y négocier avec le gouvernement les conditions d'acquisition des terres - le prix sera fixé à 80.000 dollars en espèces, 2.000 fusils et 6 canons de campagne, le reste de la commission s'éparpilla pour étudier la région. Au bout de deux mois, tout ce petit monde réembarqua sur la «Louise Marie» pour le voyage de retour.

Le rapport remis par la commission était élogieux. Il n'y avait pas de contrée plus saine que le district de Santo-Thomas : pas de fièvres, ni de maladies endémiques. Le pays était beau et riche en produits de toute sorte : bois, café, riz, maïs, canne à sucre, fruits. Il suffisait de travailler aussi peu que le font les Indiens, c'est à dire le quart du travail journalier d'Europe» pour couvrir la terre de toutes sortes de moissons. Un acre de terre vierge devait largement suffire à nourrir son homme au bout de quatre à cinq mois, le temps nécessaire pour le défricher et le mettre en production. Les hommes qu'il faut envoyer ici, précisait le rapport, doivent être des paysans, des charpentiers et menuisiers, des bûcherons et surtout des cultivateurs, mais il convient que le premier convoi se compose de 15 à 20 familles ayant des ressources pour passer les premiers six mois; enfin un prêtre connaissant l'espagnol ou disposé à l'apprendre».

Cette vision optimiste des choses n'était pas partagée par le Lieutenant de Vaisseau Petit qui ne donnait pas six mois aux colons européens non habitués à vivre comme les indigènes

pour connaître la ruine, ni par le médecin du bord qui soulignait les inconvénients des marécages et forêts, «vrais réceptacles de miasmes putrides et pullulant de nuées d'insectes malfaisants engendrés par la chaleur et l'humidité».

On ne tint pas compte de leur avis. Forte du patronage du Roi et des capitaux (privés) qu'elle avait réunis par souscription, la Compagnie Belge de Colonisation se livra à une importante campagne de publicité en faveur de son initiative, pompeusement baptisée la «Nouvelle Belgique». Elle rencontra un indéniable succès. S'il ne fallait que six mois pour commencer à gagner sa vie à Santo Thomas, cet endroit apparemment paradisiaque, pourquoi demeurer au pays avec, pour beaucoup, comme seules perspectives d'avenir le chômage et la misère ? On se pressa au portillon de la Compagnie, qui dût refuser du monde.

Un premier groupe d'émigrants quitta Anvers le 16 Mars 1843 à bord de deux bricks nolisés pour la circonstance, le «Théodore» et le «Ville de Bruxelles», escortés par la «Louise Marie» sur laquelle avait embarqué le directeur de l'expédition, l'ingénieur des Ponts et Chaussées Pierre Simons. Ce groupe, assez hétéroclite, se composait de 79 personnes, dont une vingtaine d'hommes de métier (bûcherons, charpentiers, fondeurs, mécaniciens...), 24 employés d'Administration, 2 pères Jésuites, un boulanger, un cuisinier, plus une poignée d'aventuriers et d'hommes sans profession.

L'expédition partit sous de mauvais auspices. L'état de santé de l'ingénieur suscita bien vite l'inquiétude du lieutenant de vaisseau Petit. À l'escale de Santa Cruz de Ténériffe, quatre médecins en confirmèrent la gravité et tentèrent de le dissuader de continuer son voyage. Mais Simons refusa d'abandonner ses compatriotes et supplia Petit de l'embarquer. Celui-ci finit par accepter pour, précisa-t-il dans son rapport, «respecter les dernières volontés d'un mourant».

La «Marie Louise» quitta Santa Cruz le 5 Mai. Simons mourut neuf jours plus tard au passage des Tropiques.

Ce fut la douche froide pour le moral des émigrants ; Simons était le seul homme réellement compétent, énergique et décidé de l'expédition. Dès l'arrivée à Santo Thomas, la pagaille s'installa. Rien n'avait été préparé pour accueillir les arrivants. Tout était à faire, à commencer par construire un semblant de campement sur un sol qu'il fallait aborder la hache à la main. Avec l'aide de quelques indigènes on construisit, sans plan préétabli, quelques cases sur un terrain à demi défriché pour abriter provisoirement les colons, mais on ne tarda pas à constater que le matériel importé était tout à fait insuffisant pour jeter les bases d'un véritable établissement. L'avenir s'annonçait sombre. Au point que dix des nouveaux venus choisirent de retourner en Belgique avec la «Louise Marie» et le «Théodore».

Des mois s'écoulèrent sans que la moindre nouvelle de la colonie ne filtre dans le public. La Compagnie incriminera plus tard les responsables de l'établissement pour l'absence de compte-rendu et rapports ; le fait est qu'elle avait tenu à cacher des informations peu encourageantes: un certain nombre de colons avait émigré vers des régions au climat plus favorable que celui de Santo-Thomas, d'autres étaient morts.

En 1844, elle arriva malgré tout à recruter encore quelque huit cents agriculteurs et leur famille pour aller renforcer les effectifs déclinant de la colonie.

Huit navires furent affrétés pour leur transport. Le major Guillaumot, directeur de l'établissement avait cependant tenté d'ouvrir les yeux des recruteurs sur l'illusion qu'on pouvait encore avoir au sujet du «paradis» de Santo-Thomas.

C'est le même major Guillaumot qui, avant de présenter sa démission à la Compagnie, lui adressa un rapport consacré au taux de mortalité élevé enregistré sans la colonie suite à l'insalubrité de la région où elle avait été créée. «Il y a des jours où les cadavres ne peuvent plus être enterrés faute de bras pour creuser les fosses, faute de mains pour clouer les

bières. La ville est toujours par une pluie incessante et continuellement enveloppée d'une atmosphère humide et brumeuse qui rend la voie du cimetière impraticable. Une brouette est la seule ressource que nous avons, dans ces temps de calamité, pour charrier par un seul homme les nombreuses victimes de la maladie pestilentielle qui sévit horriblement sur nous». Il exagérait à peine, puisqu'entre mai 1843 et novembre 1845, 412 décès avaient été déplorés.

En avril 1845, la «Louise Marie» retourna à Santo-Thomas pour la quatrième fois ; elle y resta six mois, son personnel ayant reçu pour mission d'établir un relevé topographique et hydrographique de la région. Celui-ci ne put que constater «le spectacle navrant» qu'offrait la colonie où régnait une épidémie de fièvre jaune. Le moral y était au plus bas. Nombreux furent les candidats au rapatriement à bord de la goélette.

Désormais, la cause était entendue. Le gouvernement belge retira son appui à la Compagnie Belge de Colonisation, qui sombra sans gloire. Jamais, elle n'avait réussi à tirer de son entreprise les ressources qu'elle escomptait. La seule cargaison de précieux bois d'acajou qu'elle avait vendu à Anvers comme venant de Santo-Thomas provenait, en fait, de Bélize (Honduras britannique).

Les autorités belges tentèrent malgré tout de maintenir la possession en vie. Jusqu'au moment où, en 1851, le gouvernement guatémaltèque déclara caduc l'acte de cession de 1843. Le bilan de ce premier essai de colonisation était totalement négatif. En huit ans, 50 hectares à peine avaient été défrichés et le nombre de maisons construites dépassait à peine la centaine. Les causes de l'échec étaient multiples : mauvaise étude du projet, absence de direction compétente, administration déficiente, dissolution des mœurs chez les colons (En 1850, 21.630 bouteilles d'alcool avaient été importées pour 70 émigrants et quelques indigènes)... Le fiasco était total.

Santa Catharina

A l'époque où se déroulait cette malheureuse tentative, d'autres citoyens belges décidèrent de créer, eux aussi, une colonie. A Santa Catharina au Brésil.

Il s'agissait, cette fois, d'une entreprise privée, mais le fait que la partie la plus importante de la concession fut baptisée «Léopoldine» laisse entendre que notre souverain avait apporté son soutien moral à l'entreprise.

L'âme de celle-ci fut un Brugeois, Charles Van Lede, major du Génie et familier de l'Amérique du Sud où il avait dirigé des travaux hydrauliques. Fin 1841, il avait effectué un voyage au Brésil et avait jeté son dévolu sur une région de l'Etat de Santa Catharina, qui lui parut présenter toutes les conditions voulues pour y créer avec succès une vaste exploitation agricole: un territoire alluvionnaire, inondé périodiquement au cours de la saison des pluies où pouvaient se cultiver une multitude de produits allant de la canne à sucre au café, en passant par le maïs, le manioc, la pomme de terre, l'indigo, les oranges et les bananes.

Une compagnie «belgo-brésilienne» fut créée, en 1842, après que Van Lede ait obtenu de l'empereur Pedro II du Brésil une concession de 10.000 km², en bordure de l'océan Atlantique, à proximité du port de Destera. La Compagnie toucherait une prime de trente mille reis pour chaque colon venant s'établir sur sa concession avec, toutefois, l'obligation d'y amener annuellement cent familles à ses frais et de construire, toujours à ses frais, toutes les installations nécessaires pour rendre la colonie habitable et exploitable.

La Compagnie, dont le capital avait été fixé à six millions de francs, émit six mille actions de mille francs donnant droit chacune à son souscripteur à 25 hectares de terre cultivable en toute propriété et fit appel aux candidats colons.

Le 28 Août 1844, le brick «Jean Van Eyck» quitta Bruges pour Santa Catharina avec cent quatorze émigrants à bord. Deux ans plus tard, il y amena un autre contingent.

Aussi compétent et enthousiaste fut-il, le major Van Lede ne réussit pas à mener son projet à bien. Il n'était pas secondé. De plus, l'endroit où devait s'établir la colonie était mal choisi. Les moyens de communication avec l'extérieur étaient quasi inexistant. Aucune route digne de ce nom. Le Rio Itajahi, en bordure duquel avaient été créées les plantations, était parsemé de chutes rendant la navigation impossible sauf pour de très petites embarcations. Pire, ses inondations étaient génératrices de fièvres auxquelles la plupart des nouveaux venus résistèrent mal.

Vu les conditions pénibles dans lesquelles ils devaient travailler, certains exigèrent une rémunération très supérieure à celle qui leur avait été promise. D'autres désertèrent tout simplement et allèrent chercher meilleure fortune plus loin. Ce fut la débandade.

La Compagnie Belgo- Brésilienne n'étant pas à même de tenir ses engagements vis à vis du gouvernement brésilien, sa concession lui fut retirée. Son entreprise ayant échoué, Van Lede revint au pays. La colonie de Santa Catharina avait vécu. Certains irréductibles choisirent malgré tout de rester au Brésil. Ils émigrèrent, cependant, vers des régions au climat plus clément. Les uns se regroupèrent en «un établissement indépendant de toute société commerciale» ; les autres s'établirent à leur compte.

En 1855, lorsque le brick de la Marine Royale, le Duc de Brabant» jeta l'ancre dans la baie de Santa Catharina, quelques familles belges se trouvaient toujours dans la région, la plupart ayant réussi . Elles ne se plaignaient que du manque d'une main d'œuvre suffisante pour leur permettre de développer leur exploitation. Ces colons n'avaient qu'un tort, celui d'être dépourvus de titres de propriété. Un beau jour (!), ils se virent confisquer leurs terres et, le gouvernement belge se désintéressant de leur sort, furent contraints d'aller tenter leur chance ailleurs

Une colonie pour 5.000 frs par an

Léopold ter ne se décourage pas pour autant. Quelques fussent les obstacles à surmonter pour rompre le carcan qui enserrait la Belgique, il restait convaincu que le développement économique du pays était indissociable de l'expansion coloniale. Ayant compris l'inutilité de nos efforts en Amérique Centrale, il orienta cette expansion vers l'Afrique où, trente ans plus tard, reprenant la tradition de cette politique Léopold II devait nous conquérir, en dépit de l'opposition des grandes puissances, un immense empire colonial. Une tentative de colonisation fut effectuée sur le continent noir qui, au départ, offrait de grandes chances de réussite.

En 1847, l'armateur anversois Cohen avait sollicité l'appui du souverain pour établir un comptoir le long des rives du Rio Nunez, sur le Golfe de Guinée. Des commerçants belges entretenaient déjà des relations d'affaires avec ce territoire, y échangeant des marchandises de fabrication belge : quincaillerie, cotonnades, dinanderie... contre des produits amenés à la côte par les caravanes de marchands indigènes : or, ivoire, épices. D'après Cohen, ces relations pouvaient être développées à relativement peu de frais.

La goélette de la Marine Royale, «Louise-Marie », commandé par le Lieutenant de Vaisseau Van Haverbeke, fut chargée de procéder à une enquête sur place. Elle mit à la voile le 20 décembre 1847 et rentra à Anvers en Mai 1848. Le rapport de Van Haverbeke était éminemment favorable. En fait, le Lieutenant de Vaisseau était tellement enthousiaste qu'outrepassant les instructions ministérielles qui lui avaient prescrit une simple enquête, il avait pris l'initiative de conclure un traité avec Lamina, roi des Nalous, qui cédait en pleine propriété au roi des Belges les deux rives du Rio Nunez (sur une largeur de 1.500 mètres et jusqu'à 60 kilomètres à l'intérieur) contre une redevance annuelle de 1.000 gourdes (5.000 francs belges de l'époque) payable en marchandises «au cours du jour».

Assuré de ne pas obtenir l'approbation du Parlement en dépit de la modicité de l'investissement, le gouvernement transforma ce traité politique en une simple acquisition

de territoire et préleva le montant de la redevance due à Lamina dans un fonds affecté au développement de nos relations commerciales avec l'étranger.

Le 31 Décembre 1848, la Louise-Marie retourna au Rio Nunez, toujours sous le commandement du Lieutenant de Vaisseau Van Haverbeke. Celui-ci avait reçu pour mission de faire ratifier le traité provisoire, de prendre possession du territoire et d'établir des relations commerciales avec la contrée.

Sur place la situation avait évolué. Du fait du chef d'une peuplade voisine des Nalous, Majoré, roi des Landoumas que tous les commerçants de la région, de quelque nationalité qu'ils soient considéraient comme un oppresseur odieux et comme le seul obstacle au commerce de la rivière auquel il ne cessait de susciter toutes les entraves possibles, toujours sans motif et dans de fréquents moments d'ivresse».

Excités par des commerçants anglais établis sur son territoire, jaloux de la concurrence de leurs homologues belges et français installés sur celui des Nalous, Mayoré avait fait plusieurs incursions sur les terres de Lamina, commettant de multiples exactions et semant la terreur. Les commerçants français et belges se placèrent sous la protection de Van Haverbeke. Pour rétablir l'ordre et le calme dans la région, celui-ci n'eut d'autre recours que d'intervenir par la force contre les Landoumas.

Le 23 Mars 1849, à l'aube, la «Louise-Marie» quitta son mouillage pour remonter le Rio Nunez avec la marée. Elle était suivie du trois-mâts belge «Emma» de l'armement Cohen réquisitionné par Van Haverbeke et dont la cargaison avait été déchargée et remplacée par un stock d'armes et de munitions et un hôpital de fortune, et par la goélette «La Dorade» appartenant à un résident français.

Après trois heures de navigation difficile, les trois navires arrivèrent à hauteur de Walkaria. Pour la »Louise-Marie», c'était le bout de la course ; elle ne pouvait remonter plus haut à cause de son tirant d'eau. Laissant le navire à la garde de son second, Van Haverbeke monta à bord de «La Dorade» qui rejoignit bientôt «l'Emma». L'une et l'autre arrivèrent le 24 Mars, vers 8 heures, en vue de Debocca, la capitale de Majoré, un village de cases en terre battue dominant les collines que l'on atteignait péniblement par des gradins irrégulièrement taillés dans le roc.

Les Landoumas les attendaient. Conseillés par deux commerçants anglais, ils avaient très habilement disposés leurs défenses. Une forte barricade avait été élevée face au débarcadère. Quatre bouches à feu consolidaient la position qui était tenue par une ligne de guerriers dissimulés dans les hautes herbes.

Ordre fut donné d'ouvrir le feu des obusiers sur le village.

Les Landoumas répliquèrent à coups de canons et de fusils. Au bout d'une demi-heure, une accalmie se produisit, à la faveur de laquelle une bonne centaine d'hommes, répartis sur quatre canots, débarquèrent. A l'arme blanche, sans tirer un coup de feu, mais protégés par l'artillerie des navires, les marins gravirent la colline sous un feu nourri et se jetèrent sur les positions des Landoumas. Ceux-ci les abandonnèrent bien vite pour se réfugier dans le village qu'ils défendirent case par case. Cette fois, les assaillants firent usage de leurs armes à feu. Le village fut enfin conquis et livré aux flammes. Pour faire bonne mesure, Van Havebeke envoya encore une demi-douzaine d'hommes à terre pour aller mettre le feu au deuxième village de Majoré, là où le chef avait entreposé le produit de ses rapines. C'en était fini du roi des Landoumas.

L'engagement avait coûté aux hommes de Van Haverbeke deux tués et neuf blessés plus ou moins graves. Les pertes chez les Landoumas étaient beaucoup plus élevées. Au cours du voyage de retour, les deux navires furent encore attaqués des deux rives par les indigènes, dissimulés derrière des buissons.

L'Enseigne de Vaisseau Dufour fut sérieusement blessé par une balle dans la gorge, mais il s'en tira grâce aux soins du médecin du bord.

L'affaire de Debocca se termina au mieux. Le frère aîné de Majoré, Tongo, fut intronisé roi des Landoumas; il s'empressa de concéder à la Belgique un nouveau territoire en amont de Debocca et des droits de navigation sur le Rio Nunez.

Les commerçants français et belges établis sur le territoire des Nalous allaient pouvoir vaquer à leurs occupations en paix.

S'il se trouva quelques députés belges pour blâmer l'intervention de Van Haverbeke au Rio Nunez, celui-ci n'en reçut pas moins la croix de chevalier de l'ordre de Léopold et fut créé, ainsi que trois de ses officiers, chevalier de la Légion d'honneur pour avoir rendu de «signalés services' aux colons français.

La «Louise-Marie retourna au Rio Nunez en 1849, en 1850 et encore en 1852 pour assurer la sécurité de la colonie à nouveau menacée par Majoré, qui avait repris le pouvoir chez les Landoumas. Ses relations commerciales avec la Belgique n'en continuaient pas moins à se développer ; nos exportations vers cette région atteignaient la valeur d'un million et demi de francs (de l'époque) par an.

Ce n'était pas suffisant aux yeux du Parlement, mais il n'était guère possible de faire mieux, sauf à créer un établissement officiel qui maintiendrait l'ordre et stimulerait l'initiative des milieux commerciaux. Les visites épisodiques de la «Louise-Marie étaient absolument insuffisantes pour assurer la sécurité des intérêts qui se seraient engagés au Rio Nunez. Malheureusement, la désastreuse expérience de Santo Thomas était encore présente dans tous les esprits ; il était hors de question de se lancer dans une nouvelle aventure. On ne vit plus de navire de la Marine Royale sur la côte africaine. Et, en 1854, le vicomte Vilain XIII annonça, sous les applaudissements, à la Chambre des Représentants que la Belgique ne payerait plus la redevance annuelle de 5.000 francs au roi des Nalous. Il n'y a pas de petites économies !

Ainsi le gouvernement abandonnait-il nos commerçants qui, sur foi du traité conclu avec Lamina en 1848, avaient engagé des capitaux au Rio Nunez. Toujours ce manque de volonté politique et cette pusillanimité qui ont, trop souvent caractérisé nos gouvernants ! Sept ans plus tard, la France reprit notre précaire établissement colonial, tirant ainsi profit des efforts réalisés, avec l'appui du Roi, par une poignée de Belges entreprenants, et en fit la base de ce qui allait devenir la belle colonie du Niger.

C'était la fin de la politique d'expansion par l'expatriation de Léopold 1er.

Notre premier souverain avait mis en pratique l'adage : «point n'est besoin d'espérer pour entreprendre, ni de réussir pour persévérer. Il n'avait été suivi que par une minorité de compatriotes dynamiques du secteur privé. Cette politique fut heureusement reprise par son fils, Léopold II, qui, ayant appris des tentatives faites par son père, que dans notre pays rien d'enthousiasmant ne pouvait obtenir un appui officiel, nous dota presque «contre notre goût" d'un riche empire colonial.

C'était aussi, ailleurs comme chez nous, la fin de la marine à voile qui, très souvent, avait démontré la valeur de nos hommes de la mer.

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Ships' age will determine the way to reach compliance with latest IMO decision on low sulphur marine fuels

As the global shipping industry is still pondering on the latest decision by the IMO's Marine Environment Protection Committee (MEPC), ship owners have started carving out their strategy in order to gain compliance with the latest rules. Much will depend on available technologies to get there, i.e.

LNG Fuels, Scrubbers, or burn compliant fuels, as well as each owner's fleet age profile, as older vessels might be hard to justify new investments in expensive technologies. It's worth remembering that MEPC convened to set the implementation date to reduce the global sulphur content of bunker fuels at 0.5% from 2020, down from 3.5% (outside existing emission control areas) today. Much debate surrounded whether implementation should be deferred to 2025 in order to give the refining sector more time to adjust. However, the report commissioned by the IMO found that the refining sector would be capable of delivering sufficient quantities of low sulphur fuel by 2020, despite many industry participants claiming the contrary.

So what are the implications? According to the latest weekly report from shipbroker Gibson, "shipowners now have a choice: install abatement technology (scrubbers), invest in new engines to burn alternative fuels (LNG) or burn compliant fuels (e.g. 0.5% Marine Gas Oil (MGO)). In the longer term, abatement technology and LNG may well become the dominant routes to compliance. Right now, scrubber technology remains in its infancy and the costs are high with some industry bodies suggesting the cost could range from \$3-10 million depending the size and type of vessel, as well as the ease of installation.

Even if costs do fall over the coming years and the technology improves, such investment on older units will prove hard to recover. For younger units the economics might make more sense, particularly if the differential between high sulphur fuel oil (HSFO) and MGO widens. However, retrofitting scrubbers may not be technically straightforward, given the requirements for additional space and waste collection tanks. Equally operators will face costs associated with disposing of the hazardous waste created during the scrubbing process. LNG remains an interesting option.

At present LNG bunkering does not have a wide enough global presence to suit tramp shipping, leading to a chicken and egg situation, which comes first, the LNG fueled ships or the infrastructure to fuel them? However, vessels are being constructed with easy conversion to LNG in mind, which appears to be a sensible option, giving owners the flexibility to convert to the fuel when the logistical, economical and technical issues are resolved. For many operators, burning lower sulphur fuels may be the most logical option, particularly for ships with limited trading life left, where recovering the cost of investment may prove tricky", said Gibson. The shipbroker added that "looking beyond the direct impact on shipping, it is important to consider the implications for the refining sector.

Current estimates suggest that marine fuel demand stands at 4 million b/d, even if it is assumed that just half of that demand is transferred across to MGO, the refining sector may still struggle to cope. Such a shift will require investment in desulphurising and coking capacity to produce the necessary volumes of compliant fuels with a separate report commissioned by BIMCO doubting such capacity will be brought online in time. Such increased demand will undoubtedly tighten the distillate market, increasing fuel prices and in particular the spread between HSFO and MGO, which could shift the focus in favour of abatement technology. A shift towards cleaner fuels may equally increase demand for

sweeter crudes which produce lower sulphur fuels, impacting upon crude trade flows”, Gibson noted.

According to the Gibson, “for operators, whilst the cost of compliance may be high, they may ultimately benefit in the long term from higher scrapping levels. On top of lower sulphur limits, the introduction of the ballast water management convention is also likely to strengthen the case for scrapping which will help tip the supply/demand balance into the owners’ favour. Whilst scrapping is likely to be higher, the risk of overinvestment in new, compliant tonnage remains, and just how supportive such regulations are for freight rates largely depends on building activity over the coming years”, the shipbroker concluded. Meanwhile, in the crude tanker market this week, Gibson said that “busy for VLCCs, as many Owners had anticipated last week. Their readiness to respond, and the consequent momentum, combined to push rates higher and reestablish close to ws 70 to the East and ws 40 to the West. November volumes aren’t expected to be quite as high as record October needs however, and the likelihood of any further significant move is slim, but equally, Charterers will find it hard to force a u-turn over the coming period. Suezmaxes maintained a reasonably solid front, but demand never got them to the point of critical mass and rates ended largely unchanged at up to 77.5 East and high ws 30’s to the West. Some hopes of improvement from that into next week. Aframaxes eased slightly to 80,000 by ws 90 to Singapore and won’t strengthen much from that unless Charterers go shopping in numbers next week”, the shipbroker concluded.

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